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Introduction: Accountability Amidst 
Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: 
Learning from Recent Cases*
Anuradha Joshi1
Abstract Conflict, violence, and fragility exacerbate the difficulties faced 
by poor and marginalised people, particularly in influencing the policy 
decisions that affect their lives. Comparing five cases in conflict-affected 
contexts, this introduction highlights a number of approaches. It emphasises 
the importance of distinguishing processes of accountability from those 
of empowerment, and recognising the complexities of the relationships 
between them. It highlights how the dynamic nature of contexts of 
fragility, violence, and conflict constrain citizen action but simultaneously 
offer opportunities for civic actors to form coalitions with new actors and 
movements. It underscores the value in viewing accountability gains within 
the longer historical trajectory of particular conflicts. Finally, it illustrates 
the core importance of narratives and framing in driving collective action 
and embedding the legitimacy of claims. The cases highlight that progress 
towards accountability is often transitory and partial, but together also 
foreground key issues that are relevant for understanding empowerment 
and accountability processes.
Keywords: citizen action, fragility, violence, conflict, post-conflict, 
accountability, empowerment.
1 Introduction
Fragility, conflict, and violence are increasingly common features of  
countries suffering from high levels of  poverty and under-development 
(OECD 2018). Estimates by the World Bank suggest that by 2030, 
about half  of  the world’s poor will live in contexts of  fragility and 
conflict.2 Such contexts are often ones where state institutions are 
weak, fragmented, and lack legitimacy;3 where non-state actors control 
territory and often provide services, and where civic space is limited 
and uneven. The big question is: under these circumstances, whether, 
how, and under what conditions can citizen-led action lead to more 
accountable and responsive institutions (state or non-state)?
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Historically, in countries with stable/consolidated states, accountability 
and responsiveness to marginalised groups have often emerged through 
grass-roots struggles – bear in mind the civil rights movement in the US 
and the apartheid movement in South Africa. Those struggles are well-
studied signposts in the history of  progress and have been markers of  how 
we think about transformational change. Drawing from those historical 
experiences and others, a substantial body of  literature on accountability 
emerged that highlighted the centrality of  information to accountability 
claims (Fox 2007; Fung, Graham and Weil 2007), the importance of  
facilitation or mediation of  citizen claims (Barr et al. 2012; von Lieres 
and Piper 2014; Shankland 2014), vertical integration, coalition building 
(Fox 2016), multi-pronged approaches (Joshi 2017), and the need to think 
of  accountability as a long-term political process that shifts relationships 
between citizens and states (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). Yet, these insights 
have been borne out of  the experiences of  relatively stable states.
Much has changed in the last 20 years. Two decades ago, there was 
an air of  optimism around the possibilities of  gaining accountability 
through empowerment from below. There was an assumption that it 
was just a matter of  time before countries affected by authoritarianism, 
conflict, and fragility would move towards democracy and related 
accountabilities. At present, we observe the opposite: increasingly, 
relatively robust democracies are becoming less so – nationalism, 
populism, and religious fundamentalism are on the rise. There has been 
a seismic shift in the ways in which both citizens and state institutions 
can connect and mobilise through the internet and related social media 
(McGee et al. 2018; McGee and Edwards 2016).
Consequently, sources of  information are multiple and often 
contradictory, making it difficult to base behaviour on facts. Growing 
inequality in most regions of  the world widens class divides and 
undermines visions of  a common future. Fragility, conflict, and 
violence seem to be spreading rather than receding. And there has 
been a growing distrust in state institutions throughout the world, a 
feature that is heightened in settings of  fragility, violence, and conflict. 
This makes the challenge of  understanding and conceptualising the 
potential for social and political action and its effects on empowerment 
and accountability in these kinds of  contexts even more urgent and 
daunting. How far do our insights from stable settings hold?
The Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research 
programme under which this research was undertaken makes a small 
start towards this enormous task of  understanding how progress can 
be made on empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict-, and 
violence-affected settings (FCVAS).4 What this IDS Bulletin hopes to 
do is to look back at recent history and identify insights from relatively 
recent experiences of  grass-roots struggles and related social and 
political change that contributed to transitory progress towards greater 
accountability of  public institutions in these contexts. We say ‘transitory 
progress’ because examples of  unqualified successes are rare, and it 
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seems too early to tell whether the progress viewed today is likely to 
continue. In many of  the cases presented here, the changes observed 
have been partial, uneven, and fragile – with setbacks already observed 
in some cases, and real possibilities of  reversals in others. Yet, even these 
accounts of  partial progress can tell us something about the pathways 
through which accountability might be sought and strengthened, and 
the conditions that enable fruitful navigation of  the uncertain and 
changing terrain in fragile, conflict-, and violence-affected contexts.
The five cases presented here – transition to democracy in Myanmar, 
civilian action in pre- and post-conflict Colombia, the anti-corruption 
protests in Guatemala, the lawyers’ movement for judicial autonomy in 
Pakistan, and the spread of  the ‘Right to Food’ campaign to subnational 
levels in India – were chosen as they are cases where we can see some 
progress on pathways towards accountability, however nascent or 
temporary. We prioritised accountability in the case selection because 
these cases are rare, and require a shift in citizen–state relations. Each 
case explores the dynamics of  empowerment and accountability, and 
their interactions.
The cases represent a variety of  histories of  conflict and potential 
pathways to accountability through political and institutional change: 
from the oldest running civil conflict in the world in Myanmar, to the 
relatively recent post-conflict peace in Colombia, to the geographically 
localised conflicts witnessed in India’s Naxal-affected states. They range 
from long-standing authoritarian regimes such as Myanmar, to countries 
where military rule has alternated with periods of  democracy as is the 
case in Pakistan, to formal democracies such as India. The reasons for the 
ongoing conflicts also vary in substance – including among the immediate 
causes: the rise of  religious fundamentalism in Pakistan, repressive 
regimes targeting ethnic groups such as the case of  Guatemala, and more 
extreme left-oriented movements such as the Naxalites in India.
Collectively, the articles in this IDS Bulletin highlight four key issues that are 
central in understanding how accountability pathways unfold in contexts 
of  fragility, violence, and conflict. First, processes of  accountability have 
to be distinguished from processes of  empowerment and strengthening 
agency. Empowerment gains might be achieved without gaining 
accountability, and, (though less likely) institutional responsiveness might 
not lead to any empowerment. Understanding the conditions that will 
foster empowerment and accountability processes independently is 
important in order to get better analytical purchase on the outcomes we 
observe. And the outcomes themselves are more likely to be precursors, 
such as overcoming fear and building trust, to the more conventional 
empowerment and accountability outcomes that are expected.
Second, the cases show how the particular dynamic nature of  these 
contexts – fragility, violence, and conflict – is constraining; but can 
simultaneously offer opportunities for civic actors to form coalitions with 
new actors and movements that enable some traction in the struggle for 
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public accountability. At critical junctures, the institutional constraints 
on agency are momentarily relaxed and provide openings for new 
configurations of  power to be sought and in some cases established 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Capoccia 2015; Capoccia and Kelemen 
2007; Houtzager 2003).
However, such coalitions by their nature are tricky and constantly in 
flux; and point to the staggered, non-linear nature of  progress – where 
gains can be made as well as lost within a short period of  time. Indeed, 
the cases suggest that any progress in the pathways to accountability 
inevitably invite backlash: in at least three of  the countries – Guatemala, 
Myanmar, and Colombia – there has been serious backsliding regarding 
accountability since the cases were selected and written up. In the other 
two countries – India and Pakistan – there has been a serious shrinkage 
of  civic space for activism of  the kind described here.
Third, the cases underscore that although such contexts are 
characterised by rapidly changing political and policy configurations, 
episodes of  claim-making and resistance have to be viewed within the 
longer historical trajectory of  conflict in order to understand why and 
how they occur, and the impacts they might have. This includes prior 
experiences with collective mobilisation, the generational internalisation 
of  fear and trauma, and the constraints those place on people’s agency. 
Simultaneously, those experiences require an examination of  the 
governance structures – the basis on which those holding power have 
exercised authority over time without constantly resorting to force. The 
‘stickiness’ of  institutional and people’s responses in the conflict period 
circumscribe the actions of  both public authorities and people in the 
present. Specifying precisely how one affects the other is a task taken up 
by several articles.
Fourth and finally, following the broader social movements literature, 
these analyses of  political and institutional change in FCVAS 
foreground the role of  narratives in driving collective action and 
embedding the legitimacy of  claims. Particularly in FCVAS, where 
the formal and rational might have less traction than in stable political 
environments, ideas and emotions seem to be particularly important in 
mobilising people. Obviously, this is not a new strategy, especially for 
political entrepreneurs, parties, and social movements. Yet, these cases 
show ways in which new framings can help create new allies, build 
coalitions, and mobilise the general public.
Before elaborating on these issues, we need to clarify conceptually how 
accountability processes in FCVAS might be different from more stable 
settings. Section 2 takes up this task.
2 Rethinking accountability processes in FCVAS
In the past few years, there has been a lot of  attention paid to 
understanding how citizen-led social and political action might lead to 
accountability. Often under the rubric of  ‘social accountability’, we have 
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new insights into the value of  vertical integration of  pro-accountability 
efforts, the importance of  scaling up local successes through various 
pathways, and the need for alliances with strategic pro-reform actors 
both within and outside the state at different levels (Aceron 2018; Fox 
2007, 2015, 2016; Pande 2008; Pande and Houtzager 2016). Yet, 
most of  these insights emerge from relatively well-functioning settings 
– with cohesive and effective states, well-established civic and political 
institutions, open societies, relatively free media, vibrant civil societies, 
and at least some adherence to formal rules and processes. How well do 
these insights matter in FCVAS?
Our starting point in this IDS Bulletin is that because contexts affected by 
fragility, violence, and conflict differ significantly from more stable ones, 
we are likely to observe different processes at work here, particularly 
in relation to empowerment and accountability, as even the terms 
‘empowerment’ and ‘accountability’ need to be understood contextually. 
Why? Three reasons stand out.
First, the features of  context. In the places we are examining, significant 
parts of  the country, often in the borderlands, are affected by fragility, 
conflict, and violence. These are places where state capacity to deliver 
public services is low, state institutions are weakly embedded, and parts 
of  the country have little or no state presence; what O’Donnell (1994) 
terms ‘brown areas’ or others have termed areas of  ‘limited statehood’ 
(Risse and Stollenwerk 2018; Risse, Börzel and Draude 2018). The 
pockets of  fragility, violence, and conflict do not mean that the state 
itself  is weak (where it is weak, however, it is by definition a brown area); 
often, it is authoritarian, with a strong capacity for repression.
Such states rely on external or point sources of  revenue (e.g. aid or 
extractives). Democracy remains nominal at the level of  regular 
elections, sometimes only a little less than free and fair, but there is little 
in the form of  a deeper democratic culture. In the pockets of  FCVAS, 
alternative sources of  authority often coexist or dominate in the form 
of  armed/non-armed groups based on ethnicity/religious or private 
interests that often overlap. Informal actors, institutions, and processes 
prevail, and power flows through non-formal, invisible channels that 
circumscribe action. Ethnic, religious, and other intersecting identities 
trump over secular, citizenship-based ones.
And social norms and perceptions of  particular actors shape attitudes 
and behaviour in terms of  action for accountability. Simultaneously, the 
internalisation of  fear and trauma borne out of  long periods of  conflict 
and violence lead people to self-censor – and inaction manifests as a 
rational strategy for the poor and most marginalised: what Pettit (2016) 
calls ‘civic habitus’. In such areas, ‘ruling’ or ‘governance’, that is, the 
process through which social coordination occurs in order to produce 
and implement collectively binding rules or public goods, depends upon 
the legitimacy of  state (or non-state) actors, as it enables rule without 
constantly resorting to force.
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For nascent democracies such as Myanmar or South Sudan, with 
limited capacities and untested political settlements, such legitimacy has 
been posited as critical for stability and preventing deterioration into 
further conflict; for example, see the recent report of  the Commission 
on State Fragility, Growth and Development (2018). Yet, as many 
authors have noted, there are diverse sources of  legitimacy, beyond 
the traditional sources of  input, process, output, and legal legitimacy 
– including social trust, traditional or religious, ethnic identity-based, 
or even charismatic leadership-based legitimacy. In areas of  limited 
statehood, Risse and Stollenwerk (2018) suggest that ‘empirical 
legitimacy’ – the social acceptance by the population of  the state’s right 
to rule – is critical for understanding governance effectiveness, as the 
presence of  such empirical legitimacy leads to voluntary compliance. 
In ‘brown areas’ or areas of  ‘limited statehood’, the big question then 
is how to understand the conditions and processes through which 
low-trust, low-legitimacy environments can be moved to be more 
accountable and evolve into higher trust, more empirically legitimate, 
accountability-oriented environments.
Second, given the challenges of  the contextual conditions described 
above, social and political action for accountability cannot be expected 
to occur in predictable forms. The limited space for civil society means 
that action is likely to take grass-roots, customary, spontaneous, and 
cultural forms. Disruption, non-traditional forms of  protest and, at least 
on the face of  it, seeming lack of  organisation are features that we are 
likely to observe. The locations of  such collective action are also likely to 
be non-traditional – virtually rather than in face-to-face organisations, 
anonymously rather than through known opposition groups, or through 
old repertoires appropriated by unexpected actors.
Such action is more likely to be nebulous and fluid, or even ‘eruptive’, 
and connections between action in different spaces less obvious. 
Violence itself  might be a form of  social and political action, viewed as 
a last resort for people who are desperate. The targets of  action are also 
diverse – from state institutions to non-state actors, including religious 
bodies, armed groups, or private sector actors – and might involve 
seeking to mobilise some of  them to influence others.
Finally, the big challenge is defining what is empirically meant by 
accountability, or even a reasonable expectation of  what accountability 
might look like in such settings – how will we know it when we see 
it? Accountability might not even have the same meaning given the 
differences in culture, experience, and expectations. Expecting that 
public officials will routinely provide justifications for their actions 
to the populace and accept any judgements and sanctions/rewards 
rendered (the traditional definition of  accountability) in these settings 
is improbable. So realistically, we are unlikely to observe the clear 
and big accountability gains that social and political action has led 
to in stable settings, such as the right to information in India or the 
institutionalisation of  participatory governance councils in Brazil.
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In fact, we are unlikely to even get the kinds of  smaller gains made by 
localised social accountability initiatives that have been tried in many 
countries. Rather, we are more likely to encounter the need for fostering 
enabling environments – that is, some public transparency, space 
for civic action, and so forth – that are precursors to empowerment 
and accountability. And progress on overcoming fear and trauma; 
incremental trust building; developing citizens’ awareness and 
expectations of  state institutions; catalysing instances of  responsiveness; 
and bolstering social actors’ cohesion, so that if  and when the broader 
context opens up, they will be better positioned to emerge and grow 
both vertically and horizontally; these are the kinds of  outcomes that we 
can expect and commend.
3 Cases of transitory progress?
The cases presented here represent transitory progress on accountability 
and unpack the interacting roles different sets of  social and political 
actors have played in their relative success. We briefly review the cases, 
before drawing out some thematic lessons in Section 4.
One set of  cases focuses directly on social actors to understand the 
conditions that enable them to achieve their objectives. Flores (this 
IDS Bulletin) traces the case of  recent anti-corruption protests in 
Guatemala by examining the strategies employed by the activists. In 
March 2015, Guatemalan youth, tired of  the corruption exposed 
through a report of  the CICIG (the International Commission Against 
Impunity in Guatemala – a UN-backed autonomous body created to 
look into breaches of  integrity in government) called for a peaceful 
non-partisan protest in the capital under the banner, ‘Renuncia Ya’, 
demanding the immediate resignation of  the president. The response 
to the call was overwhelming and protests continued every Saturday in 
cities across Guatemala until the president was forced to resign. Given 
the long-standing problem of  corruption embedded in public services in 
Guatemala, this was, ten years later, a significant, albeit limited, victory 
for the anti-corruption movement. Yet because of  elite backlash, CICIG 
is now being closed down.
Joshi and Chowdhury (this IDS Bulletin) trace how relatively successful 
national rights campaigns can reach back to the grass roots and mobilise 
in conflict-affected locations. Examining the evolution of  the Right 
to Food (RTF) campaign in the Naxalite-affected states in India, they 
show how social movements fighting for the government to respect 
socioeconomic rights can emerge and thrive in areas where they might 
compete with armed groups (termed left-wing extremists (LWEs) by 
the state), for credibility and support of  local populations. Their ability 
to do so depends, they argue, on the overlap in geographic areas and 
issues between the RTF campaign and armed groups. In the case of  
rights campaigns in India, LWEs did not obstruct the work of  the RTF 
campaign, as LWEs were not able to deliver on the basic needs of  the 
people, due to their limited resources. In fact, the tension between the 
RTF campaign’s goal of  making the state ‘work’ for the people, and the 
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LWEs’ struggles that rejected the legitimacy of  the state, enabled the 
RTF campaign to establish roots in these locations.
Similarly, Khan (this IDS Bulletin) follows the Lawyers’ Movement in 
Pakistan and its efforts towards re-establishing judicial independence 
and empowering the judiciary, from the brief  period between the 
dismissal of  the Chief  Justice in 2007 and the resignation of  President 
Musharraf  in 2009. Identifying five distinct phases of  the movement, 
she shows how the alliances forged between lawyers and the judiciary, 
with the support of  opposition political parties led to re-establishing 
judicial autonomy. And yet, as she shows, the conditions and strategies 
that led to success also ironically later led to the judiciary gaining 
too much power, enabling it to resist calls for its own accountability. 
Further, the alliances forged between sections of  the bar, the bench, and 
opposition parties in the earlier period of  seeking judicial independence, 
were reconfigured in the latter civilian period, and new lines of  cleavage 
opened within the bar and the bench along party political lines.
The remaining articles take a broader look at cases of  accountability 
where there have been transitions to new institutional settings – the 
transition to democracy in Myanmar (Brenner and Schulman, this 
IDS Bulletin) and the progress towards peace in Colombia (Justino, this 
IDS Bulletin). In both, the role of  social actors and their contributions 
to the shifts are not direct or given; they have to be ‘read’ through 
unearthing their contribution over time, from the period of  conflict 
to the post-conflict situation. Both articles argue that how social and 
political actors make demands in the period immediately following 
conflict is shaped by their experiences during the conflict.
Brenner and Schulman (this IDS Bulletin) argue that the long historical 
roots of  the political transition in Myanmar shape the possibilities and 
contours of  social and political action in the present. The role of  the 
British during colonial rule was to exacerbate fragmentation and social 
cleavages through preferential treatment of  ethnic minorities in the 
army, enlisted to control the Bamar population. They show how the 
political transition was orchestrated by the Burmese military skilfully 
consolidating its political and economic power. The role of  social 
and political action in such a context has been limited, fragmented, 
sporadic, and has been consistently opposed by the regime. These 
tensions continue to linger, and greater fragmentation post-transition 
has led not only to a proliferation of  civil actors, but also to a thriving 
‘uncivil’ society which actively fosters social divides and cements narrow 
notions of  identity.
Drawing upon the case of  Colombia, Justino (this IDS Bulletin) describes 
how both guerrilla and paramilitary groups took control over territory 
at different points of  time during the conflict over the past several 
decades. She develops a conceptual typology of  social and political 
action by population, based on whether armed groups are predatory or 
seek to dominate by establishing rules. She further breaks down social 
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and political action in each of  these contexts based on the institutional 
and economic capacity of  social actors, as well as whether their interests 
are aligned with those of  the armed group or not. Using this typology 
and evidence of  population response to rule in Colombia, she argues 
that those social groups that were able to resist armed groups during the 
conflict have been better able to push open space for their participation 
in the peace process. Yet those same activists committed to building 
peace in presumably former conflict zones are now at risk from a 
resurgence of  diverse armed actors.
Together these cases offer insights into a range of  issues that are central 
to the empowerment and accountability agenda in contexts of  fragility, 
conflict, and violence. We turn to these in the next four sections.
4 Disentangling empowerment and accountability
Those working on empowerment and accountability tend to assume 
that they are automatically mutually supportive of  one another or 
that they exist in a virtuous cycle. Our cases show that, particularly in 
FCVAS, these more often than not follow distinct paths. We trace some 
of  the issues that are raised by the cases next.
A critical point is who is being empowered (and who might be 
getting disempowered). In FCVAS, as elsewhere, social actors are not 
homogenous and processes of  social and political action that empower 
one group, often do so at the cost of  others. Brenner and Schulman 
(this IDS Bulletin) suggest that in Myanmar, donors who were funding 
civil society groups active in border regions during the pre-transition 
period, started channelling funds in the post-transition period to support 
government programmes, leading to a crisis for organisations who 
were dependent upon aid for their activities. As they show, this has 
led to a debate between donors advocating for continued cross-border 
aid (support to civil society organisations (CSOs) in the borderlands) 
to avoid disruption of  services, and donors propagating aid through 
Yangon and government channels.
Simultaneously, the experience of  resisting during the conflict can 
empower communities to be more active during the post-conflict period. 
In Colombia, Justino (this IDS Bulletin) drawing on Moser (2005) and 
others notes how women who have actively participated in the peace 
process report raised levels of  self-esteem, which leads to a virtuous 
cycle of  greater participation. By contrast, the experiences of  extreme 
violence and repression during the conflict in Guatemala led to an 
atmosphere of  fear and disempowerment in the post-conflict period, 
and it took a new generation of  youth to take to the streets to break the 
cycle of  inaction and demand accountability from the government.
Moreover, the empowered actors in our cases are not always in favour 
of  accountability. As Khan (this IDS Bulletin) shows in the case of  the 
Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan, the movement was keen to empower 
the judiciary and ensure its independence as a key institution for 
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political accountability, and yet the judiciary, once empowered resisted 
calls for its own accountability. As she summarises pithily, the conditions 
that make lawyers pro-empowerment actors may not make them 
pro-accountability agents.
And accountability itself  in these cases is difficult to assess. There are 
the rare instances of  responses on the part of  the government, but 
though the claims and responses are linked, they represent instances of  
accountability rather than ongoing accountability relationships between 
citizens and the state. In these instances, authorities routinely provide 
information and justification for their actions, opening themselves 
up to the judgement of  the public through a process of  deliberation. 
In Guatemala and Pakistan, the positive response was followed by a 
reversal in terms of  powerful actors preventing pro-accountability 
coalitions from gaining ground.
5 Unexpected coalitions and cleavages
The cases of  transitional success in establishing precursors for 
accountability and empowerment highlighted here also show the 
possibilities for unexpected coalitions for change, as well as the 
development of  new cleavages. In several cases, if  analysed through a 
historical institutionalist lens, there were critical junctures – defined as 
a ‘relatively short period of  time during which there is a substantially 
heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome 
of  interest’, that opened up the space for pro-accountability forces to 
collaborate through new configurations that challenged the existing 
status quo (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348).
In Guatemala, a reformist public prosecutor backed by the CICIG was 
able to provide credible information on large-scale political corruption 
that contributed to the rise of  the youth protests. This resulted in what 
Jonathan Fox has called a ‘sandwich strategy’, which forced a corrupt 
government out of  office by applying pressure through the reformist 
public prosecutor and the CICIG from above, and through protests 
in the street from below (Fox 2015). And yet, this did not lead to 
consolidation of  the anti-corruption coalition. After the resignation of  
the president, the youth movement splintered into two groups: those 
who supported a neoliberal agenda and those who aligned with the 
traditional left, indigenous, and peasant movements. Neither did the 
alliance between the public prosecutor and CICIG last long – the next 
president ‘directed much of  his government’s energies over the past two 
years to trying to strip CICIG of  its authority’ (Malkin 2019).
Similarly, the Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan started from an 
unexpected alliance between lawyers and judges reacting to the 
growing public anti-regime sentiment and an attack on the judiciary 
by a person in uniform, borne out of  institutional motivations of  
preserving the institutional autonomy of  both the bar and the bench 
against an extraconstitutional regime (Khan, this IDS Bulletin). And yet 
once the battle was won and autonomy was institutionalised, alliances 
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re-fractured in new ways, creating a situation where only some parts of  
the bar and bench were fighting for accountability. In India, a strategy 
of  constructive engagement with the state on basic food security and 
simultaneous advocacy supported by the national campaign, enabled 
the Right to Food campaign to distinguish itself  from LWE groups at 
the state level, by not taking up the issues of  displacement and land 
rights which were core to the LWEs’ agenda. Yet, since the passing of  
the Right to Food Act in 2014, there has been greater acknowledgement 
of  the need to work on issues of  displacement and land rights by the 
national RTF campaign; at the same time there are new cleavages 
emerging among LWEs, thus blurring the stark LWE/RTF positions 
from the earlier period.
6 History shapes possibilities
It is an oft-repeated refrain that history affects the present; yet we 
need to unpack precisely how it does so. Most obviously, in FCVAS, it 
is history that produced the conflict, fragility, and fragmentation that 
actors have to deal with in the present period. What are the factors 
that linger and cast constraints on actors? Scholarship in the historic 
institutionalist tradition has stressed the staying power of  institutions, 
through the notion of  path dependence – decisions taken at ‘critical 
junctures’ then reconfigure institutions and set in motion a new set of  
constraints within which change once again only happens incrementally.
But in FCVAS settings (and perhaps in others) when viewed from 
an accountability and empowerment lens, a double whammy effect 
might result. In what we might call ‘institutional overhang’, structures 
developed for repression and control become a drag on the new 
democratic processes. Constraints such as fear and reticence that made 
sense and were strategies adapted for a previous political period of  
conflict, become millstones for accountability action in the post-conflict 
setting. Further, often the momentary opening of  space and responses to 
claims – what we might see as accountability gains – turn out to foster 
a new set of  constraints that make future accountability struggles even 
more challenging.
As we see in the cases of  Colombia, Guatemala, and Myanmar, 
identities and fear forged and reinforced during the trauma continue 
to shape behaviours of  the present. In Guatemala, it took a new 
generation of  urban youth to mobilise on social media and challenge 
state structures; far away geographically and temporally from the 
violence experienced in rural areas by the older generation. Brenner 
and Schulman (this IDS Bulletin) take the long view of  the history of  
Myanmar to highlight how British colonial rule set ethnic minorities at 
the border against the heartland Bamar groups. This not only created 
conditions for the conflict post-independence, but also cast a shadow 
over the political transition, limiting possibilities for cooperation as 
advantages and disadvantages have become institutionally embedded 
for different groups. In India, the long history of  the LWE groups and 
their position vis-à-vis working with the state created an opportunity 
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for RTF activists to work on food security despite working in the same 
terrain, and yet the same history limits the possibilities of  what the 
RTF activists can do in the area in terms of  direct confrontation or 
challenges to the state which would be seen akin to ‘terrorist’ activity 
similar to that of  the extremist groups.
7 Framing the narratives
While ideas and narratives about values and imagination have been 
seen as an important tool for mobilising action, particularly in the 
social movement literature (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and 
Benford 1988; Gamson 1992), they have received less attention in the 
donor and project-focused accountability work which has tended to be 
initially more technical, and only recently more political. Unpacking 
cases of  success as being underpinned by the mobilising power of  
narratives, of  framing claims as stories of  moral rights and wrongs, 
bestowing legitimacy on the claimants through socially accepted moral 
norms – what might be called the contemporary moral economy – is 
relatively recent (Hossain and Scott-Villiers 2017; Hossain and Kalita 
2014; Thompson 1971). And yet, as these cases show, lurking behind 
the processes driven by institutions and interests are stories of  where 
particular frames appear to be galvanised by social actors to advance 
their cause. A few illustrations follow.
In Pakistan, what was initially considered by the populace as a single 
narrow issue, was given different guises at different moments to different 
audiences. As Khan (this IDS Bulletin) writes, the bar leaders played a 
pivotal role in constructing these multiple yet cohesive narratives to 
respond to a rapidly evolving political situation. These efforts were 
supported by a significant moment in the mobilisation when the 
hearings on the case were allowed on camera, as they further served to 
mobilise public opinion, which until then had largely regarded these 
hearings as an issue limited to the courts. Similarly, as we will see, the 
Indian RTF campaign in the Naxal-affected states used the ‘right to 
food’ framing to gather together a range of  development issues that 
different groups were already working on (from subsistence agriculture 
to children’s rights) under a collective umbrella.
This broad church strategy not only gained it a diverse membership, 
but the rights framing also directed efforts at the accountability of  the 
state (the duty bearer), allowing the campaign to underscore that it was 
interested in working with the state to make the state work for the poor, 
rather than posing a threat to its very existence. In Guatemala, the 
students mobilised under the banner of  ‘anti-corruption’, which they 
portrayed as apolitical, a matter of  good governance; thus constructing 
a popular common cause that appealed across class, ethnic, and political 
affiliations. However, as Flores (this IDS Bulletin) outlines, the movement 
later quickly broke up into different ideological streams, diluting the 
movement as well as its broader appeal.
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8 Conclusions
This IDS Bulletin set out to look at recent history for lessons on how 
progress on empowerment and accountability might be made in 
contexts of  fragility, conflict, and violence. The five cases presented here 
offer rough contours of  the issues and their conceptual underpinnings 
that might be relevant for understanding and conceptualising 
empowerment and accountability processes in such settings. Taken 
collectively, the set of  cases show that progress is possible in the 
conflict/post-conflict context despite the unfavourable terrain, but 
the paths that social action takes is heavily constrained by local 
understandings of  empowerment and accountability, the configuration 
of  pro-accountability stakeholders, the history of  the conflict and its 
effects on various groups, and how narratives are mobilised to serve 
political change. Moreover, any progress, we note, is transitory: it can 
and has been reversed. Whether or not social action is durable and has 
accountability effects, can only be judged over the long term.
As pockets of  fragility, conflict, and violence emerge in what have so 
far been relatively stable places, initial insights from these cases will 
be increasingly relevant for tackling these issues globally. Foremost, it 
seems clear that processes of  accountability and empowerment each 
move at a different pace, following their own trajectories and are only 
loosely linked. And yet, in each of  the cases, there are moments of  
opportunity when things shift and new political configurations enable 
new coalitions and action to become possible, which may or may not 
lead to accountability and empowerment gains.
One of  the key findings seems to be that processes of  empowerment 
and accountability are more likely to unfold when some precursors are 
in place that would lay out the foundations of  the pathways. A legacy 
of  conflict and repression, it turns out, plays a big part in shaping how 
actors respond to the opportunities. And the cases show that the battle 
for accountability is not only fought through formal institutions and 
against deeply entrenched interests, but also in the battlefield of  ideas, 
where simple strategies of  framing or reframing can shift the advantage 
in favour of  accountability in the eyes of  the public at large.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
  I am grateful for the incredibly helpful comments provided by 
Colin Anderson, Jonathan Fox, John Gaventa, and Peter Houtzager 
on an earlier version of  this article.
1 Anuradha Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, 
UK.
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2 See World Bank: www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
fragilityconflictviolence/overview.
3 State weakness in the sense of  the capacity and willingness to 
organise the provision of  public goods; often, they are strong in terms 
of  repression and military power.
4 For details of  the A4EA programme, see www.ids.ac.uk/programme-
and-centre/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability-a4ea/.
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Myanmar’s Top-Down Transition: 
Challenges for Civil Society*
David Brenner1 and Sarah Schulman2
Abstract This article historicises the nature of political transition in 
Myanmar to better appreciate the challenges faced by civil society. After 
Myanmar’s political reforms in 2011, Western donors rushed into the 
country in support of what they misunderstood as a remarkable instance 
of democratisation. In 2019, escalating civil war, ethnic cleansing, and 
contracting civil liberties urge a rethink. This article argues that viewing 
transition in Myanmar through the lens of democratisation has always been 
misleading and problematic. Partial liberalisation was orchestrated by the 
military to safeguard its own power. Reforms have not only benefited civil 
society but also enabled the growth of uncivil society, fuelling sectarian 
violence and bolstering military rule. Operating on the assumption of 
democratisation, Western donors shifted funds from grass-roots networks 
to militarised state bureaucracies that seek to co-opt peace-building 
and development projects for the purposes of ethnocratic state-building 
and counterinsurgency. Rethinking the nature of transition is pivotal for 
preventing inadvertently aiding authoritarianism and conflict.
Keywords: civil society, democratisation, civil–military relations, 
ethnic conflict, aid, Myanmar, transition, development, civil war, 
peace‑building.
1 Introduction
The political landscape of  Myanmar has changed significantly since 
former dictator Than Shwe paved the way for a series of  wide‑ranging 
reforms in 2011. A nominally civilian government was sworn in and 
political prisoners were freed. Most visibly, long‑term opposition leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi has ascended to power after her long‑banned 
opposition party – the National League of  Democracy (NLD) – won 
the historic elections of  2015 by a wide margin. The country’s vibrant 
civil society also benefited from the lifting of  restrictive laws on media 
and public mobilisation. Despite these remarkable transformations, 
Myanmar’s transition has seemingly slowed down and the space for 
progressive social and political action has contracted once again. 
Particularly worrying is the situation in the country’s borderlands, 
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where long‑running sectarian conflicts have escalated since 2011. In 
order to understand the challenges that persisting authoritarianism, 
state violence, and civil war pose to civil society in Myanmar, this article 
situates contemporary social and political action within a historical 
analysis of  political transition. It asks about: (a) the nature of  political 
transition in Myanmar, (b) the challenges that the trajectory of  political 
transition poses for civil society actors, and (c) the implications for 
international development and peace‑building initiatives.
This article argues that Myanmar’s political transition should not 
be understood as a process of  democratisation that is driven by 
pro‑democratic forces and which might eventually lead to liberal 
democracy. Viewing the country’s transition through the lens of  
democratisation is not only misleading but deeply problematic. 
Political reforms were planned and executed by the country’s military: 
the Tatmadaw. The emergent hybrid civil–military order safeguards 
authoritarian rule and military dominance. This top‑down nature 
of  political transition poses significant challenges for civil society. In 
combination with fragility and conflict, liberalising the public sphere 
has not only benefited progressive social and political action but has also 
enabled the growth of  uncivil society,3 whose pursuit of  exclusionary 
identity politics fuels sectarian violence.
Persisting conflict and instability in turn has benefited the army by 
playing to its self‑portrayal as the guardian of  the nation. Rethinking 
the history and trajectory of  top‑down transition is important for 
development and peace‑building initiatives in Myanmar. The rush 
of  Western aid donors to support transition without appreciating its 
intricate nature has in fact created additional challenges, including 
for civil society. The wholesale shift of  funding from border‑based 
civil society organisations (CSOs) to state‑led projects has not only left 
established civil society networks struggling for survival. It has also 
played into the hands of  a militarised state apparatus that seeks to 
co‑opt development and peace‑building initiatives for the purposes of  
counterinsurgency and ethnocratic state‑building.
The article is structured in three parts. Section 2 will analyse the historic 
roots of  fragility, conflict, and violence that lie at the heart of  persistent 
authoritarianism in Myanmar by tracing how the country’s protracted 
ethnic conflict emerged from militarised and violent processes of  
identity formation during the colonial and postcolonial era. Section 3 
will explain why and how Myanmar’s generals initiated wide‑ranging 
liberalisation in 2011 and what this has meant for an increasingly 
fragmented landscape of  civil society actors. Section 4 will analyse the 
challenges of  top‑down transition for civil society in the country’s centre 
and borderlands, including donor engagement with Myanmar.
2 The roots of conflict, fragility, and authoritarianism
Analysing the root causes of  conflict and fragility in Myanmar 
is important to understand the emergence and persistence of  
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authoritarianism and armed political orders, including the role of  the 
military and the country’s rebel groups, also known as ethnic armed 
organisations (EAOs). Contrary to an oft‑heard narrative, Myanmar 
was not a relatively prosperous and stable nation at the time of  
independence from British colonial rule in 1948. In fact, the country 
laid in ruins after the Second World War and experienced significant 
tensions between its different ethnic groups. At the eve of  independence, 
Myanmar indeed descended into what was to become one of  the 
world’s longest‑running civil wars between ethnic minorities seeking 
greater autonomy or outright secession from Myanmar’s ethnocratic 
central state. Contemporary fragility, conflict, and violence are rooted in 
this incomplete and crisis‑ridden process of  state formation.
Key to understanding persisting conflict and authoritarianism 
in Myanmar is the divide between the country’s centre and its 
borderlands, which dates back to precolonial times. Despite complex 
interdependencies, both regions have developed distinct political orders 
throughout the country’s history. Since the Bamar people established 
the Bagan Kingdom in 1044, various dynasties have ruled in the valleys 
of  the Irrawaddy River basin, the heartland of  what is nowadays 
known as Myanmar (or Burma). Similar to Southeast Asian kingdoms, 
the Myanmar polity has never fully extended its territorial reach into 
the far‑flung and inaccessible mountains and forests on its fringes. Its 
frontiers have instead been home to a dazzling array of  ethnic groups, 
including communities that today identify as Kachin, Shan, Chin, and 
Karen. Located far from the gravity of  power, these communities have 
long governed themselves with overlapping and fluid systems of  local 
authority (Scott 2009).
British colonial rule cemented the difference between Myanmar’s 
population groups by ruling the Bamar‑dominated centre of  British 
Burma as ‘Burma Proper’ and the ethnic minority‑dominated border 
areas as ‘Frontier Burma’ (Smith 1999: 40). Differential treatment of  
differently classified population groups contributed to the emergence 
of  multiple ethno‑nationalisms in Myanmar’s borderlands that soon 
stood in direct competition with growing Bamar nationalism in the 
country’s centre (Taylor 1982: 8). Preferential recruitment of  ethnic 
minorities into the colonial armed service was the most important factor 
driving this development. This pitched the country’s population groups 
directly against each other as ethnic minority soldiers were deployed 
to suppress the growing dissent among Myanmar’s ethnic Bamar 
majority and its increasing aspiration to independence. The Second 
World War deepened this divide. While Bamar nationalists allied with 
Japanese forces invading British Burma in an attempt to rid themselves 
of  colonial rule, many minorities allied with the British and their allies 
against the Japanese (Brenner 2019: 32–7). Majoritarian nationalism 
in ‘Burma Proper’ did, thus, not only develop in opposition to British 
colonial rule but also in opposition to the country’s ethnic minorities 
(Walton 2013: 8).
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This notwithstanding, independence leader General Aung San went 
to great lengths in his attempts to negotiate a federal settlement that 
included provisions for autonomy and power sharing with delegates 
from the Kachin, Chin, and Shan communities: the so‑called ‘Panglong 
Agreement’ of  1947 (Walton 2008: 889–900). Tragically, Aung San 
was assassinated by ultranationalist Bamar paramilitaries shortly 
afterwards and Myanmar’s constitution never incorporated any 
federal provisions (Smith 1999: 79). Civil war broke out shortly after 
independence in 1948 after Karen in the east and communist forces in 
the north started to rebel against the state. By the late 1950s, most of  
Myanmar was embroiled in war, which placed the military firmly in 
the driver’s seat of  postcolonial state‑building (Callahan 2003). Seeing 
that the post‑independence civilian government of  President U Nu 
proved incapable of  pacifying the country, the Tatmadaw developed a 
self‑perception as guardians of  the Myanmar state (Maung Aung Myoe 
2009; Jones 2014; Egreteau 2016). After General Ne Win assumed 
power in a coup in 1962, all other political parties but the newly 
founded Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) were banned and 
decades of  authoritarian rule commenced.
3 Transition from above
Myanmar’s generals surrounding former dictator Than Shwe initiated 
wide‑ranging political reforms in 2011 under the leadership of  
President Thein Sein. While this surprised international observers at 
the time, the initial phase of  transition was well planned from above. 
In fact, the junta’s mouthpiece newspaper, The New Light of  Myanmar, 
announced a ‘roadmap’ to ‘a discipline‑flourishing democracy’ as early 
as 2003, calling for restoring the National Convention, redrafting and 
holding a constitutional referendum in 2008, and thereafter holding 
national elections (The New Light of  Myanmar 2003).
Scholars of  Myanmar point to several drivers behind the transition. 
Many highlight that the country’s generals felt secure enough, not least 
after adopting a new constitution in 2008, in their own positions of  
power to liberalise parts of  the political system (Callahan 2012; Jones 
2014; Egreteau 2016; Taylor 2015; Ruzza, Gabusi and Pellegrino 
2019). By 2011, the Tatmadaw (wrongly) thought that it had neutralised 
viable threats from ethnic rebels in the borderlands with co‑optative 
mechanisms used since the early 1990s (Jones 2014). In addition, the 
military rulers defused any sizeable opposition in the country’s centre 
after crushing the so‑called ‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007 (Pedersen 2014; 
Jones 2014). Moreover, it seems that Myanmar’s military rulers were 
driven to initiate reforms by a desire to end the country’s international 
isolation and to diversify its international relations, especially its 
dependence on China (Haacke 2010; Steinberg and Fan 2012).
Importantly then, scholarship suggests that the swift and wide‑ranging 
reform process in 2011 was not the outcome of  mounting internal 
pressure on the streets of  Yangon or the trenches of  rebel borderlands. 
Neither was it the result of  international pressure, such as Western 
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sanctions. If  at all, Myanmar’s generals felt more secure after having 
successfully fended off interventionist calls in the wake of  cyclone 
Nargis in 2008 (Bünte 2014; Egreteau 2016: 9). The ruling military 
elite initiated the political transition in Myanmar and it did so from a 
position of  strength. To understand why and how Myanmar’s military 
leaders would loosen their grip on power voluntarily and what this 
top‑down nature of  transition means for social and political action, it is 
important to analyse the country’s long path to transition, which started 
in the late 1980s. Just before the end of  the Cold War, international and 
domestic forces started to reorder in ways that empowered Myanmar’s 
central state over its restive periphery.
Internationally, China’s and Thailand’s interests changed. Instead 
of  providing covert support to various non‑state armies, Beijing and 
Bangkok became increasingly interested in profiting from Myanmar’s 
promising economic potentials to develop their own land‑locked and 
marginalised peripheries. Myanmar’s vast but largely untapped natural 
riches – including minerals, natural gas, and hydropower – and its 
undeveloped export market, presented ideal opportunities for this 
(Jones 2014: 791; Smith 1999). Conscious that ethnic rebels could not 
be defeated in light of  the thriving smuggling economy, Myanmar’s 
military leaders concomitantly pushed for liberalising foreign trade. 
This enabled Myanmar’s state to erode the revenue base of  EAOs, 
which tipped the power balance between the centre and periphery into 
the direction of  the central state (Jones 2014: 794).
Domestically, Myanmar’s generals have managed to marginalise EAOs 
with bilateral ceasefire agreements since the late 1980s. EAO leaders 
entered these arrangements out of  a variety of  reasons, among which 
war weariness and humanitarian concerns featured prominently. They 
initially hoped that ceasefire agreements would lead to political dialogue 
and eventually a negotiated settlement of  their demand for greater 
autonomy. This did not materialise under the previous military‑led 
regimes – the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
established in 1988 after the student revolution and renamed the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. Yet, the ceasefires 
allowed rebels to retain their arms and govern pockets of  territory in 
newly established special administrative regions. Moreover, leaders of  
ceasefire groups were rewarded with opportunities to partake in an 
unregulated ‘ceasefire capitalism’: the mutual exploitation of  their area’s 
natural resources together with foreign and domestic businessmen as 
well as Tatmadaw generals (Woods 2011; Brenner 2019: 40–6).
These ceasefire politics enabled the Tatmadaw to establish itself  as the 
most powerful military, political, and economic actor in Myanmar’s 
border areas. Militarily, the Tatmadaw has rapidly expanded its troop 
size and firepower in the country’s rebel borderlands. Overall troop size 
increased from 200,000 troops in 1988 to 320,000 troops in 1995, most 
of  which were stationed in the country’s border areas and outfitted with 
US$2bn worth of  modern Chinese weaponry (Smith 1999: 426;  
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Jones 2014: 792). Bureaucratic reforms established the military’s 
regional commands as the de facto government in border provinces, 
implementing the so‑called ‘Programme for the Progress of  the Border 
Areas and National Races Development’ (Smith 1999: 426–27). 
First introduced in 1989, this top‑down development programme 
was later renamed as the Ministry of  Border Affairs and is locally 
known as Na Ta La. Its stated objective is to develop ethnic minority 
regions, mainly through the expansion of  physical infrastructure 
and the state bureaucracy itself  (Lambrecht 2008). A major part of  
‘development’ funding has been extorted from local communities 
as so‑called ‘people’s contributions’ in forms of  forced labour, cash, 
and material (ibid.: 158). Top‑down economic development, state 
territorialisation, and counterinsurgency have since merged into a 
highly securitised development agenda under direct control of  regional 
Tatmadaw commanders. The latter have used political and economic 
powers to establish their own fiefdoms (Lambrecht 2008; Meehan 2015).
Importantly, the ceasefire politics of  the 1990s and early 2000s 
weakened EAOs and enabled the Tatmadaw to encroach into previously 
off‑limit territory to an unprecedented extent (Brenner 2019: 40–46). 
Beginning in 2008, this emboldened the military to attempt to bring 
ceasefire movements under direct Tatmadaw control as Border Guard 
Force (BGF) militias. This plan largely failed and instead contributed 
to a new round of  escalation with movements that previously signed 
ceasefires, including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). 
Yet, it signified that the power balance between rebel borderlands and 
the state centre had effectively changed in favour of  the latter. The 
marginalisation of  opposition has created a sense of  security among 
Myanmar’s military rulers that was crucial for their decision to initiate 
reforms in 2011 (Jones 2014). Despite its withdrawal from day‑to‑day 
politics in central Myanmar, the military has remained the country’s 
most powerful institution.
Per the 2008 constitution, civilian authorities have no oversight or 
influence over the military. Its statutes cement the role of  the military 
as the guardian of  the nation and enable the Tatmadaw to ‘participate 
in the national political leadership of  the State’ (Constitution of  the 
Republic of  the Union of  Myanmar 2008: 6f). The constitution also 
gives the Commander‑in‑Chief  excessive authority to intervene in case 
of  a state of  emergency that could ‘cause disintegration of  the Union, 
disintegration of  national solidarity and loss of  sovereign power or 
attempts therefore by wrongful forcible means such as insurgency or 
violence’ (ibid.: 40c). Military institutions are granted excessive autonomy 
both with regard to budget, the appointment of  military personnel, and 
of  drafting their own defence and security policy through the powerful 
National Security and Defense Council (Maung Aung Myoe 2017: 262). 
Crucial ministerial portfolios of  defence, home, and border affairs are 
delegated to the Tatmadaw and 25 per cent of  the seats in both the 
Union parliament and the state and regional legislative assemblies are 
reserved for Tatmadaw delegates, thereby preventing constitutional 
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amendments to pass as such amendments require more than 75 per cent 
of  the votes (Constitution of  the Republic of  the Union of  Myanmar 
2008: Art. 60biii, 109b).
The limited powers of  Myanmar’s civilian authorities have, indeed, 
been frequently exposed. Civilian authorities, including the NLD 
have, for instance, struggled to strike a balance between market 
liberalisation, the interests of  the military‑industrial complex, and the 
sanctioning of  social and political action. This was illustrated in the 
case of  the Letpadaung copper mine conflict. Since 2010, the project 
has been operating as a joint venture between the military‑owned 
company Mining Enterprise 1, the military‑controlled holding Union 
of  Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL), and the Chinese 
firm Wanbao Mining. Since the inception, mining operations were 
accompanied by human rights abuses, including land‑grabbing and 
forced evictions, as well as severe environmental pollution (Amnesty 
International 2017). Although criticism was raised against Aung San 
Suu Kyi for not taking a stronger stand against human rights abuses, 
others pointed out that her hands were tied in light of  Tatmadaw 
interests in continuing the mining operations (Schearf  2013).
Despite the continued military dominance in the political and economic 
sphere, there is scope for change. This was best illustrated by the NLD’s 
surprising move to bring Myanmar’s main public administration body 
– the General Administration Department (GAD) – under civilian 
control in January 2019. The GAD has traditionally operated under 
the military‑controlled Ministry of  Home Affairs (MoHA). Described as 
the ‘bureaucratic backbone of  the country’, it directly controls all state 
bureaucracy on the local level, including in the districts, townships, and 
village tracts. Its 36,000 staff members, many of  which are transferred 
military personnel, are responsible for issuing licences, handling land 
management and disputes, and collecting taxes (Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and 
Arnold 2014: iii). Since April 2011, the GAD has also been tasked to 
handle the increased engagement from international aid donors.
Development aid and humanitarian relief  has since been funnelled 
through the GAD (Kawasaki et al. 2017). Placing the GAD under the 
civilian Ministry of  the Office of  the Union Government seems like 
an important step to break the military domination of  bureaucracy. 
While its new supervising ministry is nominally civilian, the Ministry 
of  the Office of  the Union Government is headed by a former air force 
colonel (The Irrawaddy 2018). At the time of  writing, it remains to be 
seen how far the GAD will transform into a genuinely civilian agency. 
This persisting entanglement of  Myanmar’s military in the everyday 
politics of  the country poses significant challenges for civil society.
4 Challenges for civil society
Myanmar has a long history of  social and political action, both in 
the centre and the periphery. Up until the military coup in 1962, a 
vibrant civil society existed, especially in urban areas. Anti‑regime 
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strikes and protests regularly emanated from Yangon University, whose 
students first protested against British colonial rule in 1920. Despite the 
suppression of  civil society under Ne Win’s authoritarian rule, disastrous 
and erratic economic policies led to further protests throughout the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The most important of  these was the ‘People 
Power Uprising’ in 1988 when hundreds of  thousands of  people 
joined students in Yangon to protest against the unbearable economic 
conditions and authoritarian military rule.
Initially, the 1988 uprising appeared successful. When the protests 
began, the Tatmadaw remained in the barracks, while the police 
cracked down on protesters. By mid‑July, dictator Ne Win announced 
that he would resign from his position as Chairman of  the BSPP, a 
referendum on a multiparty system would be held, and economic 
reforms would be implemented. However, a month later, the 
Tatmadaw violently crushed the protests in what has been described 
as a ‘self‑coup’, establishing a new military regime: the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) (Farrelly 2013: 2). Thousands of  
civilians were killed or imprisoned. Martial law was declared, public 
participation banned, and political opposition supressed. In 1990, the 
Tatmadaw surprisingly called for elections, convinced that the result 
would benefit SLORC, seeing as the opposition movement had been 
severely repressed. When Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of  General 
Aung San and the appointed leader of  the democratic movement of  
1988, registered her new party, the National League of  Democracy 
(NLD), and won a landslide victory, SLORC refused to acknowledge the 
result and placed her under house arrest (Maung Aung Myoe 2009: 4).
In the wake of  the 1988 uprising and the 1990 election, many members 
of  the NLD, as well as NLD‑affiliated political activists and civil society 
actors, fled to the Thai side of  the Myanmar–Thai border. They did 
so at a time of  a deepening humanitarian crisis in eastern Myanmar, 
where the Tatmadaw concentrated its firepower on its arch enemy, 
the Karen National Union (KNU), after it had concluded ceasefire 
agreements with most ethnic armed groups in the country’s north. This 
was particularly so as Myanmar’s army has indiscriminately targeted 
civilians since the 1960s when it came to adopt the so‑called ‘Four Cuts’ 
counterinsurgency doctrine that aims to ‘cut’ rebels from their four basic 
support needs from local communities: recruits, finance, intelligence, 
and food (Human Rights Watch 2005). In regions such as Karen State, 
where EAOs have embedded themselves in local communities, this 
meant that the army was displacing local communities on a large scale.
Violence in eastern Myanmar escalated even more after internal 
fragmentation within the Karen rebellion pitched several Karen 
armed groups against each other. Most importantly, the increasing 
dissatisfaction of  Buddhist members of  the Christian‑dominated KNU 
led to a major split of  the movement in 1994, which contributed to 
the fall of  the Karen headquarters at Mannerplaw. This sparked an 
exodus of  Karen people fleeing to Thailand, where they joined tens 
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of  thousands of  other civilians that have fled the war since the 1980s. 
In 1995, the Thai government merged various dispersed refugee 
settlements into nine major refugee camps. These have since become 
increasingly dependent on foreign aid from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as a dazzling array of  
international non‑governmental organisations (NGOs), many of  which 
established their offices in Mae Sot or Chiang Mai.
The influx of  Bamar political activists, ethnic minority organisations, 
and international human rights, relief, and development organisations, 
quickly established the Thai border as the main hub of  CSOs from 
Myanmar, both from the Bamar‑dominated centre and ethnic border 
areas of  the country. With the help of  international donor money, 
diverse projects came into being, from health clinics to anti‑trafficking 
and poverty relief, as well as funding of  both ethnic minority 
organisations and NLD‑affiliated networks. Ethnic CSOs, such as the 
Mae Tao Clinic, have since focused on health and education to refugees 
as well as communities trapped inside eastern Myanmar’s conflict zones. 
NLD‑affiliated democratic activists established independent media 
outlets such as The Irrawaddy and have campaigned extensively for the 
release of  political prisoners.
The Thai–Myanmar border also became the cradle for Myanmar’s 
women’s movement through the establishment of  the Burmese 
Women’s Union (BWU) in 1995, followed by the umbrella organisation 
the Women’s League of  Burma (WLB) in 1999. The shared experience 
as refugees created an opportunity for the women’s movement to 
overcome state‑imposed ethnic divisions between centre and borderland 
communities (O’Kane 2018). The proximity to international human 
rights agencies on the Thai border provided funding and support for 
Burmese women’s organisations to conduct research on gender‑based 
violence committed by the Tatmadaw (Hedström 2016). When the 
Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) together with the Shan 
Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) in 2002 published the report License 
to Rape about the military’s systematic use of  rape in the Shan State, 
the military regime appointed a committee to look into allegations 
of  gender‑based violence (SWAN 2002). This incident elevated the 
issue of  sexual violence onto the overall political agenda for the exiled 
opposition movement and carved out a platform where women as 
political agents could be heard with the support of  international 
advocacy. Women’s rights groups have since flourished and pushed for 
stronger protection of  women’s rights and more political participation 
of  women in a country where women accounted for about only 10 per 
cent of  political representatives between 2011 and 2016 (Shwe Shwe 
Sein Latt et al. 2017).
Despite the successes in civil society mobilisation on the Thai border, 
this exile civil society emerged as highly dependent on continuous 
donor funding and interest. Since most international donors started to 
engage more actively with the Myanmar government in the wake of  
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President Thein Sein’s reform agenda, they have gradually withdrawn 
funding from social and political action, including humanitarian 
organisations, on the Thai border. Unsurprisingly, many border‑based 
CSOs have since struggled, relocated to Myanmar, or ceased to exist 
(Décobert 2016). With the relocation of  aid funding and political 
liberalisation, civil society in central Myanmar has flourished to 
unprecedented extents. Yet, space for social and political action has 
contracted severely since Aung San Suu Kyi took over power. Under her 
NLD government, persecutions of  journalists and peaceful protesters 
have become commonplace again and inhumane treatment of  political 
prisoners, including severe torture, remains to be a sad part of  reality in 
Myanmar (Human Rights Watch 2019).
The top‑down nature of  transition in a context of  protracted conflict 
and authoritarianism poses severe challenges for civil society in 
Myanmar. The following section will focus on: (a) the growth of  uncivil 
society that pursues exclusionary and violent agendas, and (b) the 
risk that peace‑building and development initiatives are co‑opted by 
securitised state‑building and counterinsurgency.
4.1 Centre: civil and uncivil society
While political and social action matured on the Thai border during 
the 1990s and 2000s, the situation for civil society groups in central 
Myanmar was dire after the 1988 uprising. Throughout the 1990s, 
SLORC expanded its intelligence apparatus, resulting in pervasive 
surveillance and mass imprisonment of  pro‑democracy activists. This 
resulted in increasing fragmentation of  the NLD umbrella between NLD 
affiliates. In the mid‑2000s, a new wave of  civil disobedience campaigns 
challenged the military regime, organised by student leaders of  the 
1988 uprising that had been released after decade‑long political prison 
sentences. The 88 Generation Students Group was founded in 2005/06 
and has since become a civil society group with high moral authority.
In August 2007, the 88 Generation organised peaceful marches against a 
steep rise in fuel prices. After authorities re‑arrested many of  the student 
movement leaders, Buddhist monks joined the protests, which became 
known as the ‘Saffron Revolution’, due to the saffron‑coloured monks’ 
robes. The violent suppression of  protests triggered a group of  monks to 
establish the then‑underground organisation All Burma Monk’s Alliance 
(ABMA). The ABMA called for the junta to restore fuel subsidies, 
release political prisoners, and engage in national reconciliation. After 
the junta remained unapologetic, the ABMA excommunicated SPDC 
leaders and called for continued protests (Selth 2008: 283).4
The political mobilisation of  the pro‑democracy monks in 2007 dealt 
a severe blow to the legitimacy of  the military regime, but also helped 
to create an international narrative referred to by Freeman as the ‘good 
monk myth’, i.e. the notion that the Buddhist monkhood in Myanmar is 
predominantly a grass‑roots, human rights movement (Freeman 2017). 
In contrast to this, the Tatmadaw has co‑opted parts of  the monkhood, 
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or the Sangha. In fact, after 2007, the military worked to politicise, 
control, and undermine the Sangha, appointing pro‑military monks to 
official positions and offering financial contributions to ultranationalist 
factions, many of  which have since been on the forefront of  fostering 
hatred against Myanmar’s Muslim communities.5
That said, prejudices and structural racism against Muslims are not 
new phenomena in Myanmar. The school system has, ever since 
Ne Win’s regime, been propagating a nationalist Buddhist curriculum 
that discriminates against religious minorities. The identity cards used 
today in Myanmar stem from the colonial era, and clearly state religious 
affiliations, which results in daily discrimination for Muslims applying 
for jobs or in any dealings with authorities. The rapid liberalisation 
of  the telecommunication market has, since 2011, allowed millions of  
Burmese to access mobile phones and social media, primarily through 
Facebook, but has also opened up new propaganda channels perfectly 
suited to incite sectarian violence and spread fake news. The outbreak 
of  sectarian violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities 
in Rakhine State in 2012 catalysed the growth of  an ultranationalist 
Buddhist movement that was very successful in spreading hate messages 
on Facebook (Lee 2016; International Crisis Group 2017).
The biggest group within the ultranationalist Buddhist movement is 
known as the Ma Ba Tha, loosely translated as the Committee for the 
Protection of  Race and Religion, although the state Sangha has forced 
it to change its official name to the Buddha Dhamma Philanthropy 
Foundation. The movement illustrates how both civil and uncivil 
society can incorporate social and political action in the context of  state 
fragility and conflict. Ma Ba Tha is a grass‑roots movement, which 
meets social needs that the state has addressed inadequately. Since 
the legal system is endemically corrupt, Ma Ba Tha has, for instance, 
offered a parallel legal entity to solve civil cases. Where the educational 
system is severely neglected, the Ma Ba Tha has offered schooling 
and vocational training. During natural disasters, the movement has 
efficiently organised disaster relief  support. Although not all Ma Ba Tha 
members adhere to an anti‑Muslim ideology, many have committed 
hate speech, violent acts, and lawless actions, instigating violence against 
Muslims on multiple occasions. Members of  the movement have also 
demanded apartheid policies, such as the banning of  Muslims from 
entering shops and restaurants, with little condemnation offered by the 
leadership (International Crisis Group 2017).
Ma Ba Tha illustrates the intricate relationship between state authorities 
and strong uncivil forces. State authorities have sought to use movements 
like the Ma Ba Tha. The former military junta and the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), for instance, strengthened 
these ultranationalist and racist elements amongst the monkhood 
by utilising the latter’s extensive networks in order to mobilise 
supporters in the election campaign of  2015. In return for support, 
the then‑President Thein Sein announced a plan to forcibly segregate 
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the Muslim Rohingya community residing in Rakhine State (Human 
Rights Watch 2014). Seeing the nationalist Buddhist movement as an 
ally against the NLD, Thein Sein also ratified a controversial marriage 
bill rendering marriage between Buddhist women and men of  other 
religious faiths unlawful. Uncivil society, similar to civil society, can also 
keep formal authorities on the run. Prominent sources from within the 
NLD, for instance, acknowledged that the NLD’s decision to remove all 
Muslim candidates from their ballots in the 2015 election was due to 
growing pressure from Buddhist nationalist groups (Hindstrom 2015). 
Similarly, Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence in the face of  atrocities against 
the Rohingya Muslims is often explained with strong anti‑Muslim 
sentiments on the Myanmar ‘street’.
4.2 Borderlands: peace-building as counterinsurgency
The complex of  relief, advocacy, and ethnic minority organisations 
at the Thai border has also shaped social and political action inside 
conflict‑affected border regions. These include CSOs such as the Karen 
Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN), which works for 
safeguarding the natural livelihoods of  conflict‑affected communities, 
and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), which documents 
human rights abuses in eastern Myanmar. Both organisations received 
training and assistance from international organisations. International 
assistance and a comparatively liberal political condition on the Thai 
border have also enabled organisations such as the Kachin Women’s 
Association of  Thailand (KWAT) to advocate for the rights of  ethnic 
communities in other conflict‑affected border regions of  Myanmar.
Many ethnic CSOs have developed within a particularly complicated 
web of  social relations, which impacts on their actions and outlook. 
In a similar vein that they cannot be understood in separation from 
international aid on the Thai border, they cannot be dislocated from 
armed conflict inside Myanmar’s border regions, including the politics 
of  EAOs. This is primarily because EAOs such as the KNU have long 
been embedded within local communities. In fact, Myanmar’s EAOs 
cannot be understood in separation from the wider society. This is 
not least because many of  them have established reciprocal exchange 
relations through wide‑reaching governance and welfare provision 
among parts of  their claimed population in ethnic border areas. These 
governance arrangements have embedded ethnonational movements 
into the social lifeworld of  ethnic minority communities in Myanmar’s 
conflict areas. This is particularly true in areas where rebels remain in 
control of  territory and operate relatively sophisticated administrative 
structures, including education provision (Brenner 2017, 2018b).
This historically grown context has two main implications for social and 
political action in Myanmar’s conflict‑affected border regions. Firstly, 
some of  the administrative and welfare departments of  EAOs are part 
and parcel of  social and political action in Myanmar’s borderlands. 
They cooperate with CSOs in the provision of  services and advocacy 
work, for instance, in the development of  curriculum and teacher 
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training programmes in Karen State or relief  action in the internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps of  Kachin State. Secondly, social and 
political action in Myanmar’s borderlands is often bound up with 
ethnonational politics (Kiik 2016). This is, for instance, expressed by 
KWAT stating that besides empowering women in war‑torn Kachin 
State, it also ‘seeks to preserve and maintain Kachin culture and history’ 
(Peace Insight 2012). However, CSOs in border regions should not be 
understood as the agents of  EAOs. On the contrary, they act as a form 
of  public sphere and can be highly critical of  EAOs (Brenner 2018b). 
Many CSOs have, for instance, repeatedly criticised ethnic armed 
groups for their involvement in unsustainable resource exploitation, 
such as mining and logging (e.g. KHRG 2015).
The pressure that social and political action exerts on EAOs can, 
for instance, be witnessed by looking at the ceasefire in Karen State 
(Brenner 2018a). Since the KNU signed a ceasefire in January 2012, 
an end of  fighting has opened the door to improving the insecure 
livelihood of  marginalised and war‑torn communities. Nevertheless, 
the Karen ceasefire delivered neither long‑term development nor 
human security. In fact, it created new insecurities and grievances for 
local Karen communities similar to the Kachin ceasefire (Brenner 
2019: 100–2). Local rights groups document that the everyday lives of  
civilians in ceasefire areas are still dominated by militarisation, forced 
displacement, and uncompensated land confiscation, most often at 
the hands of  army and militia soldiers, who forcefully clear the land 
for mining operations, agri‑businesses, infrastructure development, 
and military facilities (KHRG 2014, 2015). Local communities and 
civil society complain that they are neither being consulted by the 
government nor by the KNU’s new leadership (Brenner 2017).
In addition to struggling against the government, foreign investors, 
and armed groups, local CSOs have developed an increasingly critical 
perspective of  international donors, since the latter have shifted large 
parts of  their support from Thai border‑based grass‑roots organisations 
to Myanmar state‑led development and relief  programmes. Most aid 
in conflict‑affected areas has since been delivered in agreement with 
militarised state authorities. In its first re‑engagement with Myanmar, 
the World Bank, for instance, granted US$80m directly to the military‑
controlled Ministry of  Border Affairs for so‑called ‘community driven 
development’ (World Bank 2013). Unsurprisingly, international partners 
have been at risk of  playing into the hands of  military authorities to 
the detriment of  local communities, an issue that has been flagged 
continuously by local CSOs (e.g. KCSN 2012; Karen Peace Support 
Network 2014).
One stark but telling example was a Finnish‑funded project in 
Karenni State. It operated under the umbrella of  the now suspended, 
Norwegian‑led Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), which 
sought to derive quick peace dividends in order to create a buy‑in into 
the peace process among conflict‑affected communities. The project 
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in Karenni State was meant to support returning IDPs after the rebel 
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) signed a ceasefire with 
Thein Sein’s administration in 2012. Karenni State has witnessed 
armed conflict since the late 1950s. A large‑scale Tatmadaw offensive 
in the late 1990s led to mass displacement of  civilians, many of  which 
fled to the refugee camps on the Thai border or remained internally 
displaced. The MPSI project intended to resettle these displaced 
communities back to Karenni State in the wake of  the ceasefire. 
Between September 2013 and June 2014, the MPSI project built ten 
so‑called ‘model villages’ in the area of  Shadaw Township to support 
251 returning IDP households (The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 
2014: viii). According to the MPSI, this project was a success (ibid.: viii).
In contrast, the Karenni Civil Society Network (KCSN) – an umbrella 
group of  Karenni CSOs – voiced strong concerns about the MPSI 
project (KCSN 2012). The CSOs argued that the Tatmadaw used the 
project for its counterinsurgency in ways that resemble the infamous 
‘strategic hamlet’ programmes, in which the United States military tried 
to separate the Vietcong from its local support base by forcibly relocating 
local communities into highly securitised villages during the Vietnam 
War. According to the KCSN, Tatmadaw soldiers confiscated 3,000 
acres of  land from local villagers near the project site for the construction 
of  training facilities. The military also maintained a heavy presence 
in the various model villages of  Shadaw Township together with 
pro‑government militias and military intelligence units. Along the road 
to Loikaw, posters propagandised the army with slogans such as ‘March 
bravely, and attack bravely!’ or ‘Crush the enemy!’ (KCSN 2012).
In an attempt to defend the project, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs stated that military installations in the village appeared 
unmanned when its diplomatic envoy visited the site. Moreover, it 
claimed that the CSOs confused the actual localities because its report 
cited different village names (Martov 2015). Its commentary illustrates 
the most dangerous shortcoming of  international donor projects in 
Myanmar’s conflict zones: limited knowledge of  the lived experiences 
of  local communities and the politics of  conflict. It is of  little surprise 
that the Tatmadaw welcomes Finnish diplomats differently than local 
villagers. The villages in the KCSN report are, moreover, the same as in 
the MPSI project. As common practice in Myanmar’s border areas, the 
denominations differ as the KCSN report uses local Karenni language 
names when referring to the villages.
While not all international aid in Myanmar’s borderlands feed 
counterinsurgency strategies, the MPSI case highlights significant 
pitfalls for international engagement in an authoritarian and securitised 
environment. Most crucially, channelling aid through government 
structures, in an environment where government and counterinsurgency 
are intrinsically linked and little knowledge exists on the side of  the 
donors, is likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate problems for local 
communities and civil society.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 50 No. 3 September 2019 ‘Accountability Amidst Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: Learning from Recent Cases’ 17–36 | 31
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
5 Conclusion
Understanding Myanmar’s political transition primarily through the 
lens of  democratisation is misleading and problematic. The political 
reforms of  2011 were orchestrated by the country’s military in ways 
that safeguard its own power interests. This explains the persistence of  
authoritarian rule and military dominance in contemporary Myanmar 
politics. The country’s top‑down transition poses severe challenges 
for civil society. On the one hand, transition has not progressed in a 
linear fashion towards liberal democracy as demonstrated by recent 
crackdowns on press freedom and other civil liberty rights. On the 
other hand, transition itself  has created new challenges. While the 
rapid liberalisation of  the public sphere has created space for civil 
society mobilisation, it has also provided a platform for uncivil society: 
ultranationalist forces promoting sectarian violence on the basis of  
exclusionary identity politics. While this has erupted most violently 
against the country’s Muslim communities, including the culmination 
in military‑led ethnic cleansing of  the Rohingya in Rakhine State, 
inter‑communal conflict between different ethnic groups is simmering 
across Myanmar. This in turn strengthens authoritarian rule by playing 
to the self‑portrayal of  the Tatmadaw as the guardian of  the nation.
At the same time, the rapid influx of  the international aid community 
attempting to support what it misconceived as democratisation has 
created additional challenges for civil society. In fact, Myanmar makes 
for a rather cautionary tale of  an aid industry crash‑landing in a 
country without profound knowledge of  its intricate politics. The very 
assumption that Myanmar’s transition is a process of  democratisation 
has not only proven wrong but deeply problematic. It has contributed 
to a wholesale shift of  donor funds from supporting long‑standing 
grass‑roots networks based on the Thai–Myanmar border to state 
bureaucracies. This has not only left existing CSOs struggling to survive. 
It has also accentuated the danger that international aid ends up being 
co‑opted by militarised power for the purposes of  ethnocratic state‑
building and counterinsurgency. This is particularly so in the securitised 
space of  the country’s conflict‑ridden borderlands where state apparatus 
and military authorities remain inextricably linked up until today. 
Unsurprisingly then, international aid has not always contributed to, but 
also undermined, progressive social and political action in Myanmar.
To find more constructive ways of  supporting civil society in this 
challenging environment, both in central and borderland Myanmar, 
international donors and development agencies should focus on: 
(a) rethinking the nature of  Myanmar’s transition, including the legacy 
of  protracted authoritarianism and conflict, as well as the ill‑founded 
assumption that it was driven by democratic forces from below 
and is leading to a Western‑style liberal democracy; (b) being more 
reflexive about the impact of  international aid on the fragile politics of  
transition, conflict, and peace. Understanding the concerns of  local civil 
society, including the inconvenient truths about the nature of  transition 
and the state, in places outside of  urban centres is indispensable in this 
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regard; (c) supporting comprehensive reforms of  Myanmar’s security 
and public administration apparatus by identifying and exploiting 
the limited political openings that top‑down transition leaves. For the 
short‑term, the key focus can rest on exploring creative opportunities 
that allow for change within the confines of  the 2008 constitution, as 
demonstrated by the NLD’s recent move to place the GAD under a 
civilian ministry. Simultaneously, however, international donors need to 
support alliances between CSOs and democratic politicians that push 
for constitutional change itself.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
1  David Brenner, Lecturer in International Relations, Goldsmiths, 
University of  London, UK.
2  Sarah Schulman, PhD candidate, Lund University, Sweden.
3  The concept of  uncivil society emerges from the analysis of  the 
public sphere in India by Muthiah Alagappa who highlighted the 
prominence of  non‑progressive forces that mobilise exclusive and 
primordial identity categories (Alagappa 2004).
4  Interview with ABMA, Mae Sot, Thailand, 15 December 2010.
5  Interview with ABMA, Mandalay, Myanmar, 6 June 2017.
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Youth-Led Anti-Corruption 
Movement in Post-Conflict 
Guatemala: ‘Weaving the Future’?*
Walter Flores1
Abstract This article examines youth-led anti-corruption protests in 
Guatemala in 2015, which contributed to the resignation of the president 
and vice-president. It outlines three key factors that were part of the initial 
success of the #RenunciaYa social media campaign, and the subsequent 
struggle towards political and structural reforms. First, it can be regarded as 
part of a much longer history of rights-led civic engagement and protest. 
Second, while social media proved indispensable for mobilising civic action, 
it was insufficient to reach beyond urban-based youth activists. Third, the 
removal of the president and vice-president was possible not only because of 
public pressure generated by anti-corruption youth activists, but also because 
of the longer-term work of two Attorney Generals and the International 
Commission Against Impunity in highlighting the fight against corruption 
within the national political agenda. Finally, the article argues that civic 
participation after conflict requires at least one generation to spring.
Keywords: anti-corruption, youth movements, post-conflict, 
Guatemala, social media, indigenous movements, social movements.
1 Introduction
This article examines the recent case of  youth-led anti-corruption 
protests in Guatemala in 2015, which resulted in the resignation of  the 
president and vice-president. Initially under the banner of  the hashtag 
#RenunciaYa, this social media campaign first galvanised protests in 
Guatemala City before spreading to the country’s other major urban 
centres. It culminated in a national strike on 27 August 2015, and the 
then president and vice-president of  Guatemala resigned in the face of  
public pressure and calls for their removal. In spite of  evolving from a 
campaign that targeted individual politicians (#RenunciaYa) to one that 
began to grapple with the breadth and depth of  corruption within state 
institutions (#JusticiaYa), momentum for systemic change proved difficult 
to sustain.
38 | Flores Youth-Led Anti-Corruption Movement in Post-Conflict Guatemala: ‘Weaving the Future’?
Vol. 50 No. 3 September 2019 ‘Accountability Amidst Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: Learning from Recent Cases’
This case study outlines three key factors that contributed both to the 
initial success of  the campaign, and to the subsequent struggle to push 
for broader political and structural reforms. 
First, it is necessary to understand the recent wave of  youth-led 
anti corruption movements in Guatemala as part of  a much longer 
history of  rights-led civic engagement and protest. This recent wave 
of  protests was borne out of  an initial period of  post-conflict political 
activism that was both distinct from, and nevertheless later connected 
to, the waves of  indigenous and peasant activism that defined 
Guatemala’s civil war period.
The youth leaders responsible for #RenunciaYa were born towards 
the very end of, or just after, the intensely violent civil conflict that 
embroiled Guatemala for over 30 years. These young leaders did not 
have direct experience with the types of  violent repression, sanction, 
and reprisal that were common outcomes for civic protest in their 
parents’ and grandparents’ generation. As a result of  this ‘generation 
gap’, as well as their initial failure to take into account long-standing 
indigenous and rural peasant movements, the youth-led anti-corruption 
movement was initially short-sighted in its quest for political change. 
Although indigenous and peasant movements participated in many of  
the protests initiated by the youth-led anti-corruption movement, their 
historical demands were not integrated into the #RenunciaYa agenda.
Second, while social media proved indispensable as a platform for 
communication to mobilise civic action, it was not sufficient to reach 
beyond urban-based youth activists. Ultimately, it was the interplay of  
social and traditional media that brought other groups – small business, 
indigenous rights organisations, and older generations – into the fold of  
the anti-corruption movement.
Third, the removal of  the president and vice-president was possible 
not only because of  public pressure generated by anti-corruption youth 
activists, but also because of  the longer-term work of  the Attorney 
General and the support of  the International Commission Against 
Impunity. This set of  actors helped to bring the fight against corruption 
front and centre in the national political agenda, communicating the 
results of  their investigations through frequent press conferences and 
traditional media outlets.
This case study explores these factors in turn and argues that the 
post-conflict period extends to a long time after the war ends. For the 
Guatemalan case, the protests occurred almost 20 years after the end of  
the war, in which a new post-conflict generation was able to undertake 
peaceful anti-corruption protests. In such contexts, it is necessary to 
bridge both generation gaps and civic demand ‘gaps’ to generate the 
necessary coalitions for judicial, electoral, and political reforms on the 
scale that Guatemala now requires.
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2 History of the conflict and aftermath in Guatemala
2.1 Period of conflict: 1960–962
From 1960 to 1996, Guatemala experienced one of  the most violent 
twentieth-century armed conflicts in the Americas. In a report published 
in 1999, Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission (Comisión de 
Esclarecimiento Histórico, or CEH) estimated that some 200,000 people 
had been either executed or disappeared, while the numbers of  orphaned 
children reached upwards of  150,000 (CEH 1999). The massacres 
and destruction of  rural villages gave rise to massive waves of  internal 
forced displacement and exile (Sanford 2004). During the period of  most 
intense conflict (1981–83) some 1.5 million Guatemalans were displaced. 
In total, one quarter of  all Guatemalans were directly impacted by 
political violence, whether in the form of  state-sanctioned assassinations, 
kidnappings, forced displacement, or disappearance (CEH 1999).
While the conflict’s original combatants were limited to members of  the 
Guatemalan military and several leftist guerrilla groups, under the umbrella 
of  Cold War politics, the conflict soon expanded to include labour unions, 
‘leftist’ intellectuals, human rights defenders, and unarmed indigenous 
populations accused of  supporting or sympathising with guerrilla groups 
(Grandin 2004). State repression targeted civil society leaders of  all stripes 
that appeared insufficiently ‘anti-communist’, as well as civic spaces 
considered rife with leftist thinkers (e.g. the national university). By the 
early 1980s, as part of  the state’s counter-insurgency strategy, arbitrary 
executions of  students and professors reached their peak and continued 
throughout the decade (Kobrak 1999). In the late 1980s, state-sanctioned 
killings shifted from targeting ‘leaders’ to targeting membership of  
grass-roots organisations as the government sought to destroy any perceived 
resistance from social and political organisations (CEH 2000).
Although the civil conflict impacted all age groups, much of  the 
violence and repression was aimed at those Guatemalans between 
16 and 45 years of  age (CEH 1999). In this sense, by attacking the 
nation’s youth, the heads of  young families, and adults in their prime, 
the repressive regime struck at the heart of  Guatemala’s human capital 
and severely hampered any potential for alternative forms of  leadership. 
The Guatemalan state inflicted violence and repression during this 
period both through legal channels and institutions, as well as through 
the use of  paramilitary and clandestine groups. Over the course of  
three decades of  conflict, these clandestine groups managed to embed 
themselves within, and co-opt structures of  the state (Insight Crime 2017). 
Ultimately, this co-optation created the grounds on which widespread 
corruption could take root. As described below, removing and fighting 
these clandestine structures, understood as organisations or groups who 
keep their affiliations and activities secret to avoid legal persecution, 
became part of  the peace agreement.
2.2 Peace Accords in the era of neoliberal policies
Following several years of  intense negotiation between the guerrilla 
movements and government, the Peace Accords were signed at the end 
40 | Flores Youth-Led Anti-Corruption Movement in Post-Conflict Guatemala: ‘Weaving the Future’?
Vol. 50 No. 3 September 2019 ‘Accountability Amidst Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: Learning from Recent Cases’
of  1996. These accords recognised the historical exclusion of  indigenous 
populations and included specific policies and targets related to public 
investment, accomplished via taxation reforms and other progressive 
policies (Cabanas 2008). Somewhat paradoxically, these progressive 
Peace Accords were secured at the same time that the Guatemalan state 
was aggressively implementing neoliberal policies, such as the signing 
of  the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Guatemala’s 
president at this time – Alvaro Arzú – who signed the Peace Accords 
represented the traditional economic elite. Beyond signing CAFTA 
and agreeing to structural adjustment reforms, Arzú went several steps 
further in the privatisation of  public assets, the enforced reduction of  
government salaries, and the termination of  15 per cent of  public sector 
contracts. Many public workers were offered yearly contracts without 
pension benefits. These policies resulted in increased unemployment and 
the concomitant expansion of  the informal economy. Not surprisingly, 
poverty indices and cost of  living increased. By the end of  the Arzú 
presidency in 1999, real-wage value had degraded to the point that it 
was equivalent to wage values in 1983 (Perla 2004).
However, while these neoliberal policies were put into place, the 
Peace Accords included specific targets for increased social spending, 
particularly in the health and education sectors. The Arzú government 
pursued these aims through social fund structures which rapidly became 
instruments of  political control and sites of  corruption. While spending 
increased via the social funds, the indicators for social development 
continued to lag far behind neighbouring Central American countries 
(Perla 2004). In sum, few of  the Peace Accords’ policies and structural 
reforms were implemented and indigenous populations continued 
to face social exclusion (Center for Economic and Social Rights and 
Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales 2009). As corruption 
within state structures and social funds grew, there was little outcry or 
civic action by non-indigenous groups. The fear of  reprisal engendered 
by three decades of  civil conflict had left its mark (Flores et al. 2009). 
While organised indigenous groups continued to mobilise on the 
long-standing issues of  land rights and war reparations, the majority of  
the non-indigenous urban middle class did not support these protests 
(Bastos and Brett 2010).
3 The rise of anti-corruption on the national agenda
Corruption has long been viewed as an intrinsic part of  the Guatemalan 
state (Andrés 2016). Beyond the violence and population displacement 
that defined the latter half  of  the twentieth century in Guatemala, there 
is a much longer history of  impunity for the country’s political and 
economic elites. However, this situation began to shift in 2015 when 
a very capable Attorney General, in collaboration with a UN panel 
of  investigators (the International Commission Against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG in Spanish)), used a press conference to present 
evidence that the then vice-president was involved in a sophisticated 
ring that stole public resources in several custom ports. Everyone knew 
that corruption existed; however, they had never been presented with 
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all the details and evidence, leaving no space for doubt. The Attorney 
General’s team used modern investigative forensic techniques that 
showed the money trail and phone recordings between ring members 
that included the vice-president as one of  the leaders. The phone 
records and paper trails also involved the then president. The capacity 
to use such methods (new to the public) was provided by the CICIG.
The CICIG (the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en 
Guatemala) had been formed in 2006 following the Peace Accords, 
in which an international independent panel of  experts was created 
to build the technical capacity of  the Public Prosecutor’s Office for 
investigation of  illegal groups using state institutions to commit crime 
(Weld 2016). In addition to the transfer of  knowledge and skills, the 
CICIG was also expected to support the public prosecutor in the 
litigation of  cases in the Guatemalan courts, recommend policy reforms 
that strengthened the judiciary system, and close legal loopholes. Most 
CICIG members are non-Guatemalan and have diplomatic immunity; 
the organisation itself  is funded by the international community (and 
not dependent on state funds). By the terms of  the Peace Accords and 
the creation of  CICIG, state representatives cannot interfere in these 
investigations or any other aspects of  the CICIG mandate.
The UN panel began its work in 2006. Although the CICIG 
investigated a range of  important cases, it did not initially tackle the 
mafia structures embedded in the state apparatus. This began to 
change in 2013, when a newly appointed Attorney General and the 
new Commissioner of  CICIG (a Colombian judge experienced in 
investigating paramilitary crime) teamed up to bring cases of  organised 
corruption that involved judges, congress members, the traditional 
economic oligarchy, and the elected president and vice-president. 
Through its work, the CICIG began to uncover the nested relationships 
of  corruption embedded within the Guatemalan state, which extended 
to all branches of  government and included members of  the economic 
elite that had bribed their way into political power.
The independent role of  the Attorney General was crucial for the 
investigation and uncovering of  cases of  institutional corruption. 
Although Thelma Aldana – General Prosecutor 2014–18 – played a 
key role in exposing corruption and laying the groundwork for the 2015 
anti-corruption protests, it was her predecessor – Claudia Paz y Paz 
(2010–14) who set the precedent for independent action. As Attorney 
General, Claudia Paz y Paz adopted the strategy of  setting performance 
targets to tackle corruption and inaction inside the Public Ministry. 
These targets provided the rationale for the removal of  those personnel 
not performing their public duties to a sufficient standard, and the 
hiring of  new, more committed, personnel (Sas 2011). Through the 
investigation process, the Attorney General kept focus on victim’s rights 
and prosecuted lead perpetrators of  the violence and repression that 
defined the civil conflict period. The most important case came in 2013, 
when the public prosecutor and the courts successfully convicted former 
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General and Head of  State, Efraín Ríos Montt, of  genocide charges 
(Gagne 2016).
By investigating and bringing to trial high-ranking military personnel for 
genocide, Claudia Paz y Paz set the precedent that the public prosecutor 
can be independent (El Mundo 2013). Many analysts state that the tenure 
of  Claudia Paz y Paz as the first truly independent public prosecutor, set 
the conditions for Thelma Aldana to advance in her role (Gagne 2016). 
In an interview in 2016, Claudia Paz y Paz reflected:
I think that the genocide trial and other important trials that were 
brought before the courts during my time as attorney general, were 
cases that have strengthened the Public Ministry as a judicial body. 
There are courageous officials, judges who have presented cases as 
important as the genocide case, and this strengthening permitted other 
cases to be presented that before were unthinkable (ibid.).
When these two groups joined forces – CICIG and the Attorney 
General’s office – it became possible to take corruption charges up to 
the highest level of  public office. Using modern investigative forensic 
techniques to unearth paper trails and phone recordings, and then 
hosting a press conference to make this evidence public, the Attorney 
General and CICIG provided proof  of  the full extent of  institutional 
and political corruption for the first time.
4 Urban youth-led anti-corruption mobilisation
The exposure of  the full extent and reach of  corruption led by the 
CICIG and the Attorney General struck a chord with a section of  
youth. Gabriel Wer, who along with three of  his friends initiated the 
2015 protests by posting an invitation on Facebook to demonstrate 
in the Central Plaza, recalls that neither he nor his friends had 
ever attended a social protest before, but they were outraged at the 
corruption of  the political elite and galvanised into action. In order to 
get people to attend, they had to explain that it was a peaceful protest, 
non-partisan and non-ideological, demanding the resignation of  the 
vice-president and then of  the president (Wer 2016). Youth indignation 
and mobilisation ran counter to decades of  political apathy on the 
part of  the urban middle classes (Luhnow 2015). Furthermore, these 
were young people who came from a social milieu where the control 
of  politics, education, the judiciary, and banking had long been in the 
hands of  their elders (Aitkenhead Castillo 2017). For them to erupt 
in rage and galvanise large numbers of  urban youth to protest what 
was effectively a corrupted ‘status quo’ was seen as radical by both the 
national and international press.
The testimonies of  young people who mobilised reflect the generational 
change between their parents who lived through the political violence 
and repressive years, and themselves, who grew up after the Peace 
Accords were signed, wanted to become civically active, but have never 
seen or experienced a civic protest. Donald Urizar, one of  the leaders of  
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the civic movement in Quetzaltenango explains it in this way: ‘For our 
parents – who lived the armed conflict – we were creating social unrest 
and were risking being repressed by authorities. For the young people, 
attending the peaceful protests was a chance to hang out in the park and 
take selfies’. However, the level of  awareness changed little by little with 
every Saturday, through the publication of  open letters and continued 
communication through social media; the participating youth became 
more engaged with the mobilisation and the demands (Urizar 2016: 67).
On Saturday 25 April 2015, over 35,000 people attended the first 
of  these anti-corruption protests in Guatemala City’s Central Plaza. 
Gabriel and his group made no claim of  leadership. The crowd 
whooped and shouted, whistled and drummed. They held up signs 
denouncing corruption and demanding the resignation of  the 
vice-president. Soon, news of  the protests in the capital reached 
Guatemala’s other cities, resulting in follow-on protests in the central 
plazas of  five other cities. The novelty of  youth-led protests, on the 
heels of  several decades of  youth apathy, was such that TV channels 
clamoured to transmit the action live. The extensive coverage no doubt 
contributed to an ever-growing number of  people joining the protests.
The civic protests continued for over 20 Saturdays in Guatemala’s main 
urban plazas, each time beginning at three in the afternoon. As reported 
in the press, the protests that followed on from that initial gathering 
evolved into something multigenerational, and brought to the streets 
people from a range of  class, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds. 
A young activist from Quetzaltenango – the second largest urban centre 
in Guatemala – recalls that the civic protest was the next step from 
cyber-activism:
We forced ourselves to go out to the streets. However, we had never 
done it before, we had no idea about the logistics involved in having 
thousands of  people walking together on the streets, the permits 
from authorities we needed to file, the logistics to close the traffic, the 
sound system, etc. (Urizar 2016: 67).
The 2015 protests became a civic celebration, sparked initially by young 
people’s anger and indignation over government corruption.
Indigenous and rural peasant movements, that is, those civic groups 
with roots in the early years of  the Guatemalan civil conflict, were 
absent from the first wave of  urban protests. However, by the third 
Saturday, these groups began to join in. Nora Chamalé, a national 
indigenous rights leader, explained the early reticence to join the 
youth-led urban anti-corruption protests: ‘We wanted the youth and the 
newly mobilised to understand that this corruption isn’t new, and this 
corruption is the same that led to many of  the injustices and abuses that 
peasants and indigenous people mobilise against’ (Chamalé 2016: 129). 
It was Daniel Pascual, she recalled, a prominent figure in the indigenous 
rights movement, who convinced his peers that this outburst of  urban, 
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middle-class protest represented something new and galvanising. The 
Saturday protests marked the beginning of  a shift in awareness among 
those with positions of  greater privilege that the Guatemalan state 
was corrupt, and that through joining forces with the historic factions 
of  rural indigenous and peasants’ movements, they could become a 
national force for change.
After more than ten Saturdays of  civic protests in urban plazas 
throughout Guatemala, the vice-president resigned but the president 
remained in power, refusing to step down. There began to be calls for 
a national strike, a tactic that represented a return to strategies of  past 
indigenous and peasant movements (Gutiérrez 2015). This call for a 
national strike gathered support among the Facebook and Twitter-
following urban youth. Furthermore, the idea spread to small businesses 
within the food industry, which employs mostly young people, and then 
beyond. The date, 27 August 2015, was declared.
On that day, over 250,000 people gathered in Guatemala City’s Central 
Plaza, while tens of  thousands more mobilised in urban plazas in 
Guatemala’s smaller cities. By the time of  the national strike, there 
were estimates that over 1 million Guatemalans had participated in 
the anti-corruption protests. The initial wave of  activism had grown 
to include not only the traditional ‘protest’ sector within the national 
universities, but also youth from private universities, religious institutions, 
indigenous and peasant movements, and ordinary citizens who had 
never once before raised their voice in protest (Ixchíu 2016). The strike 
paralysed the capital and many other cities for at least 12 hours.
Surveys conducted after the fact suggested that the civic mobilisations 
were not driven by a single political ideology, but that participants 
ranged from across the political spectrum (Mendoza 2017). These 
mobilisations marked a tectonic shift in Guatemalan public life, as one 
young activist explained, given the country’s long established ‘culture of  
fear and silence’ which – since the days of  Spanish colonisation – ‘have 
been part of  structural social relations in Guatemala’ (Ixchíu 2016: 31).
5 The benefits and limitations of social media and cyber-activism
As we saw in the previous section, the anti-corruption mobilisations 
were first catalysed via social media channels, namely Facebook and 
Twitter. As with youth-led political mobilisations in other corners of  the 
world, the communication tools offered by social media enabled the viral 
recruitment of  others to their anti-corruption cause. With the help of  
sharp imagery and a clever hashtag, #RenunciaYa captured attention and 
quickly snowballed so that within a few hours of  the initial call for protest, 
some 10,000 people had confirmed their participation (Wer 2016).
The use of  social media continued to be of  critical importance in 
the build-up to the national strike on 27 August. Through social 
media campaigns, the #RenunciaYa group encouraged small businesses 
to declare allegiance to the anti-corruption cause. Bolstered by 
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15 additional organisations that took on formal roles as ‘co-organisers’, 
the campaign grew in strength to the point that it was able to generate a 
citizen boycott of  those food, retail, and service businesses that refused 
to join the strike. With pressure building, several large international food 
chains switched allegiance and announced their support of  the national 
strike on 26 August. By the morning of  27 August, the organised private 
sector was left with no option but to announce its support (Solís 2016).
A few days after the strike, Parliament voted to remove the president’s 
immunity. This removal and the social pressure resulted in the president 
announcing his resignation. He was immediately taken into custody 
to face accusations of  leading a corruption ring that operated via the 
government customs agency. His resignation was widely celebrated 
and the Saturday mobilisations came to an immediate halt. While 
social media had enabled the rapid spread of  the Saturday protests and 
engendered citizen outrage, the youth-led anti-corruption movement 
had no staying power. In the aftermath of  the resignations, the 
protesters celebrated a job well done. However, as analysts have argued 
since, the newly mobilised urban youth did not have any in-depth 
knowledge of  the historical precedent of  state capture by paralegal 
crime. Given the depoliticisation of  the Guatemalan population at large 
following so many years of  political repression and state-sanctioned 
violence, this new wave of  protesters did not have the necessary 
experience or contextual understanding to identify the corrupt practices 
of  the president and vice-president as part of  a larger system, and 
saw the resignations as ‘mission accomplished’ (Cuevas-Molina 2016; 
Morales 2016).
6 The beginning of a movement aware of history and continuous 
civic action
Despite the abrupt conclusion of  the Saturday protests, some elements 
of  the urban youth anti-corruption movement remained committed 
to ongoing civic action. They have since come to understand that real 
change will require greater participation in political parties, through 
campaigns for elected representatives that uphold the anti-corruption 
mission, and through sustained calls for government accountability 
(DiálogosGT 2017). Subsequently, the group #RenunciaYa, who created 
the original Facebook event transformed themselves into #JusticiaYa, 
now an active organisation of  urban youth with affiliates in urban 
centres beyond the capital.
In light of  having learned the limitations of  targeting individually 
corrupt actors, versus seeking change at a systemic level, these 
organisations have since implemented a dynamic learning exchange 
with historical indigenous and peasant movements that they call 
‘weaving the future’. This ‘weaving the future’ involves pulling together 
the threads of  past civic protest together with contemporary calls for 
judicial, legislative, and political reforms. Gabriel Wer, now a leader of  
#JusticiaYa explains:
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In the year 2015, we concentrated our demands on the resignation 
of  the president and vice-president. When the calls to continue the 
pressure further to implement structural reform came about, we 
lost it – we did not have enough information and knowledge to act 
strategically (Morales 2016).
Through ‘weaving the future’ they have greater knowledge on 
the historical roots of  the causes of  corruption and the structural 
reforms that will be required to unpick and dismantle the rot within 
state institutions (Morales 2016). For example, in Quetzaltenango, 
Guatemala’s second city, what began as #RenunciaYa has now become a 
formal civil society organisation that monitors public budgets and holds 
to account the municipal authorities (Urizar 2016). The organisation 
continues using social media as a mobilising strategy: ‘By using social 
media in an adequate manner, we have been able to inform and make 
other young people aware, who are now very active in supporting civil 
society organisations’ (ibid.: 73).
One key aspect of  ‘weaving the future’ has been the awareness-raising 
of  urban, middle-class youth to the historic demands of  indigenous and 
peasants’ rights movements. During the civic protests, particularly in urban 
areas beyond the capital, indigenous youth played a crucial role. Whereas 
the urban, middle-class youth who initiated #RenunciaYa constituted a newly 
politicised population, indigenous youth such as student leader Lucia Ixchíu 
who was 24 during the 2015 protests, represented a multigenerational 
cohort of  social mobilisation and political struggle (Ixchíu 2016: 32). 
Indigenous rights leaders, who within their own communities have passed 
down knowledge of  past repression, violence, and strategic mechanisms for 
claiming rights, now talk of  urban youth as an ‘awakened’ group who can 
contribute to their ‘historical struggle’ (Silva 2016: 48).
7 Reappearance of traditional divides within the youth movement
The anti-corruption crusade led by the public prosecutor together with 
CICIG had almost complete support from Guatemalan society during 
2015 and 2016. However, as the investigation advanced and new cases 
were brought to courts, the indicted went beyond corrupt politicians 
to include bankers, private corporations, and family members of  the 
powerful traditional economic elite. One case involved the brother 
and son of  newly elected president Jimmy Morales. These recent cases 
revealed the extent to which economic and political elites had benefited 
from their co-optation of  the structures of  the Guatemalan state. Not 
surprisingly, these revelations of  the systemic and structural nature of  
corruption in Guatemala created rifts among those who had originally 
supported the anti-corruption agenda. In response to the spread of  
allegations, powerful industrial elites initiated a campaign accusing 
CICIG and the public prosecutor of  a leftist political agenda against 
their affiliates (Garcia and Pellecer 2018).
Among the urban youth that had first mobilised as part of  the 2015 
wave of  protests, new groups and movements emerged that began to use 
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the judiciary and courts to hold politicians and government authorities 
to account. At the same time, other factions of  politically mobilised 
young people splintered off from the original cause. For example, the 
#GuatemalaInmortal movement organised to protect ‘life, liberty and 
private property’, directly challenging what they perceived of  as a 
‘leftist’ takeover of  the 2015 civic protests (Urrutia 2017). Since 2017, 
#GuatemalaInmortal has used social media to protest against the CICIG 
Commissioner and the constitutional reforms that aimed to strengthen 
the judiciary, as well as voicing their support of  the current president (in 
spite of  emerging evidence of  illicit funding of  his electoral campaign) 
(E&N 2017). Other factions of  the mobilised youth that first gained 
ground in the 2015 protests include groups that support conservative 
and religious agendas (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-LGBT rights, anti-gender 
rights). On the left, these splits led to the creation of  two new political 
parties: Movimiento Semilla, identified as centre-left, and Movimiento 
para Liberación de los Pueblos, with a left-leaning, progressive, 
and indigenous rights agenda. What began as an urban youth-led 
anti-corruption movement in 2015 has now since split along divergent 
ideological lines (conservative, left, right, religious).
8 Conclusions
This case of  the 2015 youth-led anti-corruption movement in 
Guatemala shows what has become possible in terms of  peaceful 
political protests for a generation not directly touched by the violence 
and repression of  the country’s 30-plus years of  civil conflict. It is clear 
that the reformulation of  an active citizenry, one with the genuine 
potential to hold political leaders to account, is a long-term process in 
a country scarred by war. The urban youth who initiated #RenunciaYa 
had no direct knowledge of  civic protest, nor were they connected in 
any direct way to the rural, indigenous movements that had formed 
the core of  rights-focused political mobilisation in the latter half  of  the 
twentieth century. Moreover, although the focus of  many reports about 
the Guatemalan anti-corruption movement has been on the urban 
youth that mobilised, it is also important to note that those professionals 
working in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, doing the groundwork of  
investigation, preparing the cases and defending the cases in court 
are also young – most of  them are less than 35 years old. This young 
generation of  public officials had a different ethos and motivation than 
the previous generations that grew up during the period of  political 
violence and conflict.
A closer reading of  the case shows that the mobilisation which 
was successful in leading to the resignations of  the president and 
vice-president was due to a fortunate alignment between protesters 
on the street (the youth) and key reformist institutions within the state 
(the public prosecutor and the CICIG), leading to pressure on the 
executive horizontally as well as vertically from below. This appears 
to be a variation of  the ‘sandwich strategy’ in which the building of  
pro-accountability coalitions is needed to effect change (Fox 2015).
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Further, although the collaboration between the new youth movement 
and the ‘older’ indigenous movements proved key to bringing about 
the national strike, as the protests matured the historic demands of  
indigenous and rural peasant movements (access to land, indigenous 
rights, and cultural identity) were not incorporated into the 
anti-corruption demands for government reform. Now, some of  the 
spin-off urban youth movements have learned from the limitations 
of  their original approach and are actively pursuing collaboration, 
exchanges, and alliances with long-standing indigenous and peasant 
groups. This suggests that while the social media strategy served to spark 
and steer the initial wave of  outrage, there is a longer process of  collective 
identity building, strategising, and ideological clarification that can only 
occur through sustained engagement and face-to-face learning exchanges.
The case also offers insights into the strengths and limitations of  
viral activism. While social media played a crucial role in the rapid 
mobilisation of  urban-based youth and to spread the news of  the 
protests across the country, it was insufficient to galvanise a common 
group identity or clear agenda for structural reforms. For genuine 
systemic change to occur, these newly mobilised young people will need 
to ‘weave the future’ together with the indigenous and peasant rights 
movements with longer histories of  protest and political action.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
1 Walter Flores, Director, Center for the Study of  Equity and 
Governance in Health Systems (CEGSS), Guatemala.
2 The Guatemalan conflict is amply documented in the literature. 
Some key references related to the arguments in this article are: 
Flores, Ruano and Funchal (2009), Grandin, Levenson-Estrada and 
Oglesby (2011), and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico 
(CEH) (1999).
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Empowerment without 
Accountability? The Lawyers’ 
Movement in Pakistan and its 
Aftershocks*
Maryam S. Khan1
Abstract This case study on the Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement and its 
aftermath aims to add to our knowledge of judicial empowerment 
processes, particularly the role of lawyers in mobilising for an independent 
judiciary, and the conditions for political lawyering as an effective pathway 
to judicial empowerment. In exploring these processes and conditions of 
empowerment, the study also examines their relationship with the longer-
term outcomes of empowerment as well as the nexus between judicial 
empowerment and accountability of legal institutions. The study marshals 
evidence from multiple sources – including 35 qualitative interviews 
with movement leaders and participants, and a representative survey of 
active litigators in the Lahore District judiciary – to show, firstly, that the 
conditions that create successful mobilisation for judicial empowerment can 
significantly limit the systemic benefits of such mobilisation and, secondly, 
that the conditions for and the pathway to empowerment may deeply 
constrain the accountability of the empowered actors and institutions.  
Keywords: Lawyers’ Movement, political lawyering, legal mobilisation, 
judicial empowerment, accountability, Pakistan bar, legal complex, legal 
professions, sociology of  lawyers, social movements.
1 Introduction
The ‘Lawyers’ Movement’ in Pakistan – that began in early 2007 and 
culminated two years later in the restoration of  judges removed by 
a military regime – prompted worldwide interest in the potential for 
political lawyering. The movement offers an unparalleled example of  
professional mobilisation in support of  the judiciary. Triggered by the 
unconstitutional removal of  the Supreme Court Chief  Justice Iftikhar 
Chaudhry by then military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, the 
movement sustained for two years through rapidly evolving political 
circumstances. It had two palpable outcomes: the downfall of  the 
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Musharraf  regime and a transition to electoral democracy; and the 
reinstatement of  the Chief  Justice and other illegally deposed judges 
from the Supreme Court and the provincial High Courts. Rule of  
law and independence of  the judiciary were hailed as legacies of  the 
movement (Kausar 2012).
This case study aims to address the deficit in our knowledge of  judicial 
empowerment processes, particularly the role of  lawyers in mobilising 
for an independent judiciary, and the conditions for political lawyering 
as an effective pathway to judicial empowerment. As a singular example 
of  political action by lawyers, the movement eludes existing typologies 
of  legal mobilisation, such as ‘cause lawyering’ (Sarat and Sheingold 
1998), ‘political lawyering’ (Minow 1996), or ‘lawyering for social 
movements’ (McCann 2006; Sarat and Sheingold 2006). Lawyers were 
the principal movement activists and deployed diverse forms of  political 
action – both within and without the courtroom, involving subversive 
strategies such as street mobilisation and court boycotts – to restore 
the judiciary. Much as Pakistan’s example demonstrates that ‘political 
lawyering’ can be a major determinant of  judicial empowerment, it 
also presents sobering findings about the long-term effects of  political 
lawyering as a pathway to achieving an independent judiciary.
The study offers two such findings, both of  which are grounded in 
the interaction of  the larger political context on the one hand with 
the processes and conditions of  mobilisation on behalf  of  judicial 
empowerment on the other, the latter including mechanisms and 
strategies of  political lawyering. One fundamental finding is that the 
movement heavily circumscribed the scope, as well as the impact, of  
judicial empowerment. It projected judicial power within a very narrow 
sphere of  judicial–executive competition and mega-politics, and limited 
the benefits of  judicial autonomy to an elite and unaccountable group 
of  judges and lawyers.
Another major finding is that just as the movement strengthened 
judicial autonomy, it created political opportunities for the judiciary 
to simultaneously enlarge its political power and insulate itself  from 
external checks (Kalhan 2013; Khan 2014; Siddique 2015). In other 
words, the context and conditions of  lawyers’ mobilisation set in 
motion parallel processes of  judicial empowerment, and judicial 
self-preservation. Far from creating an impetus for redistributing power 
and resources within the judicial system or making the system more 
responsive to litigants, the movement produced downstream constraints 
for the political and institutional accountability of  both lawyers and 
judges, the very actors who mobilised against an unaccountable 
military regime.
Abstracting from Pakistan’s experience, the study points to two general 
observations on empowerment and accountability of  broader relevance 
to political development in transitional contexts. Firstly, the context, 
conditions, and pathways that create successful mobilisation on behalf  
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of  judicial empowerment have a significant bearing on the outcomes, 
and may indeed have the effect of  inhibiting structural changes in the 
judicial system despite some immediate gains in autonomy. Secondly, 
the move towards judicial empowerment may or may not coexist 
with or stimulate a broad-based mobilisation for more responsive and 
accountable legal institutions. Paradoxically, the context, conditions, 
and pathways that produce judicial empowerment may create an 
impulse in the higher judiciary to insist on self-governance, sealing 
itself  off from external accountability. Anchored in these two findings 
– the incongruence between empowerment and its outcomes, and the 
tensions between empowerment and accountability – this Pakistan 
case study tells a cautionary tale about the complex, contingent, and 
non-linear trajectory from judicial empowerment to an accountable and 
responsive judicial system.
The study is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief  
historical context to the Lawyers’ Movement, and underlines the 
lawyers’ political action as the key movement mobiliser. This analysis 
is based on a combination of  qualitative sources, including news 
reports and legal archive material, as well as 35 stakeholder interviews 
with a cross-section of  lawyers representing both movement leaders 
and participants. It seeks to explain the conditions in which the ‘legal 
complex’ – i.e. legal institutions in the aggregate, particularly the core 
inter-institutional network between lawyers and judges (Halliday, Karpik 
and Feeley 2007, 2012) – mobilised and sustained the movement. The 
second section shifts focus from the movement to post-movement bar 
politics and examines the nexus between the two, especially in relation 
to accountability. In addition to other sources, it presents original data 
from a mixed representative survey of  654 active litigators in the Lahore 
District courts concerning their perceptions and actions vis-à-vis the bar 
and the judiciary. The article concludes with the main findings of  the 
study and their implications for empowerment and accountability.
2 Revisiting the Lawyers’ Movement – what the evidence shows
2.1 Historical and political context
The Pakistani bar inherited its structure from colonial times 
(Schmitthener 1968). Apart from the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) and 
its five provincial off-shoots – the regulatory bodies for lawyers – lawyers 
are voluntarily organised into bar associations at every tier of  legal 
practice: from tehsil bar associations at the sub-district level, to district bar 
associations, to High Court bar associations at the provincial level, and 
finally to the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) at the apex. There 
are an estimated 200 bar associations across the country. These are the 
loci of  associational politics as well as social capital for lawyers, enabling 
them to engage in annual elections, coordinate activity across and 
within regions, and lobby for professional issues. The SCBA is a federal 
body composed exclusively of  Supreme Court lawyers and provides 
the anchor for the bar’s collective action at the national level. The 
decentralised and locally embedded network of  bar associations across 
the country heightens the mobilising potential of  lawyers (Munir 2012).
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In the post-independence era, the bar retained substantial autonomy 
over its internal politics. In contrast, the judiciary’s alignment with the 
increasingly militarised state deepened as Constitutional Courts became 
instrumental in legitimating extra-constitutional regimes (Khan 2016). 
Lawyers were at the forefront of  two major social movements against 
military dictators – the first, against General Ayub Khan in the 1960s 
and the second, against General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s (known as the 
Movement for the Restoration of  Democracy (MRD)). In both cases, 
the judiciary played the role of  regime legitimation, only to be heavily 
restrained through martial law or virtually ousted by military courts.
However, much as it is tempting to view lawyers and judges through 
a historical binary of  pro- and anti-democracy forces, past examples 
of  lawyers’ mobilisation (or lack of  it) show it is always contingent on 
political conditions. For instance, lawyers were active in a movement to 
dislodge the civilian Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government in 1977, 
resulting in General Zia’s military coup. Lawyers have proven similarly 
inconsistent in mobilising for judicial empowerment. For instance, when 
General Zia forced then Chief  Justice, Yaqub Ali, to vacate his office 
soon after the coup, Justice Ali’s resistance provoked little reaction from 
the bar.
Similarly, when General Musharraf  purged the judiciary after his 
military coup in October 1999, the refusal of  13 Constitutional Court 
judges to take a fresh oath barely attracted any notice. The bar’s muted 
reaction was consistent with the general political atmosphere in favour 
of  Musharraf  (Khan 2016). Musharraf  was able to further fragment 
political opposition by holding general elections in 2002 and creating 
a façade of  parliamentary politics. Coordinated action within the bar 
built up only gradually after these elections when, in August 2002, the 
regime proposed amendments to the Constitution – known as the Legal 
Framework Order (LFO) – for entrenching the military executive.
The LFO spurred an ‘anti-LFO movement’ (Malik 2008; Khan 2016). 
Bar leaders demanded that the Constitution be restored to its pre-LFO 
status, and that extensions to the retirement age of  regime judges – 
known as ‘PCO judges’ on account of  taking oath under Musharraf ’s 
‘Provisional Constitutional Order’ (PCO) in 1999 – be revoked. PCO 
judges, consistently loyal to Musharraf, were a major obstacle to 
declaring the LFO unconstitutional. In early 2003, bar representatives 
established a ‘National Action Committee’ (NAC) – comprising 
executives of  all bar organisations – as a channel for coordinated 
decision-making and mobilisation across the country. The NAC was 
instrumental in organising anti-LFO protests over the next two years.
The highlight of  the NAC-led movement came in late 2003 when 
the Musharraf  government withdrew the judicial tenure extension. 
Simultaneously, however, parliament approved Musharraf ’s controversial 
Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment (‘17th Amendment’), taking the 
steam out of  the bar’s advocacy on issues of  general importance such as 
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restoration of  the Constitution and regime change. Nonetheless, many 
anti-regime lawyers continued to agitate on these issues, and prominent 
players among them later became the vanguard (Halliday et al. 2012) of  
the Lawyers’ Movement (Jaffrelot 2015).
Viewed together, the anti-Zia mobilisation in the 1980s and the 
anti-LFO movement underscore lawyers’ capacity to mobilise 
against extra-constitutional regimes in the absence of  political party 
mobilisation. In both instances, lawyers’ action preceded political party 
involvement. However, there is an important qualifier: while political 
lawyering may be highly effectual in matters directly affecting the 
institutional and corporate interests of  the legal profession, it is unlikely 
to be successful on broader political issues without a convergence with 
constituencies outside the bar. Hence, although anti-LFO lawyers 
were successful on narrow grounds – halting the proposed extension to 
judicial tenure – they could not thwart the 17th Amendment without 
political party cooperation.
2.2 The Lawyers’ Movement
When Iftikhar Chaudhry became the Supreme Court Chief  Justice in 
June 2005, the relationship between anti-regime lawyers and judges was 
largely oppositional. As a Supreme Court judge, Chaudhry had decided 
in favour of  the Musharraf  regime in political cases between 2000 and 
2005. As Chief  Justice he took cognisance of  several cases involving 
government corruption and human rights violations (Khan 2014). Some 
of  his judgments had elements of  anti-regime judicial activism, but 
much as some lawyers may have perceived them as a brewing challenge 
to the military establishment (PILDAT 2007), influential sections of  the 
bar leadership maintained an oppositional posture towards the Supreme 
Court, not least because of  Chaudhry’s reputation as a close aide of  
Musharraf  and what interview respondents describe as his brusque, at 
times even hostile, courtroom demeanour.
On 9 March 2007, Musharraf  summoned the Chief  Justice and, in 
the presence of  senior military and intelligence officials, pressured him 
to resign over multiple allegations of  misconduct. The Chief  Justice 
courageously refused. Almost immediately, the media broke news of  the 
incident, repeatedly televising images of  Chaudhry flanked by military 
personnel. The same day, a hastily convened Supreme Judicial Council 
(SJC) – the body with exclusive powers for removing Constitutional 
Court judges – suspended the Chief  Justice pending adjudication 
of  a Presidential Reference against him (Iqbal 2007). A few days 
later, lawyers swarmed onto the streets in a show of  angry resistance, 
triggering a larger mobilisation in the ensuing weeks of  lawyers, civil 
society activists, and political party workers.
A large majority of  interview respondents suggested that the decay that 
had set in the Musharraf  regime and the larger political context of  
growing anti-regime sentiment were critical to the mobilisation. Many 
also viewed this incident as an attack on the legal fraternity as a whole. 
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These sentiments seem to point less to Chief  Justice-centred motivations 
for the movement and more to institutional ones of  preserving bar and 
bench autonomy against an extra-constitutional regime.
The movement evolved through shifting political conditions over the 
two years that followed. In the first phase, lawyers mobilised to reinstate 
the Chief  Justice. They used a combination of  street mobilisation – 
involving weekly strikes and protests, and countrywide circuits of  bar 
associations with the Chief  Justice himself  – and strategic litigation, 
forcing a transfer of  the Presidential Reference from the SJC to the 
Supreme Court for open proceedings. The media spontaneously allied 
with the protestors, reporting on the protests around the clock and 
publicising instances of  police force. The factor that imparted a deep 
sense of  cohesion and purpose to what was otherwise spontaneous 
collective outrage was the strategic action of  bar representatives who 
quickly emerged as movement leaders. In a matter of  days, these 
leaders brought mobilising lawyers under their control and organisation, 
catapulted the legal fraternity into the media spotlight, and adopted 
the Chief  Justice as a rallying symbol for their anti-Musharraf  struggle. 
A few months later, an emboldened Supreme Court dismissed the 
Reference and reinstated the Chief  Justice.
In the post-reinstatement phase, lawyers once again deployed a 
combination of  tactics both within and without the courtroom to 
buttress the court’s growing anti-regime activism in a bid to block 
Musharraf ’s re-election as President and to force a transition to civilian 
politics. While the first phase was largely about lawyers empowering judges, 
this second phase set in motion a cycle of  mutual empowerment.
In the third phase, the movement suffered a major setback when 
Musharraf  imposed emergency rule in November 2007 to block the 
court’s ruling against his dual office of  President and army chief  
(Qureshi 2010). The regime backlash against the court’s activism 
resulted in a massive judicial purge – over 60 Constitutional Court 
judges were dismissed and put under house arrest (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). A newly installed Supreme Court, with new PCO judges 
headed by a new Chief  Justice, swiftly validated the emergency (Khan 
2016). After the emergency was lifted in December 2007, lawyers 
launched the movement afresh and re-defined their objective in 
terms of  restoring the judiciary to its pre-emergency status, making a 
conscious choice to eschew court-centred strategies in favour of  street 
mobilisation and subversive activities such as court boycotts.
The movement’s fourth phase began with the electoral transition in 
February 2008. The newly elected coalition government headed by 
the PPP ordered the release of  all detained judges and lawyers, with 
a commitment to restore the judges in the near future. Movement 
leaders immediately rallied around the deposed judges and assimilated 
them into their street mobilisation. This led to a unique legal complex 
configuration outside the formal institutional space, with lawyers 
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and judges pursuing a harmonised agenda. For the next few months, 
movement lawyers and deposed judges were locked in a relationship 
of  mutual support, as the government repeatedly reneged on its 
commitment to restore the judges. The first ‘long march’ of  June 2008 – 
in which lawyers were joined by civil society actors in an overwhelming 
show of  support and strength – marked the apogee of  the movement. 
However, differences among bar leaders and between them and young 
lawyers over continuing a sit-in outside the Supreme Court at the 
conclusion of  the long march threatened to disintegrate the internal 
command of  the movement.
This led into the movement’s fifth phase, a period of  flux in which the 
ruling coalition of  the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz 
(PML-N) sought to regain political control by leveraging international 
support to impeach President Musharraf. Musharraf  pre-empted 
impeachment by resigning in August 2008, allowing the PPP to 
consolidate its position by electing its own co-chairperson as President. 
Movement lawyers attempted to directly lobby the government for 
restoration of  the remaining judges (Haq 2008), thus actively pursuing 
political party cooperation while continuing with street-based politics. 
However, with the resurgence of  political party control, the legal complex 
crumbled as a large majority of  deposed judges returned to the bench 
after taking a new oath (Abbas and Jasam 2009). In March 2009, a 
second ‘long march’, supported by the PML-N and allegedly backed by a 
negotiated political agreement involving the new army chief, culminated 
in the restoration of  the remaining deposed judges (Khan 2016).
2.3 What made the movement possible? Analysing the enabling conditions
The Lawyers’ Movement, while sharing some commonalities with past 
examples of  lawyers’ political action in Pakistan, is truly unprecedented. 
One key distinction is its immediate impact: the movement restructured the 
bargaining positions of  the regime vis-à-vis political parties, fomented 
the political space for a transition to civilian rule while forcing out the 
incumbent dictator, and succeeded in restoring illegally deposed judges 
(Munir 2012). Moreover, the mechanisms and strategies deployed by lawyers 
also stand out in three important ways. Firstly, lawyers were the principal 
movement activists; as such, they eclipsed the role of  political parties and 
other actors at crucial points in the movement, and mobilised more 
intensely and consistently than any other group. Secondly, the forms 
of  political action that the lawyers used were unconventional and highly 
tactical. Though lawyers in Pakistan have previously relied on street 
mobilisation, the strategic way in which they switched from one action 
to another, or adopted parallel methods when the situation necessitated, 
or made voluntary coalitions for achieving short-term goals, gave the 
movement a very different character.
Finally, the bar’s insistence on autonomy was also something new. Lawyers 
claimed to represent causes independent of  what they viewed as the 
parochial agendas of  political parties. Thus, lawyers did not perceive 
their role as auxiliaries to political parties as was the case in past social 
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movements such as the MRD in the 1980s. Instead, they pushed for 
their own goals as well as their own narrative, even as they sometimes 
welcomed parallel support from political parties and civil society groups.
What were the broader conditions that made this kind of  political action 
for judicial empowerment possible? The evidence suggests that the 
movement was predicated on six interlocking conditions: (1) a historically 
organised bar with high mobilising potential; (2) deepening political 
consensus within the bar in opposition to the incumbent military regime; 
(3) broad anti-regime convergence of  political constituencies within and 
without the bar; (4) absence of  a united political opposition and/or low 
potential for a political party-led mobilisation; (5) functional courts with 
judicial review powers; and (6) a visible cause-generating event linked to 
the institutional interests of  the bar.
The first two conditions – namely, an organised bar with high 
mobilising potential, and an intra-bar political consensus against 
unconstitutional regimes – are common to most instances of  political 
mobilisation by lawyers in Pakistan (Rizvi 2015). Parallels between the 
Lawyers’ Movement on the one hand, and the MRD and anti-LFO 
movements on the other, testify to the institutional capacity of  the bar 
to engage in collective action, and to do so through unconventional 
techniques, including disruptive and subversive practices such as 
strikes, boycotts, and mass street mobilisation. The historical parallels 
also point to a broad oppositional consensus within the bar against 
military rule. However, this consensus has seldom been immediate and 
spontaneous. In the 1980s as well as the 2000s, the consensus against 
military government within the bar deepened only gradually and 
was contingent on active bar politics. The passage of  time helped the 
cause of  politically motivated lawyers as the negative consequences of  
military rule became more apparent, and as the initial euphoria that 
characterised the coups turned to ambivalence, if  not antagonism.
The third condition – a broad convergence of  anti-regime 
constituencies – is also apparent in all successful mobilisations. In 
both the MRD and the Lawyers’ Movement, at least some if  not all 
mainstream political parties supported the bar’s anti-regime political 
action at crucial moments. When this broad convergence thinned out, 
the mobilisation too experienced a downturn.
In addition to historical similarities, differences between the Lawyers’ 
Movement and past mobilisations also shed light on other conditions 
of  mobilisation. One major difference lies in the nexus between the 
political action of  lawyers and political party opposition. For instance, 
in the 1980s, the goal of  lawyers’ mobilisation was to facilitate a revival 
of  political activity on behalf  of  political parties that were deeply 
suppressed under martial law. Lawyers played a central role in unifying 
anti-regime parties under the common platform of  the MRD, with the 
parties building on the efforts of  the lawyers to foment a mass social 
movement.
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In contrast, in the early 2000s, anti-regime lawyers had to contend with 
a divided political opposition. Unlike Zia, Musharraf  made good on his 
promise of  holding elections within three years of  his coup, ensuring 
that there was less incentive for political parties to create a strong 
opposition coalition. As parties sought opportunities for reconciliation 
with the military regime, not only did lawyers come to view them with 
circumspection, they also capitalised on the political space open to them 
to define and execute their own agendas. This allowed lawyers to maintain 
institutional autonomy even as they engaged in unprecedented strategies 
for judicial empowerment. From this, one may surmise that the nature 
of  political party opposition pre-mobilisation significantly determines the 
degree of  autonomous agenda-setting in political lawyering.
Another major difference in the Lawyers’ Movement was the status of  
the judiciary. Unlike General Zia’s clampdown on Constitutional Courts 
and indefinite suspension of  their fundamental rights jurisdiction in the 
1980s, Musharraf ’s government initially tolerated the courts as part 
of  its international rhetoric on ‘guided democracy’ and ‘rule of  law’ 
(Talbot 2002), and took a calculated risk in permitting them to exercise 
their inherent judicial review powers. Moreover, while the Constitution 
remained suspended for seven years under Zia, Musharraf  revived it 
within three years as a prelude to elections. This early revival of  the 
Constitution allowed the courts much greater agency and kept open the 
possibility of  lawyers pushing legitimacy-seeking judges into mounting a 
more effective challenge to the regime. In other words, it created an arena 
for judges to cooperate with anti-regime lawyers. In the absence of  a 
united political opposition, a mutually supportive legal complex emerged.
Finally, the extraordinary and mutually empowering alliance between 
lawyers and judges may not have materialised had it not been for the 
media-driven spectacle of  the Chief  Justice’s defiance at a time when 
political opposition to Musharraf  was high, and an organisational 
machinery already in place for coordinated action by anti-regime 
lawyers. The ‘pre’ mobilisation greatly enhanced the likelihood that an 
incident of  this nature could be used to coalesce an otherwise politically 
diverse, and at times divided, bar. So, although the removal and bold 
insubordination of  the Chief  Justice were cause-generating factors, the 
fact they happened within the context of  a larger political consensus 
against the military regime was a necessary condition for successful 
mobilisation.
3 Post-movement politics – whither accountability?
3.1 From movement to post-movement politics
The larger political context, combined with the mechanisms and 
strategies of  activist lawyers, created downstream constraints in 
the aftermath of  the movement for the accountability of  both 
judges and lawyers. Firstly, the military regime’s assault on the 
judiciary perpetuated a binary in the movement narrative between 
judicial empowerment and regime accountability. Lawyers viewed 
empowerment and accountability as inhabiting two different and 
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competing spheres: the judiciary on the one hand and the executive 
on the other. Especially from the third phase onwards, when the 
large-scale dismissal of  judges made their restoration synonymous with 
judicial independence, it was impossible for the movement narrative to 
simultaneously accommodate the goals of  judicial empowerment and 
accountability. This binary carried over into the post-election period 
because of  the civilian government’s reluctance to restore the judges. 
Thus, there was an inevitable delay in the emergence of  constituents 
within the bar for judicial accountability as well as of  a general 
discourse on accountability in the bar and the bench.
Secondly, lawyers’ strategies of  popularising the judges, and particularly 
Chief  Justice Chaudhry, created a cult of  personality. Chaudhry’s 
self-projection as a populist judge was evident in the zeal with which 
the post-restoration Supreme Court deployed its suo motu powers and 
mounted challenges to the civilian government (Khan 2014).
Thirdly, the delays in and the modality of  the final restoration of  the 
judges in March 2009 – through a long march supported by PML-N 
against the reluctant PPP-led government – created an environment of  
distrust between the restored judges and the government. In order to 
ensure fidelity to their agenda of  judicial independence, the restored 
judges, led by the Chief  Justice, embarked on a plan to reorganise 
Constitutional Court membership. In their view, the courts needed to 
be purged of  ‘illegitimate’ judges: namely, PCO judges who took oath 
under Musharraf ’s emergency law in 2007, as well as those who took 
oath under Chief  Justice Dogar after the emergency and, again, after 
the ousting of  Musharraf  in August 2008. The chasm between the 
core group of  judges and the government, and by extension the wider 
circle of  judges legitimised by the ruling government, largely explains 
the Chief  Justice’s motivation for the purge (Kalhan 2013). Arguably, 
this reshuffling was a form of  judicial accountability, but only in the 
very narrow sense of  removing judges ostensibly loyal to the Musharraf  
regime (Gazdar 2009). Indeed, sections of  the bar, including many 
former supporters, accused the Chief  Justice of  vendetta, and of  
stacking the courts with his own loyalists (Walsh 2013).
All these factors – the movement’s focus on judicial empowerment, 
the rise of  judicial populism, the re-entrenchment of  the Chief  Justice 
in the Supreme Court, and the judiciary–government conflict in the 
post-Musharraf  era – collectively contributed to a hyper-activist apex 
court asserting its newfound normative authority over a fragile civilian 
government during Chaudhry’s tenure from 2009 to 2013 (Kalhan 
2013). This post-movement period of  judicial assertion opened up rare 
opportunities for the judiciary to arrogate to itself  executive powers, 
notably the power of  judicial appointments in the Constitutional Courts 
(Ijaz 2014; Oldenburg 2016). The power to select judges was a major 
arena of  contestation between the judiciary and the executive as well as 
the legislature. Originally, the Constitution authorised the President to 
appoint and promote judges in consultation with the Chief  Justice.
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In 2010, the new civilian government introduced a two-tiered 
participatory process involving the judiciary, bar, and parliament to 
minimise judicial–executive conflicts and court-packing. However, 
the Supreme Court overrode this amendment by extinguishing 
parliamentary oversight from the appointments process (Kalhan 2013). 
The result was a hegemonic role for the Chief  Justice in Constitutional 
Court composition, as he presided over the selection, promotion, and 
removal of  judges (Rahman 2017). Hence, far from creating conditions 
for making the judiciary more inclusive and accountable, the political 
transition to civilian rule in the aftermath of  the movement enhanced 
the power of  the Supreme Court while concurrently allowing the 
judiciary to insulate itself  from external accountability (Kalhan 2013; 
ICJ 2013; Khan 2014; Siddique 2015).
In the five years since Chief  Justice Chaudhry’s retirement in 2013, five 
Supreme Court Chief  Justices have peacefully completed their tenure. 
During this period, the court has decided many major political cases 
– the most recent being a series of  judgments between 2017 and 2018 
disqualifying the incumbent Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, on corruption 
charges (Bhatti 2018). Thus, it appears that the Lawyers’ Movement has 
had enduring judicial empowerment outcomes in the form of  security 
of  tenure for judges. At the same time, the litany of  criticisms against the 
judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, has expanded.
The gravamen of  these criticisms is that while the court’s political 
impact and autonomy have increased, it has not only deliberately 
eschewed questions of  judicial accountability but also failed at deeper 
institutional reform and a fairer distribution of  resources to the district 
courts, the backbone of  the judicial system. Litigants who frequent 
these lower courts continue to suffer as before from neglect and reform 
inertia (Siddique 2013). Thus, the gains in judicial independence appear 
to be limited in two ways. Firstly, they relate to a very narrow sphere 
of  governmental accountability on mostly political and governance-
related matters, with the Supreme Court acting as an arbiter of  
mega-politics and the fate of  elected governments (Kalhan 2013; Khan 
2014; Siddique 2015). Secondly, empowerment gains have not cascaded 
down to the district judiciary, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
posturing on judicial reform through the 2009 National Judicial Policy 
(Siddique 2013).
3.2 Bar politics and accountability bottlenecks
Many of  the Supreme Court’s critics are erstwhile leaders and active 
movement mobilisers. Why, then, has the bar not engaged in effective 
collective action for judicial accountability? The following analysis 
shifts the focus to post-movement bar politics to explore why Pakistan’s 
lawyers are weak pro-accountability actors and whether there is any 
scope for their political action on accountability-related issues.
It is important to highlight at the outset that just as the judiciary suffers 
from an accountability deficit, the bar is riven by its own problems 
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which appear to be heightened in the aftermath of  the movement. One 
key issue is the rapid decline in lawyers’ moral social standing. In just 
a few years, lawyers’ public image has gone from heroes to ‘hooligans’ 
(Leiby 2012; Mir 2017). Lawyers are increasingly violent and disruptive 
both inside and outside the courtroom, against other lawyers, police, 
litigants, and even judges – a phenomenon described in local parlance 
as ‘wukala gardi’. It is widely felt that the movement has emboldened 
lawyers, particularly younger lawyers, to use their ‘newly-discovered 
power of  defiance’ to undermine the legal system (Rizvi 2015).
Interview respondents speculate that the ‘hooliganism’ is a result of  
incompetent lawyers rising to prominence based on their fidelity to the 
movement, or because generally lawyers have become emboldened 
about agitating against judges, or both. Wukala gardi, although perceived 
as normalised only among a minority of  the legal community, raises 
serious doubts about lawyers’ agency for judicial accountability and also 
lawyers’ own discipline and accountability.
Be that as it may, the bar is not devoid of  a constituency for judicial 
accountability. The first post-restoration bar association elections – held 
in the SCBA in October 2009 – demonstrated an even split between 
support for and opposition to veteran lawyer and movement leader 
Hamid Khan and his ‘Professional Group’ on the question of  judicial 
accountability. This intra-bar split emerged, partially, in reaction to 
Chief  Justice Chaudhry’s decision to purge the judiciary and wrench 
control of  judicial appointments from parliament. The main contention 
of  the Professional Group was that the bar must strive to consolidate 
movement gains by buttressing the restored judiciary’s powers despite 
the democratic transition. That Khan’s presidential candidate for the 
SCBA secured a marginal victory not only signalled shifting alliances at 
the bar’s highest levels, but also a return to ordinary politics for the bar.
In 2010, Asma Jahangir – a lawyer and social activist who rose to 
eminence in the 1980s for her anti-Zia resistance and human rights 
advocacy – defeated Khan’s candidate to become the first female SCBA 
President (Dawn 2010). Since then, elections in the SCBA as well as 
bar associations across Punjab have been dominated by two factions: 
Hamid Khan’s pro-judiciary Professional Group and Asma Jahangir’s 
pro-accountability ‘Independent Group’. The latter has argued against 
judicial arbitrariness and pushed for greater accountability in the 
wider context of  the struggle for civilian political supremacy (Express 
Tribune 2011).
Despite the existence of  a pro-accountability constituency, it appears 
that lack of  cohesion in the bar leadership is an important factor 
inhibiting effective political action, especially because of  the nature 
of  the cleavage. The fact that the split was grounded in the very 
issue of  judicial accountability with an entrenched ‘pro-judiciary’ 
group in favour of  the status quo, impeded political action to address 
the accountability deficit. In addition, the pro-accountability group 
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was seen to have its own accountability deficit insofar as it claimed 
to represent the interests of  PCO judges removed by Chief  Justice 
Chaudhry (Sheikh 2012), fuelling the impression that the group’s 
primary agenda was to settle scores with Chaudhry and his allies.
Another factor that has compounded the lack of  cohesion in the bar 
is the nature of  coalitions between a cross-section of  lawyers and 
Constitutional Court judges. Of  the interview respondents active 
in bar politics, several criticised what they perceived to be clientelist 
relationships between judges – ostensibly beneficiaries of  the movement 
– and pro-judiciary lawyers in the movement’s immediate aftermath. 
The judiciary’s hegemony over judge selection brought about a wider 
shift in the way that power and privileges were allocated in the legal 
complex. Previously, the selection power was shared between the 
executive and the judiciary, with the former typically trumping the 
latter. Post-movement, power came to rest firmly with the Supreme 
Court, incentivising lawyer–judge nepotism (Express Tribune 2012) that 
effectively thwarted political action for judicial accountability, with 
lawyers vying for leverage in the judiciary and judges maintaining 
constituencies in the bar for their judicial activism. Equally, the 
near-unconditional support from strong sections of  the bar in the 
post-restoration period allowed the court to drag its feet on resuscitating 
the SJC (Niazi 2016).
The accountability bottlenecks in the Constitutional Courts – namely 
the cleavage in the bar on the question of  accountability and the 
clientelist cooperation between exclusive groups of  lawyers and judges 
– flowed directly from the movement-centred trajectory of  judicial 
empowerment. Almost a decade after the restoration, a majority 
of  survey respondents still echo this view: when asked whether they 
thought the current dynamic between the bar and the bench was 
attributable to the movement, 40 per cent said ‘highly’ or ‘very highly’ 
and 34 per cent said ‘partially’.
3.3 The ‘new’ legal complex
The accountability bottlenecks point to an underlying structure within 
the legal complex that is based on mutuality between segments in 
the bar and the bench. This structure instantiates a ‘cross-cutting’ 
legal complex (Halliday et al. 2012) in which, at any given time, a 
cross-section of  lawyers and judges cooperate for mutual entrenchment 
while the larger bar–bench relationship ranges from unengaged to 
oppositional. Over time, the divide between the Professional and 
Independent Groups has become as much about pro-judiciary and 
pro-accountability as about the politics of  entrenchment and elite 
capture. This is reflected in the near-unanimous opinion of  survey 
respondents (89 per cent) that bar representatives should have a greater 
role in the judicial appointments process. This configuration is markedly 
different from the pre-movement legal complex that consisted of  a 
pro-regime and anti-regime cleavage. It is also very distinct from the 
legal complex underpinning the movement in which, broadly speaking, 
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the bar cohered around the anti-regime group to build a cooperative 
legal complex against a third party, the regime. In the present 
cross-cutting legal complex, cooperative and oppositional segments 
coexist in tension but are also fluid and contingent on alliances with the 
evolving locus of  power within the higher judiciary.
The mixed survey responses reflect this complexity. When asked to 
characterise the present bar–bench relationship, 35 per cent said it was 
‘highly cooperative’ or ‘cooperative’, while 21 per cent said, ‘highly 
conflicted’ or ‘conflicted’. A majority (44 per cent) thought that the 
relationship was ‘neither cooperative nor conflicted’. When asked about 
the main reasons for the bar–bench conflict, there were varied responses 
with the most recurrent being, ‘the attitude of  lawyers and judges with 
each other creates conflict’ (25 per cent) and ‘leaders of  the bar are to 
blame for the bar–bench conflict’ (11 per cent). A high 90 per cent of  all 
respondents were in favour of  greater bar–bench cooperation.
Nonetheless, this cross-cutting legal complex is not a static configuration 
and tends to gravitate to oppositional mode under conditions 
threatening the bar. This typically happens when the judiciary makes 
a direct attempt at holding lawyers – particularly bar office holders – 
accountable for misconduct against judges. An example is the recent 
‘Multan Bench controversy’, triggered by an altercation between a 
Lahore High Court (LHC) judge sitting on a bench in Multan and 
the President of  the Multan Bar Association, Sher Zaman Qureshi. 
Courtroom confrontations between lawyers and judges, often involving 
threats and violence, are not uncommon and are widely publicised in 
the media. On this occasion, an allegedly heated exchange between 
the judge and Qureshi spiralled into a mob-like reaction from Multan 
district bar lawyers.
In response, the LHC Chief  Justice, Mansoor Ali Shah – known for 
his pro-accountability interventions against both lawyers and judges 
(Husain 2016) – immediately recalled all judges on the Multan Bench, 
and constituted a new bench which suspended Qureshi’s licence 
and issued him a show cause notice for contempt of  court. Qureshi 
refused to appear and lawyers aggressively protested in Justice Shah’s 
courtroom. Subsequently, when the LHC issued an arrest warrant for 
Qureshi, lawyers clashed violently with anti-riot police (Malik 2017b).
When asked about their views on these events, survey respondents had 
remarkably homogeneous reactions against Justice Shah’s interventions: 
almost 87 per cent disagreed with the recall of  Multan Bench judges, 
and 84 per cent did not support the decision to suspend Qureshi’s 
licence and issue him a contempt notice. Thus, contrary to the view that 
bar–bench standoffs are essentially conflicts between pro-accountability 
judges such as Justice Shah and elite lawyers (Husain 2016), lawyers 
across the board appear to be strongly opposed to the judiciary taking 
direct disciplinary action against bar members. Lawyers also believe 
that the judiciary is sidestepping the rising number of  complaints 
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of  judicial misconduct in the SJC. An overwhelming 90 per cent of  
respondents wished to see the SJC functional again. Taken together, 
these figures show a strong self-preservation instinct, a clear preference 
for self-accountability, and a high demand for judicial accountability 
through the SJC. The politics of  self-preservation can be further gauged 
from the fact that, barring exceptions such as Asma Jahangir, there 
was little public condemnation by senior bar leaders of  the misconduct 
and violence in the Multan case. This is evidence that lawyers are poor 
receptors of  external accountability interventions, including from the 
judiciary, and on this axis the legal complex is deeply oppositional.
4 Conclusion
The Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement case study and its aftermath presents 
two salient findings for our understanding of  political action and 
how it relates to judicial empowerment and accountability. Firstly, the 
conditions, processes, and methods of  empowerment may impose 
significant limits on the outcomes, benefits, and gains that flow from 
them. In Pakistan, the political context combined with political lawyering 
as a pathway to judicial empowerment have profoundly shaped both 
the course and institutional quality of  the judiciary’s power. In a bid to 
consolidate its newfound populist authority, the judiciary has expanded 
its jurisdiction towards routine and arbitrary intervention in political 
and governance-related questions to the detriment of  its ever-spiralling 
regular caseload (Malik 2017a). The judiciary’s hyper-assertion of  
autonomy in this narrow sphere of  judiciary–executive relations has, in 
turn, led to democracy-weakening outcomes (Siddique, forthcoming). 
At the same time, the concentration of  power within the Supreme Court 
and its singular focus on political questions has ensured that there is 
no structural change within the judicial institution itself. If  anything, it 
appears to have become even more hierarchical and stratified than before.
Secondly, the conditions for empowerment and accountability may 
be altogether different, especially where the processes leading up to 
them are structured sequentially or are otherwise temporally distinct. 
Indeed, the conditions for and pathway to empowerment may 
produce unintended constraints and perverse consequences for the 
accountability of  empowered actors and institutions. In Pakistan’s 
case, judicial empowerment – despite the strong mutuality between 
lawyers and judges during much of  the movement – has led to new 
accountability bargains such that there is a deep distrust of  and 
resistance to inter-institutional accountability between the judiciary and 
the bar, and as a result a clear tendency in both institutions towards 
self-regulation and self-accountability.
On the one hand, Constitutional Court judges exercise exclusive power 
over judicial appointments and bestow selective privilege on favoured 
lawyers to sustain their populism. On the other, bar leaders leverage 
well-entrenched constituencies within the bar to jockey for judicial 
patronage or to press the court for desired outcomes in important 
briefs. In this inward-looking and self-preserving environment, there 
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are impromptu attempts on both sides to discipline and hold the 
other accountable, often resulting in either an accountability deadlock 
or indirect accountability through mechanisms such as judicial 
appointments and judicial transfers.
Quite apart from the accountability deadlock between the judiciary 
and the bar, there is another important accountability bargain that has 
emerged in reaction to the movement that wields a covert, but systemic 
influence, on the Supreme Court – namely, the ‘military–judicial 
complex’. While judicial empowerment has ensured de jure security 
of  tenure for Constitutional Court judges, it cannot be credited with 
bringing about a structural transformation in the imbalance of  power 
between military and civilian institutions. Even as the legal complex 
has championed a narrative of  embedding an independent judiciary 
and ousting military rule, the deep state has mobilised its resources to 
adapt to the political transitions of  the past decade and to accumulate 
executive and judicial powers without any overt or extra-constitutional 
political interventions. The most dramatic example of  this in the 
movement aftermath was the constitutional consensus on the transfer of  
judicial power in a number of  vaguely defined terrorism-related offences 
to the military courts without recourse to fundamental rights-based 
remedies (Newberg 2016). In the more recent imbroglio involving 
the forced removal of  an elected Prime Minister in the run-up to the 
2018 general election, the military publicly supported the Supreme 
Court’s relentless chastening of  the PML-N (Gul 2018) – a historically 
military-friendly political party that has fallen out of  favour with the 
establishment – raising allegations that the court’s ‘celebrity judges’ are 
aligned with the military’s interests (Hussain 2018; The Economist 2018).
The simultaneous emasculation and propping up of  the Constitutional 
Courts by the military reproduces the old dynamic of  judicial 
collaboration for de facto control over the political process, albeit through 
indirect means. The revival of  the military–judicial complex means 
that while the judiciary may freely assert its autonomy over civilian 
governments, its institutional survival and accountability is still, as in the 
past, closely tied to the military’s political agenda. Thus, the sources of  
judicial empowerment and accountability tend to occupy different, even 
mutually exclusive, spheres, underscoring the fact that the relationship 
between the two is highly contingent on the historical, political, and 
institutional context.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
1 Maryam S. Khan, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development and 
Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), Pakistan.
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Localising National Accountability 
Claims in Fragile Settings: 
The Right to Food Campaign 
in India*
Anuradha Joshi1 and Aheli Chowdhury2
Abstract How does a national movement go local in places with multiple 
armed actors, simultaneously retaining credibility at the grass roots, while 
making claims and negotiating with the state? This article explores how 
a rights-based movement, the Right to Food (RTF) in India, with a strong 
national core and some state-level support expanded into areas that were 
experiencing militant insurgency. We find that the RTF movement was able 
to coexist with the militant groups because the movement: (a) brought 
new framings and issues to existing groups that were already working with 
vulnerable populations; and (b) distinguished itself from the militant groups 
in terms of substantive issues and approach (avoiding issues of displacement 
and land rights), as it was willing to work with the state to tackle issues of 
hunger and food entitlements.
Keywords: India, Right to Food, grass-roots action, fragility, conflict, 
armed militancy, Naxalite, social movements, socioeconomic rights.
1 Introduction
How does a national movement go local in places with multiple armed 
actors, while simultaneously retaining credibility at the grass roots and 
making claims and negotiating with the state? This article explores 
how a rights-based movement, the Right to Food (RTF) in India, with 
a strong national core and some state-level support, expanded into 
areas that were experiencing militant insurgency, which was in part 
rooted in the lack of  rights among those populations. The setting is 
one of  subnational locations in India where the state is repressive 
and militarised and in which, therefore, civil and political rights are 
curtailed. How does the RTF movement work in these locations 
dominated by extremists, while retaining a commitment to achieving 
rights through the law? To what extent do the claims of  the armed 
militants converge with the broader RTF movement?
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Since the 2000s, India has witnessed a wave of  rights-based movements 
for accountability for socioeconomic rights. Starting with the National 
Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), many of  
these movements have managed to win significant gains through 
progressive legislation, including the Right to Information Act (RTI) 
2005, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (MGNREGA) 2005, the Forest Rights Act 2006, the Right to 
Education Act 2009, and the National Food Security Act 2013. The 
trajectory of  these struggles often follows a common storyline: a small 
movement (either grass-roots-based or comprising a small organisation 
with middle-class activists) escalates from a relatively local struggle to a 
national movement which then succeeds in shifting national policy. The 
story of  the RTI Act, starting with the efforts of  the Mazdoor Kisan 
Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) to ensure minimum wages for workers on 
public works programmes in the state of  Rajasthan and moving to the 
national level lobbying for a Right to Information Act with the newly 
elected Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, 
exemplifies this narrative (Pande 2014; Baviskar 2010; Singh 2010; 
Jenkins and Goetz 1999).
Yet, this perspective on scaling up of  local struggles, while important, 
neglects an equally important trajectory: how do such efforts once they 
reach the national level, reach back to the grass roots, in locations where 
they have few roots, and succeed in broadening their base? Existing 
literature offers few clues. It has tended to focus on the operations of  
movements themselves, including how movements sustain over decades 
through high and low levels of  mobilisation on the ground (Isserman 
1987; Morris 1984; Tilly 1978; Whittier 1995); how interactions of  
organisational structures and political opportunity structures shape 
the continuity and character of  the movement over time (Whittier 
1997); and how within social movements, internal heterogeneities 
and subgroups of  interest are suppressed in the interest of  broader 
strategy (Sharp et al. 2000; Dwivedi 1997, 1998; Baviskar 1995). While 
these studies highlight essential aspects of  movement dynamics and 
operations, there is less attention on understanding how movements 
sustain their presence on the ground, particularly in settings of  fragility, 
conflict, and violence. Baviskar’s (1997) work on Narmada Bachao 
Andolan (NBA) that operated in a similar terrain to the RTF movement 
reveals the complex relationship of  the tribal groups with nature, the 
state, and the co-habiting middle-class activists, but does not shed much 
light on how the movement negotiated space within settings of  conflict 
and violence.
This article focuses on this less studied dynamic – of  the downward 
diffusion of  social movements – drawing upon the experience of  the 
RTF campaign in India in three states affected by left-wing extremism 
(LWE).3 The evolution of  the well-known RTF campaign in India is 
a good case to explore these questions. The campaign originated with 
a Supreme Court Case, in which a human rights group – the People’s 
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) – charged the government with 
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inaction in preventing deaths through starvation while there was surplus 
food rotting in government storage silos (Birchfield and Corsi 2010). 
The campaign gathered some credibility and momentum through 
the interventions of  the Supreme Court in the form of  orders that 
mandated the government to take immediate action to prevent any 
form of  starvation and hunger and to consider it as their (central and 
state) primary responsibility.
The Supreme Court appointed ‘Commissioners’ to monitor 
implementation of  all orders relating to the case. The orders of  the 
court then became a rallying point around which activists and groups 
in different states came together to form the RTF campaign. The 
campaign remained a loose network of  groups and individuals who 
provided ground-level information about implementation of  the 
court orders to the Office of  the Commissioners. The story of  the 
evolution of  the campaign from this small beginning to the passing of  
the National Food Security Act in 2013 has been already documented 
to some extent and will only be touched on lightly here (Hertel 2015; 
Srinivasan and Narayanan 2007).
What is often less stressed is that the RTF campaign, supported 
by the Supreme Court orders, has been extensively animated by 
unrelenting national-level advocacy by the Supreme Court Office of  
the Commissioners in New Delhi. Simultaneously, the same office, 
in coordination with the RTF campaign, has made a concerted 
effort to foreground issues of  food entitlements to civil society groups 
at the subnational level.4 The Office of  the Commissioners at the 
subnational level worked in tandem with RTF campaign members, in 
monitoring the implementation of  the Supreme Court orders in the 
states. They played a key role in the investigation of  deaths through 
starvation, mobilising awareness of  relevant orders (prior to the act 
passing), establishing monitoring mechanisms such as public hearings, 
and linking groups to national-level action. Yet, this subnational 
story has been less explored, particularly of  how the state-level RTF 
campaign mobilised and linked local groups to the national campaign. 
Of  particular interest, and so far undocumented, is how this process 
unfolded in states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Bihar, 
and Andhra Pradesh, which are dominated by large tribal populations 
and are substantially affected by violent conflict due to the presence of  
Maoist-inspired LWE groups.
It is only recently that the literature has been engaging with issues 
of  how rights-oriented court judgments are complied with (or not) 
and the role of  social movements within them (Langford, Rodríguez-
Garavito and Rossi 2017). Assessing a number of  cases, they conclude 
that, ‘particularly important appears to be the degree and extent of  
internal mobilisation amongst litigants, the strength of  leadership in affected 
communities and the types of  alliances in the enforcement phase’ (ibid.: 25). 
Simultaneously, the literature on the role of  law in social change 
acknowledges that favourable judgments might not be enforceable. 
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Social movements view the courts as only one of  the many arenas within 
which struggles occur (Hunt 1993; Joshi 2010). The hope is that legal 
judgments shape the way issues are conceived and discussed both by the 
aggrieved parties as well as the broader public (McCann 1994).
In addition, judgments provide protection for social mobilisation – 
‘being on the right side of  the law’. As Rohit De (2018) shows in his 
recent book on the cases brought under the Constitution immediately 
post-independence, even when the court failed to uphold rights, 
activism was still important in shaping the law, as well as the range 
of  other actions that organised groups took against the state. Thus, 
courts in practice offer both: a remedy for the rights violations as 
well as cover for social mobilisation. Viewed in this manner, the RTF 
campaign’s spread into conflict-affected states is natural, but also poses 
an additional challenge for such accountability work in fragile settings: 
how does a movement navigate the terrain with multiple armed actors, 
retain credibility at the grass roots, and simultaneously make claims and 
negotiate with the state without appearing threatening?
Based on interviews with state- and national-level RTF activists in 
three such states,5 this article offers insights into how social movements 
manage alliances and garner support, in contexts of  violent conflict and 
the presence of  alternative groups (sometimes armed), with different 
ideologies that might equally draw support from, and are embedded 
in, local communities. Three key features of  such downward diffusion 
stand out. First, not surprisingly, when entering new and particularly 
fragile, complex terrain, the experience of  the RTF shows that they 
have to focus efforts on reorienting existing groups towards food, rather 
than attempting to start new groups from scratch. Second, the RTF, 
like many movements, attempts to balance a confrontational stance 
towards government, with an engaged, cooperative stance as a strategy 
for increased effectiveness. The RTF is seen as a group that clearly has 
state allegiance and works within the framework of  the Constitution 
to hold the state accountable. In the contexts of  conflict, however, this 
becomes imperative for avoiding being targeted as a terror-supporting 
organisation.
Simultaneously though, such balancing puts credibility with the local 
populations under constant jeopardy. In the recent past, there has been 
an increasing incidence of  mass-scale displacement and suppression 
of  the dissenting population in these states. This has further intensified 
the crisis within the local population and how they view the state. 
Paradoxically though, as we show, it is this ‘working with the state’, 
which seems to have been the reason why the RTF has managed to 
work in areas with LWE presence. Finally, the case shows that despite an 
initial separation of  issue areas related to food and livelihoods security, 
both the RTF campaign and the LWE are evolving towards similar 
positions on key issues – a fact that is not surprising given that both are 
seeking legitimacy for their work from local populations whose primary 
need is material and social wellbeing.
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The article is laid out in the following way. Sections 2 and 3 provide 
some background to the RTF campaign and the Naxalite movement 
in India. This is followed by two substantive sections that present the 
interview findings – Section 4 details how the RTF campaign operated 
within these states and Section 5 shows why they were able to coexist 
peacefully with the LWE groups. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Right to Food campaign
The RTF campaign is usually considered to have started with the Civil 
Writ Petition 196/2001, filed by the PUCL against the Union of  India 
and others. The core contention was that the government had not acted 
to prevent deaths through starvation in the country despite holding a 
large stock of  food grains under the Public Distribution Scheme (PDS), 
which was aimed at food security for the poor through the provision of  
subsidised food grains. The case, popularly known as the ‘Right to Food’ 
case, was soon to become the longest running mandamus on the right to 
food in the world (see Figure 1). The Supreme Court, through two key 
steps was instrumental in shaping the trajectory of  the RTF campaign 
in the country (Sinha et al. 2014).
First, it passed close to 200 interim orders in the case, requiring the 
government to undertake action on a range of  food-related issues, 
including school midday meals, supplementary nutrition for pregnant 
and lactating mothers, the food subsidy scheme, pensions, and 
maternity benefits. These orders converted government programmes 
into legal entitlements. Second, it created a Supreme Court Office of  
the Commissioners, and appointed two Commissioners – N.C. Saxena 
and S.R. Sankaran (who was later replaced by Harsh Mander) – 
ex-government bureaucrats, to monitor the implementation of  the 
interim orders in the states. The Commissioners were sympathetic 
to framing food as a right and attracted staff who were either drawn 
from food-related civil society groups, or sympathetic to them – to the 
extent that the Office of  the Commissioners was deeply allied with the 
RTF campaign. Many of  the state-level advisors of  the Commission 
were simultaneously part of  local activism and played the dual role of  
monitoring as well advocacy.
This consequential RTF case and related campaign had its origins in 
the prevalence of  hunger and starvation deaths in the state of  Rajasthan 
where the PUCL chapter had been the node for a network of  civil society 
organisations (including MKSS, which was the grass-roots organisation at 
the heart of  the RTI movement). The initial shoots of  the campaign found 
support in progressive human rights lawyers including Colin Gonzalves 
and journalists such as P. Sainath, who highlighted the paradox of  
‘hunger amidst plenty’ and reformist bureaucrats such as B.N. Yugandhar, 
Abhijit Sen, and Syeda Hamid at the Planning Commission. The 
campaign quickly morphed into a loosely knit, non-funded, decentralised 
network of  grass-roots groups and activists united in their commitment 
to the ‘realisation of  the right to food in India’.6 Most of  these 
grass-roots groups in the states were part of  other networks such as the 
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Figure 1 The Right to Food campaign, India
Source Authors’ own.
2001
As an offshoot of the Supreme Court case, the Right to 
Food campaign is formed.
2002
The Supreme Court through interim orders appoints 
Dr N.C. Saxena and Mr S.R. Shankaran as ‘Commissioners’ 
for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of all 
orders relating to the Right to Food case. 
Subsequently, a subnational Office of the Commissioners 
was set up with advisors to assist the national 
Commissioners in monitoring implementation.
2003
Bhopal, June 2004
2005  
Responding to the long-standing demand of the 
campaign, the government passed the MGNREGA. 
It was passed in 2005, but implemented from 
February 2006 onwards.
Kolkata, November 2005
2007
Bodhgaya, April 2007
2009
Rourkhela, August 2010
2013
Gujarat, April 2014
2017
Ranchi, September 2017
Writ Petition submitted to the Supreme Court of India 
by the People’s Union of Civil Liberties, Rajasthan. The 
case thereafter known as the PUCL vs Union of India 
and others, Writ Petition 196 of 2001. The petition 
asks the court to order the Government of Rajasthan 
to (a) provide immediate open-ended employment in 
drought-affected villages, (b) provide ‘gratuitous relief’ to 
persons unable to work, (c) raise the Public Distribution 
Scheme (PDS) entitlement per family, and (d) provide 
subsidised food grain to all families. Finally, the petition 
requests the court to order the central government to 
supply free food grain for these programmes.
9 April 2002: Day of action on Mid-Day Meal (       ) 
Instrumental in persuading several state governments to 
initiate cooked midday meals in primary schools. 
Six National Conventions (    ) on food-related issues 
held to date. These conventions discussed issues, took stock 
of the implementation of the Supreme Court Orders at 
the subnational level, and also planned future action.
May–June 2005: Rozgar Adhikar Yatra (     ), 
a 50-day tour of India’s poorest districts to demand for 
immediate enactment of the MGNREGA.
September: At a day-long convention in Delhi, the 
Right to Food campaign drafted a set of common 
‘essential demands’ for the National Food Security Act. 
Based on this, the campaign formulates the draft 
Right to Food Act.
September: The Government of India passed the 
National Food Security Act, 2013.
February: The Supreme Court closes the 
Right to Food case.
2000
Present
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National Alliance for People’s Movements and the RTI campaign, and 
worked on issues of  land and displacement, health, education, and others.
Given the salience of  the RTF case, the sweeping orders being issued by 
the Supreme Court, the formation of  the Supreme Court Office of  the 
Commissioners, and the significance of  the media in placing the issues 
on the national agenda, the RTF campaign very soon became more 
active at the national level advocating for a Right to Food Act. Between 
2009 and 2013 when the idea of  passing a food security act was being 
drafted, the campaign focused its energies on influencing the contents 
of  the proposed act, consulting heavily with its membership, and was 
fairly influential in shaping the final draft.7 The National Food Security 
Act was finally passed in 2013 by the Congress-led UPA government. It 
was one of  the last rights-based laws to be passed by the UPA before it 
fell from power in the 2014 elections.
This is not to say that grass-roots campaign work in the states was 
not ongoing; just that it was not as much in the limelight at the time. 
The campaign and affiliated organisations at the state level launched 
awareness-raising activities, social audits, protest marches, and held at 
least 16 high-level conventions on the right to food or related issues over 
a period of  14 years.8 What is less appreciated is the issue of  how the 
RTF campaign managed to work in states such as Bihar, West Bengal, 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra 
where it did not have a strong presence on the ground initially and 
which had several districts with a heavy presence of  LWE groups. 
In these states, high levels of  poverty, large tribal and schedule caste 
populations combine with an inhospitable terrain of  forest and hills, 
making these locations well suited for guerrilla tactics, and particularly 
inhospitable to mainstream civil society movements. We turn to the 
origins and ideology of  these LWE groups next.
3 The Naxalite movement and marginalised groups
The ‘Naxalite’ movement has its roots in Naxalbari, in north Bengal, 
where in 1967 a peasant uprising broke out with the support of  the 
Communist Party of  India (Marxist) (CPI-Marxist). Three veteran 
leaders of  the party – Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal 
Santhal – had been mobilising the peasants against oppression by 
the landlords. Peasants forcibly occupied land, burnt land records, 
and looted property, establishing a stronghold in the region. The 
government reacted by sending police to crush the movement, with 
the police opening fire, resulting in the death of  nine villagers. These 
actions by the government were widely criticised and had wide-reaching 
impacts in terms of  triggering similar movements across the tribal-
dominated states nearby. Since then, the Naxalite movement, drawing 
upon Maoist ideology, continues to affect several states in India where 
the LWE groups have established guerrilla bases. In 2006, more than 
60 districts across ten states were affected by LWE. By 2009, the 
Naxalites were influential across approximately 180 districts in ten states 
of  India (Giri 2009; Planning Commission 2008).
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The basic driver of  LWE was the failure of  the state to implement 
the Fifth and Ninth Schedules of  the Constitution of  India which 
call for autonomous self-governance and land reforms.9 No state has 
so far implemented the Fifth Schedule, and only three states have 
implemented land reforms – West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, and 
Kerala – and even in these, the reforms have been incomplete. This lack 
of  implementation led to the rise of  the Naxalite movement supported 
by local tribal and marginalised populations. The core challenge is that 
of  feudalism, and the aim of  the movement is to overthrow landlords 
and regain control of  natural resources (land, forests), which are the 
primary source of  livelihoods for the tribal populations. In this, the 
LWEs contrast with more mainstream left parties which view the 
main challenge to be that of  the economy with its colonial roots, and 
integration into the system of  global capitalism. As Prasad notes,
The nature of  left politics in India has been structured by this 
difference in interpretation, while Naxalites and Maoists have 
preferred to interpret the power structure in rural India as 
semi-feudal, the nature of  capitalist relations in agriculture and allied 
sectors had remained the focus of  other left parties. Therefore it is 
not surprising that the growth of  the Maoist movement has been far 
greater in places that have not experienced either land reforms or 
high agricultural growth (Prasad 2010: 7).
These struggles have taken different forms in the different states 
affected by LWE. In Bihar, there are two streams within the movement: 
the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI ML) Liberation which is considered 
‘revisionist’ by the other Naxalites; and the amalgamation of  the 
CPI (ML)-People’s War and the Maoist Communist Centre, in 2004 
to form a new party, the CPI (Maoist), also known as CPI (M).10 The 
core support in Bihar has tended to be from landless agricultural 
labourers or poor peasants, often from the lowest castes (Bhatia 2005). 
In Chhattisgarh, the expansion of  the Maoists was the result of  the 
formation and influence of  the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh, 
which started operating in the Dandakaranya region in the district of  
Bastar that borders Andhra Pradesh. In the 1990s, they formed two 
organisations, the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangathana 
(DAKMS) and the Krantikari Mahila Adivasi Sangathana (KMAS).
Prasad (2010) notes that although the Maoists gained support by 
focusing on issues of  daily importance, their practices lasted only 
until they gained control, after which they ruled through coercion and 
ruthless elimination of  opposition. In Jharkhand, the main group, 
the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), appears to have mobilised 
support through running a protection racket for the rural elite, 
offering protection to the resources of  the state, as well as protection 
from its own excesses, rather than being a poor people’s movement 
(Shah 2006). The presence of  the Maoists in Odisha has declined 
in recent years, with no activity in five districts.11 In other districts, 
the groups that are active apart from the CPI (M) are the breakaway 
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Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP), and People’s Liberation Front of  
India (PLFI). In West Bengal, where grass-roots politics has been 
well embedded in society, LWE groups are many, with the dominant 
one being CPI (M), and often the boundaries between grass-roots 
movements and LWE are blurred.
In addition, a generational shift is emerging in tribal areas of  all states: 
increasingly the younger generation of  tribals and landless labourers 
no longer want to continue farming or depending upon forests for 
livelihoods, and challenge old customs (deference to elders, marriage 
laws, etc.) (Shah 2011). Such youth are joining LWE groups, where 
they can get a taste of  power gained by direct action of  looting from 
landlords, moneylenders, or state-subsidised fair price shops (Ramana 
2008; Thivet 2014). These similarities and variations in the nature of  
LWE shape the nature of  interactions with the RTF and the potential 
for it to grow deep roots in each state.
The Indian state, for its part, has oscillated between defining the Maoist 
movement as a ‘law and order’ problem and as a socioeconomic problem. 
In its ‘law and order’ framing, the state uses the repressive weight of  the 
security forces to address Maoist-led insurgency. In its socioeconomic 
problem framing, Giri (2009: 465) argues that the state has defined the 
Maoists through three lenses over time – first as the byproduct of  the 
failure of  the ‘development model’ of  the state; second as fighting for 
the rights of  the poor and marginalised; and last, recognising them as 
an alternative political formation inspired by the need to find common 
ground between LWE groups and the state agencies.12
This latter reading of  the state’s view echoes with the view of  the left. 
The Indian left has argued that the government has long used the 
‘Maoist threat’ to justify the rise of  the security-centric state. The Indian 
left continues to critique the repressive capitalistic neoliberal state, but 
their position is one of  accommodation within a democratic framing. 
Giri (2009) argues that this understanding of  the Maoist movement by 
the Indian state and the Indian left shifts the discourse, from it being a 
security problem to it being a socioeconomic issue, which can be resolved 
by better state intervention. This clearly serves to ‘exclude them [the 
Naxalites] out’ as a political alternative (ibid.: 463). Thus, as we will see, 
not only are there differences between the positions of  different factions 
within the Naxalite movement, but there are a multitude of  positions 
towards them from the Indian state and from those on the Indian left, 
that coexist and shape the contested terrain of  Indian politics.
4 Taking the campaign to the states
The RTF campaign faced several challenges in reaching out to states 
where there was a significant Naxalite presence. First, these were states 
where a comprehensive platform of  food-related issues had not been 
on the agenda for development practitioners. Existing groups focused 
often on only part of  the problem; for example, groups working on 
child rights which took on midday meal issues, or groups working on 
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transparency which looked at corruption within the PDS. Further, in 
these states, issues of  tribal rights to land and forests loomed large and 
were the issues around which the many groups mobilised. The challenge 
then, was to bring various activists together under a comprehensive 
‘right to food’ framing.
Second, substantial parts of  these states were affected by conflict due to 
the use of  violent tactics by the LWEs, making it more difficult for the 
work of  the RTF oriented to peaceful rights claims. The uneven presence 
of  the state and state programmes, the multiplicity and ambiguity of  
different groups, and the challenges of  establishing credibility with the 
local populations were hurdles that the RTF campaign had to overcome.
Third, in these settings, the state already had an extremely distrustful 
view of  civil society organisations, viewing them as thinly disguised 
terrorist organisations. As we shall see, any criticism of  the state, or 
demands for accountability, made the RTF campaign vulnerable to 
being labelled as LWEs. Finally, these locations were among the poorest 
states in India, which meant that although they were the ones with 
the greatest need, they were also those with the most limited capacity 
and resources for full implementation of  the right to food, even if  they 
were politically committed to doing so. Evidence from our interviews, 
recounted below, presents an account of  how the RTF campaign 
navigated this shifting and uncertain terrain.
4.1 Linking with grass-roots groups
In the early 2000s, bringing the RTF movement to the local level in the 
conflict-affected areas revolved around forging links with existing groups. 
In one state, people who had been involved with literacy issues joined 
the RTF campaign. In another, the focus of  one group had been on 
dalit rights. The coalitions at state level thus included a range of  issues 
such as health care, violence against women, forest rights, maternal and 
childcare, or agricultural workers. These groups came together because 
the RTF campaign offered something for everyone, an overlap with their 
issues of  concern. In the three states we examined, the RTF campaign 
usually started with a small set of  core organisations that led the work in 
the state.
Initially, many groups in the state-level campaigns were funded by 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).13 Yet, over 
the years, with shrinking space for social activism, it was precarious 
to accept INGO funding, and simultaneously INGOs retreated from 
support of  overt challenges to the state. As one activist noted: ‘At the 
time it was fine by these funded organisations to work on rights-based 
issues, but now they have become scared’.14 Some even viewed INGOs 
with suspicion: ‘We have had funding agencies wanting to blatantly 
break the campaign. It was always a non-funded campaign’.15
From early on, the preference was to work with existing grass-roots 
groups which were working on some part of  the right to food agenda. 
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As an activist noted,
We focused particularly on organisations that have a mass base. This is because 
we think that this is not NGO-type work. The moment you involve NGOs then 
the spirit is gone. The NGOs are always very worried about their future, about 
projects, FCRA [Foreign Contribution Regulation Act] cancellation. They 
also tend to do only awareness and mobilisation, and mostly avoid doing active 
struggle.16
This sentiment was echoed by another interviewee:
For us, also we feel it is better that we move away from funded organisations to 
include individuals and people who directly want to work with us… Basically 
we are now moving from being an NGO-based campaign to become a more 
people/mass-based campaign.17
In India, the 1980s saw the advent of  NGOs, with the central 
government recognising their role as a delivery agency for rural 
development. They mushroomed over the next two decades and 
have been distinct from large social and peoples’ movements. They 
have been funded and staffed with professionals, in contrast to the 
social movements, which have remained non-funded and based at the 
grass roots. NGOs have over time supported and also participated in 
social movements, but were viewed mostly as outsiders. The general 
perception has been that NGOs are less radical, less critical of  the state, 
and prone to taking decisions based on funding needs (Raina 2004).
This tension persisted and intensified after the amendments to the 
FCRA in 2010 which prohibited NGOs receiving foreign donations 
from undertaking ‘anti-state’ activities. Reflecting this mix of  NGOs 
and movements and in contrast to popular perception, the RTF 
campaign’s grass-roots origins in these states were uneven and varied 
from state to state. National activists invested significantly in reaching 
out to local groups – both social movements and NGOs – to activate 
them around issues of  food. Yet, these efforts were circumscribed by the 
presence of  the LWE groups in the state, an issue we turn to next.
4.2 Presence of left-wing extremism
The scale and extent of  left-wing extremist activity varies from state 
to state, and for the most part LWE groups are present only in some 
blocks/districts of  the state, while RTF campaign work is more 
widespread. By and large, LWE groups did not counter the growing 
influence of  the RTF campaign as it expanded, as Chandra points out 
in the case of  Jharkhand: ‘Non-governmental organizations are rarely, 
if  ever, stopped from working for grass-roots development’ (Chandra 
2013: 57). Rather, LWE groups often remained unseen and the RTF 
campaigns coexisted somewhat uneasily, aware of  their presence. In one 
state, an RTF activist noted, ‘The presence of  these groups (Maoists) is 
invisible by and large. The main activities of  these groups are concerned 
with the security forces’.18 Yet the same activist noted that in some 
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pockets, ‘The entire area is under the control of  the Maoists. In these 
areas, there is no presence of  [the] RTF campaign, and I don’t think that 
they would be allowed either’.19 In state Y, a state with tracts of  forested 
areas completely under LWE control, our interviewee stated that,
The core RTF and the core violence of  those two areas are very different. The 
reason being that initially again, the presence of  civil society groups in those 
[the LWE] areas was very thin. And those that were there, were pushed out 
by the state. It was not feasible for activist groups to remain active there on 
any issue.20
And yet, he noted, ‘For the RTF this has been a sore point, that there 
was never a feasible strategy of  how to cover those areas’.21 In state X by 
contrast, the RTF worked ‘more or less everywhere or rather anywhere’.22
Several activists challenge the narrative of  widespread LWE-led 
terror and believe that the state was using the presence of  LWE as 
an excuse to repress populations and censor civil society groups. One 
interviewee observed that the government was deliberately exaggerating 
the presence of  LWEs for its own ends. ‘We are in the block that is 
considered to be Naxal affected, but we have not seen their presence 
that much. We feel that it is a myth, a myth that has been created to 
terrorise the area. It’s a myth created by the state’.23 In state Y, our 
interviewee noted that, ‘On paper a lot of  the districts are classified 
as LWE… But actually, the violence-affected areas are very small’.24 
Another pointed out that,
Certain parts of  the state have the presence of  Naxalite groups, but these groups 
too are also forced to take a line supporting the people’s demands, apart from 
their own agenda of  armed struggle. Unfortunately, the state has a myopic view 
that treats every resistance by people and every civil society criticism as ‘Maoist’ 
influenced, and tries to tackle these with military repression. This leaves very 
little space for civil society work.25
Making the same point, another noted, ‘If  you do activism, you can be 
branded a Naxal. It is a convenient excuse for the state to come down 
on any form of  activism’.26 Depending upon who is being pilloried, 
an activist from state Z noted, ‘They [the government] at times call 
me the NGO-wala, and at other times they call me Maoist’.27 Overall, 
activists felt that the presence of  Naxals was reducing the space for any 
movement on socioeconomic rights.
The RTF reaction to such labelling by the state was hard-hitting. When 
an RTF activist was implicated in an incident of  violence and branded 
a Naxal, the campaign took an assertive stand denying any links with 
the LWE. ‘We went aggressive, because we felt that if  we didn’t put our 
foot down now, we would be dragged into all kinds of  activities that 
Maoists were involved in’.28 In another state, the RTF was proactive in 
addressing the challenge of  the LWE, which proved to be a successful 
strategy for carving out an independent space.
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The RTF reached out to the Maoist groups. They published pamphlets with 
clear messages which communicated with the Maoist groups by saying that 
‘they’ need to address basic and essential issues of  people. They cannot expect 
the most deprived to be part of  a movement to overthrow the state when they 
are struggling to get one square meal for their families. After the campaign, the 
Maoist groups also started respecting the work of  the RTF and since then they 
have never interfered.29
Yet others observe that LWE groups also have occasionally taken 
up issues of  raising minimum wages and implementation of  the 
MGNREGA (Chandra 2013).
The challenge, though, for the RTF campaign is that, on the ground, 
the lines between various factions of  the LWE groups, civil society 
organisations, and grass-roots movements are rather blurred. In an 
environment where the local state is weak and possibly captured, 
alliances and adversaries are fluid and changing:
In [X] state, there is a general problem of  criminalisation, corruption, and 
extreme backwardness… Sometimes there is some sort of  a nexus between the 
Maoists, pseudo-Maoists, anti-maoists, police-sponsored gangs, and all kinds 
of  factions. Basically, in these areas, democratic institutions are not functioning, 
and that makes the situation worse.30
5 Competition or coexistence?
The presence of  LWE in areas where the RTF campaign is increasingly 
active raises the question of  whether the groups compete for the support 
of  the local population, and how the LWE groups view the work of  
the RTF campaign and vice versa. As highlighted earlier, for the most 
part, they seem to be operating independently, sometimes in the same 
locations. Two factors seem to maintain this separation: on the one side, 
the perspective of  the LWE groups on working with state institutions 
and programmes such as the PDS, and on the other side, the relative 
lower priority for the RTF campaign regarding raising issues of  land 
rights, though in some states they are raising issues of  forest rights.
As others have pointed out, in contrast to mainstream communist 
groups that have focused on rights over natural resources and to 
minimum wages as a step towards Indian socialism, LWE groups 
view the primary power structures in rural India as semi-feudal, 
with the Indian state continuing the feudal traditions of  the colonial 
state (Prasad 2010). Thus, LWE groups are against the state itself, 
rather than attempting to make the state responsive. Similarly, rather 
than critique capitalism and neoliberal policies, LWE groups are 
not ‘against the intrusion of  the market’, a point illustrated by their 
position on the issue of  forest produce such as tendu patta which was 
nationalised by the government with set prices (ibid.: 13). Their struggle 
was to denationalise, and force middlemen in the market to pay 
reasonable prices.
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These positions are unsurprisingly instrumental. As Prasad notes, ‘The 
attitude of  the “Maoists” towards traders and contractors was guided by 
meeting the short-term interests of  the tribal people in order to organize 
them in their support’ (ibid.: 13). The LWE strategy of  supporting their 
own cadres is based on divisions between the chhapparmar zone (raiding 
zone) and the ‘liberated’ areas where they are in full control. The main 
source of  income is by imposing informal taxation (rangdari) on people 
and natural resources in the raiding zone (Prasad 2010; Chandra 2013). 
Such organisation of  LWE groups goes some way in explaining their 
attitudes to the RTF campaign.
Thus, for the most part, the RTF campaign has found little interference 
in their work, as basic needs of  the marginalised, such as food, cannot 
be opposed without invoking the antagonism of  local populations. To 
illustrate, one activist pointed out,
They don’t think much of  these schemes [food entitlement programmes]. 
But they wouldn’t undermine it either. They know that food is important for 
people. So if  that’s the case, then their presence makes no difference to us. They 
don’t interfere with the RTF campaign either. The RTF campaign works in 
many areas which has presence of  Maoist groups.31
Foremost, the lack of  interest also stems from their political position. 
LWE groups do not want to back or improve any initiatives taken by the 
government for food security. One RTF activist noted,
They think of  us as reformists who are talking nonsense… they think of  
the RTF as some NGO initiative that negotiates with the government for 
things. That is their biggest contention with us, the fact that we are constantly 
negotiating with the government.32
Some view such a position as having lost them some support:
It is a bit of  their lack of  thinking. If  they would have supported MGNREGA 
and opposed criminal siphoning of  money, they would have gained a lot of  ground 
support. But for them, anything that is within the system is not worth it.33
Instead we were told, ‘The Maoists, the party, does not interfere with 
these schemes and programmes. They take money from the contractors 
and vendors, so far as I know they would not interfere with the PDS or 
MGNREGA’.34
Yet, on occasion, the two sides have worked on the same issues, albeit 
not together:
The left groups are also acknowledging the need to address basic people’s 
issue. Say, when the hunger deaths happened, we responded. These incidents 
have made them realise that people need food and they can’t keep waiting for 
revolution on empty stomach. They are also engaging on these issues.35
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In another state, ‘The Maoist groups have tacitly supported our work. 
For instance, during the hunger death incidents, the Maoist groups 
also worked to supply food grains in the village; before this they would 
mostly remain ignorant to such incidents’.36
Beyond non-interference with groups working on basic needs such as 
the RTF, LWE groups also surprisingly found that the RTF movement 
did not intrude on a core issue that they were advancing, that of  land 
rights. Such a position from the RTF movement, particularly in these 
states, needs some explanation. Although the issue of  land rights (and 
related forest rights) and reforms underpin food security and have 
always been on the broader agenda of  the RTF movement, with the 
exception of  a few groups they have not been taken up actively.37
One reason for this was that the RTF movement originated from the 
PUCL case and the orders that flowed from that, and the broadening 
of  the campaign issues only occurred later. A related possibility, one that 
we could not confirm, was that the RTF movement, through the PUCL 
case, was engaging with the state around resources it already had, 
whereas the issue of  land rights and natural resources run up against 
powerful private and political interests, and therefore lack political 
champions. Yet another reason was that, as discussed earlier, civil society 
groups in these states are viewed with suspicion, and any group that 
called for land rights could be dubbed terrorists and their work would 
be hindered. As an activist noted,
The RTF has moved from agitation to strategic intervention, where they oppose 
the government a lot more on paper, but also work with them and make alliances 
with them strategically to improve the implementation of  different schemes… The 
confrontational mode limits the degree of  intervention.38
Or as another activist from another state put it:
RTF has maintained a strategic relationship with the government. They work 
hand in hand with the state and influence policy matters. Therefore, as a strategy 
they often avoid getting into an overtly conflicting situation with the state… as they 
have been able to acquire space to work within the system, they would rather not 
compromise the space.39
Yet, in state Y, there was some disagreement on this from one of  our 
interviewees. He noted, ‘The areas of  land rights and the areas of  
Naxals, those are also very different’.40 The argument was that in that 
state, the tribals were not being displaced from their lands, there was no 
mining happening there – it was in other locations that the land issues 
were salient, yet those were not LWE-dominated.
Although the collective statement of  the RTF campaign does state the 
importance of  land, it could have greater emphasis. Some activists saw 
it as a missed opportunity:
Criticism has always been there from left groups as well as groups working on 
displacements and land right issues. They always tell us that we revolve around 
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the government and on schemes and subsidies. We do little to question larger issues 
of  inequality and inequity, issues of  land and displacement. But we are also 
moving towards that. We feel that it is needed to address these issues, but there is 
need to address basic needs of  people like food and ration. We are thus moving 
from the food security to food sovereignty.41
I think, we as the campaign have failed to make these connections. The connections 
between dispossessions and people’s claims on local natural resources on the one 
hand and the demand for entitlement of  say, food and employment on the other. I 
think the main reason is that in the case of  displacement movements, the state is 
seen as the enemy, it is in fact the enemy, but that is not the only role that the state 
plays. It also plays a constructive role. When we are making claims on the state, 
the assumption is that the state is in a constructive role. I think there is no tension 
in seeing that the state has on the one hand a repressive role and on the other hand 
a constructive role. But for most people, it’s one or the other. That is the tension 
and the gap that we have not been able to address. But it can be done.42
Since the election of  2014, with a massive Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) victory at the national level, there has been a shift in the political 
environment, with a government that is friendly to business groups and 
which views conventional civil society as threatening. The subnational 
level too has seen changes of  government, which combined with the 
reluctance of  the central government to support rights, has meant that 
RTF campaigns in these states have lost valuable allies. These allies until 
then had enabled them to collaborate and at the same time advocate 
and demand accountability. Since 2014, there has been a shift from 
the previous government’s support for rights-based legislations and 
schemes that they had introduced. Though instances of  land acquisition 
and mass-scale displacement had begun post-1990s, the biggest 
displacement struggle43 due to the Sardar Saravor Dam has intensified 
in the last five years. Coupled with threats of  targeting and surveillance 
by the government on members of  civil society participating in so-called 
‘anti-state’ activities, this lack of  support for rights-based approaches 
has further led to shrinking democratic space (Chandhoke 2017). As a 
result, the RTF campaigns in the states are working on smaller issues 
that can sustain the momentum of  the campaign, while not invoking the 
wrath of  the state. Strategies have shifted:
There are softer forms of  action, writing to the collector, organising a meeting. 
We avoid such actions, such as sitting on hunger strike, it gets noticed by 
media… it is more confrontational… so, do smaller forms that are viewed as 
less threatening.44
In such a context, the presence of  LWE has seriously reduced the space 
for any action, and the outlook for further expansion of  rights-based 
work is poor.
6 Conclusions
This article has traced how a relatively successful national campaign on 
the Right to Food reached back to mobilise support at the grass roots 
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in new locations; particularly those affected by fragility, conflict, and 
violence. The process, as we saw, involved a meeting in the middle, 
where the RTF brought new framings and issues to existing groups 
that were already working with vulnerable populations. The ability of  
the newly formed networks around food at the state level to mobilise 
support, however, depended upon the reaction of  the armed groups to 
such work. In the case of  the LWE-affected states in India, they coexist 
without infringing on the spaces being occupied by the other.
The perception of  the state towards LWE serves to enable their 
coexistence. LWE groups are seen by the state simultaneously 
as benevolent actors striving to bring justice to the people most 
marginalised by the neoliberal state, while at the same time as a security 
threat due to the ‘means’ that they use. This perception, and the 
strategy of  the RTF campaign to work with the state, provides both 
RTF and LWE ideological common ground to coexist and cooperate in 
delivering rights and entitlements to a marginalised population rather 
than being in conflict with each other.
Moreover, the passage of  the National Food Security Act in 2013, 
and the change of  government in 2014 has further complicated the 
contested political field between the democratic state, the Maoist 
movements, and the RTF campaign in India. For the RTF movement, it 
has sharpened the focus of  its campaigns at the state level, as there is a 
greater role for monitoring the implementation of  the act and ensuring 
better access for the people to its entitlements. However, with the overall 
shift to a hostile political environment for civil society groups carrying 
out accountability work since the election of  the BJP government in 
2014, both LWE groups as well as civil society have had to rethink their 
strategies. How the new dynamics will play out in the long run remains 
to be seen.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
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1 Anuradha Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, 
UK.
2 Aheli Chowdhury, Independent Consultant.
3 In this article we use the term left-wing extremism (LWE) or left-wing 
extremist groups (LWE groups), Maoists, or Naxals interchangeably, 
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to indicate a large number of  organisations inspired by Maoist 
ideology, and whose primary aim was to foster revolution against 
state structures. These groups are colloquially called Naxalites. 
All forms of  Naxalite organisations have been deemed terrorist 
organisations under Indian law.
4 Exceptions include the short section devoted to this by Birchfield and 
Corsi (2010: 723); Krishnan and Subramaniam (2014); and more 
recently Pande and Houtzager (2016).
5 We carried out interviews with national- and state-level activists of  
the RTF campaign between late 2017 and early 2018. The names 
of  the interviewees as well as the names of  the states have been 
anonymised for protection of  the interviewees. For obvious reasons, 
we did not interview people from the LWE groups, and this is one of  
the limitations of  the analysis presented here.
6 RTF foundation statement, see www.righttofoodcampaign.in/about/
foundation-statement.
7 See newspaper pieces at www.righttofoodcampaign.in/food-act/
articles.
8 See www.righttofoodcampaign.in/events.
9 The Fifth Schedule states that all scheduled areas of  the country 
which are forest reserves and inhabited by scheduled tribes are to 
be administered by the governors of  the states by appointing 
tribal advisory councils with tribal representatives from the relevant 
forest reserve or scheduled area. The Ninth Schedule of  the 
Constitution dealt with the fact that cultivable land which over 
thousands of  years had come under the ownership of  upper castes 
should be acquired by the government and redistributed among 
India’s landless peasantry.
10 The latter is banned and operates underground, though it has ‘open 
fronts’ which continue to function.
11 https://odishapolice.gov.in/?q=node/69.
12 The argument is based on a close reading of  a report commissioned 
by the Planning Commission (2008).
13 The RTF campaign itself  is not funded by any national or 
international organisation. See www.righttofoodcampaign.in/about/
finance.
14 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
15 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
16 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
17 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
18 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
19 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
20 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
21 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
22 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
23 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
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24 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
25 Written interview conducted with interviewee CT, 16 November 2017.
26 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
27 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
28 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
29 Phone interview conducted with interviewee SD, 2 November 2017.
30 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
31 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
32 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
33 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
34 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
35 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
36 Phone interview conducted with interviewee SD, 2 November 2017.
37 For example, in the 2004 convention in Bhopal, Jean Drèze 
noted, ‘Land rights is another issue on which a strong need was 
felt for coordinated action. Various proposals were made at the 
workshop on “land rights and food sovereignty” and concrete 
decisions on this are likely to be taken quite soon at follow-up 
gatherings’. See https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl2114/
stories/20040716006012500.htm. Yet these have not featured 
prominently in RTF campaign demands.
38 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
39 Phone interview conducted with interviewee SD, 2 November 2017.
40 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
41 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
42 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
43 Displacement figures estimate more than 50,000 people across three 
states of  Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra,  
www.narmada.org/sardar-sarovar/sc.ruling/Displacement.rehab.html.
44 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
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Civilian Action in Conflict Settings: 
The Case of Colombia*
Patricia Justino1
Abstract This article analyses how social and political action among civilians 
during violent conflict may affect efforts to sustain peace and strengthen 
peace-building processes in the post-conflict period. The main argument 
advanced is that forms of social and political action that emerge in conflict 
settings – and their evolution and effects on societies in the post-conflict 
period – are shaped by interactions between civilians and armed actors that 
control territories during the conflict period. These pathways are illustrated 
through the case of Colombia and used to derive implications for other 
countries grappling with the fragility of post-conflict processes.
Keywords: social and political action, civilian resistance, armed groups, 
conflict, violence, Colombia.
1 Introduction
Social cohesion and strong civic engagement have been widely 
promoted as central to peace-building and state-building efforts in 
conflict-affected countries. Efforts to support social and political action 
in such contexts include the financing of  civil society organisations, 
mechanisms to integrate ex-combatants into civilian life, and 
interventions to strengthen state–citizen accountability. These policies 
are based on the implicit assumption that violent conflict results in the 
destruction of  civic structures. Consequently, improving the ability of  
civil society to act and cooperate will sustain peace and stability.
However, recent evidence has shown that the relationship between 
armed conflict and social and political action among citizens is more 
complex than this. First, it is not clear that armed conflict will always 
damage the social and political fabric of  communities. In fact, recent 
empirical research has shown that exposure to violence may result in 
positive forms of  civic engagement and social cooperation (Bellows 
and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Voors et al. 2012). Second, it is also 
not clear that improving social and political action in conflict contexts 
will always result in positive outcomes, since social mobilisation at the 
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community level may facilitate the outbreak or renewal of  violence 
(Petersen 2001; Pinchotti and Verwimp 2007; Wood 2003).
The main purpose of  this article is to advance the conceptual 
understanding of  how social and political action within and between 
communities during violent conflict may affect efforts to sustain and 
strengthen peace-building processes in the post-conflict period. The main 
argument advanced is that forms of  social and political action that emerge 
in conflict settings – and their evolution and effects in the post-conflict 
period – are shaped by interactions between civilians and armed (state and 
non-state) actors that control territories during the conflict period.
In contexts of  violent conflict, power and authority are fragmented. 
Different political actors – insurgent groups, but also the state military 
and other armed actors – contest and sometimes win control of  
territories and populations, transforming social, economic, and 
political structures, organisations, institutions, and norms (Justino 2009, 
2012, 2013; Kalyvas 2006; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). These 
actors can adopt various strategies that range from attacking civilians, 
displacing them, and looting their assets, to capturing or creating new 
social, economic, and political institutions that advance war strategies 
(Arjona 2016; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011). At 
the same time, despite the control exercised by armed groups and the 
stress of  living under the threat of  violence, civilians can shape to some 
extent how these strategies are set in place through either engaging with 
or resisting armed groups (Arjona 2016; Gáfaro, Ibáñez and Justino 
2014; Justino 2013; Kaplan 2017).
To illustrate how some of  these mechanisms operate on the ground, 
this article explores how relations between armed political actors and 
civilians emerged and evolved in Colombia during the 60-year-long 
conflict and the implications of  these various forms of  social and 
political action for the ongoing (albeit fragile) peace process.
Colombia is a relevant case study for this analysis for several reasons. 
First, the length of  the conflict and the enormous work done by 
academics and civil society to document conflict dynamics over this 
period allow us to analyse changes in social and political action, 
something that is rarely possible. Second, areas of  Colombia were ruled 
by a variety of  groups at different times with large variations in how 
they related to the local populations (Berry, Hellman and Solaún 1980; 
Mampilly 2011; Gáfaro et al. 2014). This enables the study to uncover 
the different factors that may shape social and political action under 
different political, economic, and social conditions. Third, Colombia is 
undergoing a peace process whereby the main guerrilla group (FARC) 
– which controlled over 40 per cent of  Colombia’s territory at various 
stages during the conflict – is negotiating a peace settlement with the 
government. We are therefore able to examine to some extent how 
patterns of  social and political action play into post-conflict periods, 
which is of  wider relevance.
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2 Social and political action in conflict contexts: a conceptual discussion
The complex interactions between armed groups, civilians, and state 
actors, and the forms of  social and political action that result from 
them and shape them, remain under-researched. This is in part because 
understanding the social and institutional dynamics and legacies of  
armed conflicts implies understanding interactions not only between 
governments and armed groups – the type of  inquiry that has so far 
dominated the study of  civil wars and political conflict – but also 
between these competing warring factions and the civilian population. 
For a long time, civilians have been largely portrayed in studies of  
violent conflict as victims and passive agents. Only recently have 
scholars started to analyse how processes of  violent conflict may be 
shaped by the choices, preferences, and behaviours, not only of  elites 
and states, but also of  civilians living in conflict areas (Arjona 2016; 
Justino 2013, 2016; Kalyvas 2006; Kaplan 2017).
Recent literature on armed conflict has started to analyse in detail 
how armed groups behave in conflict areas. Such groups control local 
populations in various ways including violence and predation, but also 
formal rules of  governance (Mampilly 2011). Several factors explain 
why armed groups behave in either more predatory or conciliatory 
ways towards local populations in different conflicts, and at different 
times during the same conflict. These factors include the need to raise 
revenue, exercise political authority, control territory, win hearts and 
minds, strengthen organisational structures, and gather information 
(Kalyvas 2006; Mampilly 2011, 2015; Weinstein 2007). Weinstein 
(2007) argues that armed group behaviour is shaped by their initial 
endowments: armed groups with external financing and access to 
resources may be more likely to behave in predatory ways.
In contrast, armed groups that are dependent on local populations 
for economic survival and manpower may adopt forms of  rule and 
collaboration and attempt to establish social order. For instance, 
Sánchez de la Sierra (2015) shows that in the Democratic Republic of  
Congo armed groups rule, govern, and adopt state-like behaviour when 
they are able to tax particular commodities, allowing them longer time 
horizons to plan and rule. Kalyvas (2006) argues that armed groups may 
attempt to govern and establish order when this offers some advantage 
over opposing groups (including the state military) by ensuring local 
population support and territorial control.
How do civilians respond to these strategies? Civilians tend to leave (or 
are made to leave) their communities when armed groups approach. 
However, although many civilians are killed or displaced during armed 
internal conflicts, many stay during the outbreak of  conflicts and carry 
on with their lives (Engel and Ibáñez 2007; Moore and Shellman 
2004). Generally, civilians are more likely to stay in areas of  conflict 
and engage with armed groups when they are economically vulnerable 
(Justino 2006, 2009), and when armed groups offer protection against 
violence committed by opposing factions (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). 
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Civilians that are able to fend for themselves economically and in terms 
of  security provision may also stay in conflict areas, when their interests 
match those of  armed groups, or where they have the capacity to resist 
the arrival and dominance of  armed groups over their communities 
(Justino 2009).
When civilians stay in areas of  armed group control, they can adopt 
various strategies of  collaboration with or resistance to those groups. In 
doing so, civilians engage in social and political actions whereby they 
exercise their agency in a variety of  ways (Bouvier 2006; García Durán 
2006; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003). Many endure the presence of  armed 
actors by obeying their rules while carrying on their daily lives. Some 
may participate voluntarily in armed groups or support them through 
local forms of  clientelism, patronage, kinship, and other informal 
links, or the formation of  new alliances and relations. In particular, 
local populations may seek physical and economic protection from the 
controlling armed groups, especially when the state is weak, inadequate, 
or abusive, or when there is danger of  being attacked by opposing 
factions (Goodwin 2001; Justino 2009; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). In 
these cases, civilians may decide to initiate forms of  social and political 
action that facilitate alliances, and political and economic relations 
with local powerful actors (Sarmiento Anzola 1998). Some may even 
actively support and participate in the groups and their war activities, 
particularly when there is a strong alignment of  preferences and beliefs 
between civilians and armed groups, along economic, ethnic, religious, 
or political lines. In many of  these cases, the armed groups may 
themselves be part of  the community or represent them in a particular 
wider social struggle, as Wood (2003: 18–19) has shown in relation to 
peasant communities in El Salvador.
Civilians may also choose to resist by refusing to comply with the actions 
or to accept the presence of  armed groups in their midst. Resistance 
can take several forms, use violent or non-violent means, and be more 
or less covert (Bouvier 2006; García Durán 2006; Petersen 2001; Wood 
2003). Open, violent resistance methods include armed self-defence 
groups, such as the Kamajor in Sierra Leone or paramilitary groups in 
El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia (Brockett 1990; Wood 2008). Covert 
resistance methods include forms of  veiled opposition, described by 
James C. Scott as the ‘weapons of  the weak’ (Scott 1985); for example, 
acting as informants to opposing factions, undermining the activities of  
the groups, or forming hidden resistance groups (Arjona 2016; Petersen 
2001; Wood 2003; Funes 1998; Fumerton 2001). Resistance can also be 
limited to certain specific actions taken by armed groups, which Arjona 
(2015) defines as ‘partial resistance’.
Resistance may lead to substantial gains in terms of  civilian autonomy 
and ability to conduct their lives and access livelihoods (Kaplan 2017). 
However, negotiating with armed groups and resisting some of  their 
advances also has substantial costs including the risk of  death, injury, 
displacement, or ostracism, when armed groups act to repress resistance 
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(Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Kaplan 2017). In the specific case of  
Colombia, Arjona (2016: 305) reports how communities with high 
capacity for collective action were specifically targeted and victimised by 
armed groups, particularly when the areas were strategically important, 
but also using ‘violence as a measurement tool’ to establish the strength 
of  local collective action.
Local communities exhibit very different capacity to resist armed 
groups or engage in collective forms of  social and political action. This 
capacity has to do largely with the strength of  local institutions (Arjona 
2016), their economic capacity (Justino 2009), and the ways in which 
social cooperation emerges in different communities (Justino 2015, 
2017a). As argued in Kaplan (2017: 9), ‘social cohesion affords civilians 
greater changes to overcome fear, break the “law of  silence” and revive 
communication, and implement collective strategies for protection’. The 
capacity of  communities to organise can also be supported by external 
actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international 
donors through technical and financial assistance (Kaplan 2017).
Overall, the exercise of  agency by civilians appears to depend on two 
key factors. The first is the behaviour of  local armed groups (including 
rebel groups and state authorities). The second are local socioeconomic 
characteristics. Figure 1 illustrates in a static way the choices faced 
by civilians in conflict-affected areas depending on the strategy of  
the armed actors in that location at that time, recognising that these 
Figure 1 Patterns of civilian agency in conflict contexts
Source Author’s own.
Communities with high 
institutional and economic 
capacity: 
Civilian resistance
Establish rule and order
Armed actor behaviour 
towards civilians
Civilian preferences align to 
armed groups:
Civilian collaboration
Civilian preferences not 
aligned with armed groups:
Civilian resistance
Communities with low 
institutional and economic 
capacity: 
Civilian displacement
Predation
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may evolve and change as the conflict progresses, and different social, 
economic, and political dynamics unfold.2 In situations of  predatory 
behaviour, civilians (that have not been killed or displaced) may be 
more likely to either obey or move given the high threat of  violence. 
In situations where armed groups decide to rule and establish order, 
civilians will resist if  they have the institutional or economic capacity 
to do so (Arjona 2016; Boix 2008), or they will obey and collaborate 
if  their interests align with the armed groups or they do not have the 
institutional or economic capacity to resist (Justino 2009; Arjona 2016). 
This framework predicts that forms of  social and political action among 
civilians to resist armed groups thus occur in two settings: communities 
with high institutional and economic capacity and communities where 
civilian interests are at odds with those with armed groups. The next 
sections explore these two factors in the case of  the Colombian conflict.
3 The Colombian case
Colombia has been characterised by profound forms of  social and 
institutional transformation as a result of  decades of  armed conflict 
(Gáfaro et al. 2014). With origins in fighting that erupted in the 1940s 
between the two main political parties, the Liberal and Conservative 
parties (Sánchez and Meertens 2001), the conflict was the result of  
centuries of  disagreements over the organisation of  Colombian society 
and polity, and led to over 200,000 deaths between 1948 and 1958. 
Violence subsided with the formation of  the National Front, a political 
settlement that ensured power-sharing between the two main parties, 
but which did not accommodate the demands of  peasant organisations 
and other left-wing political movements.
Peasant organisations that emerged during the period of  La Violencia 
(1948–58) turned into left-wing guerrilla groups during the early 
1960s. The strongest guerrilla group was the FARC, which grew from 
850 combatants in 1978 to more than 16,000 in 2000 across 66 fronts 
(Kaplan 2017). The second guerrilla group was the National Liberation 
Army (ELN), formed in 1962. The ELN had about 4,500 combatants 
in 2000 but undertook almost the same number of  kidnappings and 
attacks as the FARC (ibid.). In later years, the emergence of  the illegal 
drug trade intensified the conflict by providing resources to left-wing 
guerrilla groups, and promoting the creation of  private armies led 
by paramilitary groups for the protection of  drug barons and large 
landowners.
The expansion of  paramilitary groups grew after a failed peace process 
with the guerrilla groups in the 1980s, and led to an intensification 
of  the conflict and to greater violence during the 1990s (Sánchez and 
Chacón 2006). These groups were united in 1997 under the umbrella 
of  the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and became heavily 
involved in the illegal drug trade and in brutal forms of  violence against 
civilians. Levels of  violence started to drop in the early 2000s, as a result 
of  Colombian government military intervention under President Uribe 
and the demobilisation of  paramilitary groups in 2003. More recently, 
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in 2016, the FARC and the Government of  Colombia signed a 
historical peace agreement that is expected to finally herald the end of  
the conflict.
The Colombian conflict has been characterised by large levels of  
displacement: more than 7 million people have been displaced, second 
only to the recent conflict in Syria.3 However, many communities 
have remained in areas where armed groups have been present and 
conflict ongoing (Engel and Ibáñez 2007), exercising various forms of  
agency (Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017). The presence of  different armed 
groups and their strategic objectives influenced local social relations 
and organisations due to their imposition of  norms of  behaviour and 
economic and political regulations (Gáfaro et al. 2014). These strategies 
debilitated many social networks and community organisations.
Some communities adapted to the presence of  either the FARC or the 
paramilitaries. Others have supported the FARC or paramilitary groups 
through a variety of  ways (Arjona 2016). In some areas, community 
organisations became a protection against violence, while in others armed 
groups faced open civilian resistance. Resistance also took non-violent 
forms with communities creating new, apparently non-political, 
organisations, such as sports, religious, and cultural organisations, to 
avoid being targeted (Gáfaro et al. 2014). There has been, therefore, 
a long tradition of  social and political action during the conflict in 
Colombia, with large variation in strength and the nature of  actions 
undertaken by different social groups across the country and across time 
(Bouvier 2009; Kaplan 2017). The sections below discuss the role of  key 
groups and organisations in these forms of  social and political action.
3.1 Labour unions and peasant associations
The important role of  labour unions during the Colombian conflict 
goes back to the period of  La Violencia when they were associated with 
the emergence of  a left-wing movement to protect workers against 
industrialists and large landowners. In the subsequent period, labour 
unions were largely eradicated by a series of  regimes and leaders backed 
by the US, who feared working-class radicalism and a move towards 
communism (Kofas 2000). This significantly weakened the labour 
movement, with a lasting impact on the unions’ role in combating 
powerful (and often violent) economic and social interests. However, 
their legacies remained, leading in some cases to effective resistance 
against the presence and control of  armed groups in more recent 
decades (Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017).
A similar process took place among peasant associations (Thomson 
2011). In the 1920s, peasants organised and successfully resisted land 
grabs by powerful political actors, and mobilised to protest against 
low wages and poor working conditions. Some peasants formed 
‘self-defence’ communities to protect themselves from eviction in the 
form of  ‘agrarian unions’ or ‘peasant leagues’. During the period 
of  La Violencia in the 1940s, many peasants fled persecution and 
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joined existing armed resistance communities. In the 1960s, ‘peasant 
resistance communities’ formed during the period of  La Violencia 
re-started their actions in attempts to retain control of  areas threatened 
by displacement. These resistance communities were known as 
‘independent republics’ since they were self-governing, and became 
targets of  military attacks. Some of  these communities became part 
of  armed groups, such as the FARC, who took advantage of  the ready 
formation of  group capital to begin supporting small-scale farmer 
groups with land claims and to start a campaign to politicise peasant 
(campesino) groups (Vallejo 1986). Other campesino groups were given 
money and training by the government as ‘self-defence groups’, while 
others resisted outside interference (Thomson 2011).
Arjona (2016) documents one such example in the municipality of  
Viotá in the Cundinarmaca department, which was the site of  one 
of  the strongest revolutionary agrarian movements across Colombia 
between the 1930s and the 1950s. In response to slavery-like working 
conditions, peasants working in large haciendas in Viotá organised and 
demanded better conditions and the re-organisation of  land tenure 
systems. Soon the municipality became the centre of  communism in 
Colombia. Arjona (2016) discusses how the success of  this movement, 
the institutions it created (notably, mechanisms to guarantee property 
rights, forms of  dispute adjudication, and self-governing institutions) 
and the resulting increased institutional capacity for collective action 
was followed, years later, by effective resistance by self-defence groups 
against the control of  the FARC and paramilitary groups.
3.2 The role of Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups
Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups played important roles in 
resistance and social and political action against the civil war and armed 
groups. Colombia’s population comprises several ethnic groups, with 
Afro-Colombians comprising around one quarter. According to the 
National Indigenous Organization of  Colombia (ONIC), there are also 
over 100 indigenous groups across the country, comprising around 3 per 
cent of  the total population. Both Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
groups have been heavily affected by the conflict due to their dependency 
on land, often coveted by armed groups (Arjona 2016; Troyan 2008). 
Indigenous groups were particularly active during the conflict in rescuing 
kidnapped victims, resolving local conflicts, and protesting against the 
presence and actions of  armed groups (Kaplan 2017).
Several studies have documented the role of  these groups during and 
in the aftermath of  the conflict. For instance, Baumeister (2007) looks 
at how indigenous groups in Bajo Atrato, Chocó used their sense of  
identity to build strong social networks and organisational structure, 
which ultimately they used for resistance against repression and 
violence. At the national level, this structure comprised the ONIC, 
a federation of  local regional councils. At the regional level, cabildos 
mayors became institutions through which indigenous communities were 
officially recognised as groups and interacted with each other. At the 
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community level, cabildos locales were formed within communities using 
traditional structures of  authority. Baumeister’s (2007) study shows, 
in line with the predictions in Figure 1, that the creation of  a strong 
organisational structure has been key in enabling resistance to armed 
groups, especially to forced displacement. This was done through a 
community-led approach that reports human rights violations at the 
local level, and exercises pressure on government institutions. The 
ONIC has also formed links with international organisations. Although 
they were still heavily targeted and affected by violence throughout the 
conflict and much remains to be done, some important achievements 
by these communities have included the reclaiming of  indigenous land, 
the protection of  heritage and culture, the creation of  local security 
mechanisms, and the organisation of  protests against violations of  their 
human rights (Hernández Delgado 2009; see also Arjona 2015).
Afro-descendent communities have engaged in similar forms of  
resistance by forming networks of  black communities across Colombia 
(Hernández Delgado 2009). Gains have been less visible than those 
among indigenous communities but, despite some institutional 
limitations and sometimes heavy loss of  lives, these movements resulted 
in more formal recognition of  their identity, heritage, and historical 
collective property rights, some gains in electoral representation in 
local councils, the reduction of  the intensity of  armed conflict in their 
communities, the prevention of  forced displacement and return of  
some displaced communities to their land, and the establishment of  
‘community shops’, which guarantee food security when armed conflict 
escalated and food was restricted (ibid.).
3.3 Peace communities
There is a long history of  peace communities in Colombia; 
communities which have managed to organise peaceful resistance to 
armed groups during the civil war. Some either originated or gave rise 
to the peasant, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian movements discussed 
in previous sections. Naucke (2017) describes the well-documented case 
of  San Jose de Apartado, where community members were successful 
in keeping armed groups at bay (see also Kaplan 2017). Two main 
historical factors shaped their ability to do this: the selective presence 
of  the state, and the ability of  the civilian population to politically and 
economically self-organise. The community of  San Jose was formed 
by persecuted and displaced people during the period of  La Violencia, 
who came to live on unoccupied land after being forced to migrate 
from other areas. They therefore came with shared experiences of  
displacement and disruption of  social relations, all starting anew. 
These factors, alongside the physical isolation of  the community and 
detachment from state institutions and social infrastructure, facilitated 
the development of  strong social cohesion, local identity, and solidarity, 
and the consequent high levels of  institutional capacity to resist.
Burnyeat (2013) describes similar community organisation and 
resistance in Uraba, Colombia through CAVIDA (Comunidad de 
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Auto-Determinacion, Vida y Dignidad) and its Humanitarian Zones in 
Cacarica. CAVIDA was formed by people living in refugee camps after 
being forcibly evicted by the paramilitaries, with the aim of  reclaiming 
their land. The idea was to form a peaceful resistance movement, 
to ‘claim justice, and denounce violations and corruption, aiming to 
transform the conflict and strengthen the peasant communities’ (Burnyeat 
2013: 438). Community members achieved their objectives by forming 
‘Humanitarian Zones’, which made use of  international humanitarian 
law to distinguish between combatants and civilians and demarcate 
safe spaces for civilians. Although peace communities became a target 
for armed groups, they were deterred from taking over the community 
in many instances due to support offered by high-profile international 
organisations. CAVIDA was legitimised by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, which backed and used its networks with 
national and international NGOs to denounce violations and threats 
against communities by armed groups. Similar peace communities 
have been documented in the Middle Magdalena Valley, in the Oriente 
Antioqueno, in Montes de Maria, and in Putumayo (Bouvier 2009).
3.4 The role of women’s groups
Women were disproportionately affected by the Colombian conflict, 
but also played important roles through a variety of  social and political 
actions. McIlwaine and Moser (2001) discuss how the conflict has created 
extreme levels of  fear, especially in communities affected by paramilitary 
and guerrilla activity, which has led to growing suspicion and a culture 
of  silence, ‘individualism’, and ‘lack of  solidarity’ which affected 
women in particular. Despite these adverse effects, similarly to other 
conflicts (Justino 2017b; Justino, Leone and Salardi 2015), the conflict 
in Colombia has afforded many women the opportunity to occupy local 
public and political roles in the absence of  their male partners, organise 
themselves into groups supporting the search for relatives who have 
been disappeared, captured, or killed by armed actors, and to generally 
broaden their role in the community (Rojas 2009).
Villareal and Ríos (2006) discuss particular resistance movements to 
armed groups in Colombia led by women. Their study argues that 
women-led movements were easier to form in rural areas, due to 
small social groups and interaction between women, which gave rise 
to collective bonds and community projects. Most women’s groups 
that emerged in these contexts were formed as channels for peace but 
had generally other overt purposes such as addressing discrimination, 
poverty, and exclusion. Examples of  such movements include women’s 
groups based around productive work, especially agriculture, which 
strengthened women’s technical knowledge, as well as awareness 
of  democratic rights and leadership skills. Other groups focused on 
creating employment and income for women. These groups have faced 
much resistance in patriarchal communities and among those worried 
about the safety of  the community. As many of  the women’s groups 
go against dominant economic interests, and therefore receive threats, 
some have chosen co-optation or alliances with armed groups to be able 
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to continue their groups in some manner. However, overall, the strength 
of  women’s organisations has created a stronger social fabric, becoming 
a form of  defence against violence caused by war and drug trafficking 
(McIlwaine and Moser 2001; Justino et al. 2012).
4 Outcomes and implications
Section 3 described some key forms of  social and political action that 
have been undertaken by social groups and movements during the 
Colombian conflict. As discussed in Section 2, two key factors shaped 
variation in social and political action across the Colombian territory 
and at different periods of  the conflict. The first was the behaviour 
of  armed groups: those areas where armed groups tended to act in 
predatory ways saw more social movement resistance, by peasant and 
indigenous communities in particular (Arjona 2016). The second, and 
arguably most important factor, was the organisational capacity of  
civilians. Full resistance has only taken place in areas with high-quality 
pre-existing institutions (both legitimate and effective) (Arjona 2015).
The discussion in Section 3 suggested that communities in Colombia 
are also better placed to resist the influence of  armed groups and 
maintain autonomy and self-rule when they are formed by members 
sharing common interests and high levels of  internal cohesion, when 
community leadership is inclusive and able to exercise sufficient balance 
between support and pressure for resistance (even when interests are not 
homogenous), and when they benefit from high levels of  social capital 
over time (Idler, Garrido and Mouly 2015; Kaplan 2017). In the case 
of  peace communities, it is also important to note the role of  external 
actors: support from national and international agencies allowed the 
successful community to build up civil society capacity and helped 
organise groups in support of  peace (Idler et al. 2015).
After almost six decades of  violent conflict, the government of  Colombia 
and the FARC signed a historical peace agreement in 2016. Violence has 
been much reduced across the country, but pockets of  violence remain 
in some areas due to the actions of  neo-paramilitary groups (bandas 
criminales), members of  the National Liberation Army (ELN), and small 
dissident groups within the FARC. There is some evidence of  an increase 
in political and social action and engagement among Colombian citizens 
during the long peace process, particularly among the groups discussed 
above. Although early talks between the government and guerrilla 
groups barely involved civil society actors during the early- to mid-1990s, 
some civil society groups started to be involved in peace initiatives, with 
important roles for women’s groups (Fernández, García Durán and 
Sarmiento 2004; Isacson and Rodríguez 2009).
In 1998, a Permanent Assembly of  Civil Society for Peace (Asamblea 
Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz) was initiated that included 
indigenous and campesino leaders. After the collapse of  the peace talks 
with the FARC in 2002, civil society organised the National Congress 
for Peace and Country (Congreso Nacional Paz y País). Civil society 
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has since had less influence on peace talks nationally, with authorities 
creating less space for them at the negotiating table (Isacson and 
Rodríguez 2009). However, civil society organisations now have some 
influence at the local level through the mobilisation of  indigenous 
groups and women’s organisations, discussed in the previous sections, 
which has contributed to increasing citizen participation in planning, 
governance, and conflict resolution (Delgado 2004).
What are the implications of  these forms of  social and political action 
for peace in Colombia, and more widely in post-conflict contexts? 
The remainder of  this article explores how social and political action 
by citizens influenced the peace process and three areas of  broad 
importance to future peace in Colombia and potentially in other 
countries emerging from conflict (peace and security, accountability, 
and empowerment) and one area where caution must be exercised 
(the potential rise of  parochial politics). The mixed experiences of  
Colombian communities over the last almost six decades of  conflict 
highlight the importance of  security for the exercise of  social and 
political action, but also the trade-offs faced by social and political 
action in either preventing or attracting further violence.
Security
Violent conflict creates fear and distrust among communities, and 
may also erode local social relations (Moser 1999). Participation 
in community action may then be greater in less conflictual areas. 
However, civilian collective agency during the Colombian conflict 
protected individuals and communities against exposure to violence in 
some instances. Communities that were able to ensure autonomy and 
retain sufficient levels of  self-rule in relation to armed groups were able 
to keep violence away from the community, sometimes for the duration 
of  the conflict (Kaplan 2017).
Social and political action during the conflict may have ensured less 
exposure to killings and destruction thanks to more effective patterns 
of  negotiation with armed groups. This may, in turn, facilitate 
recovery in the post-conflict period in terms of  better capacity for 
social organisation, and stronger political capital. It may also mean 
better access to economic resources where land and livelihoods were 
less destroyed, although some communities with a high capacity for 
collective action were also severely targeted by armed groups (Arjona 
2016). Such targeting has continued; as the peace agreement with 
the FARC has progressed, unionists, human rights activists, and other 
civil society groups critical of  the actions of  armed actors have been 
frequently targeted and killed by one or other of  these forces, including 
very recently (Bergquist, Peñaranda and Sánchez 2001; Bouvier 2009; 
Gutiérrez Sanín, Marín Jaramillo and Carranza 2017).4
Accountability
Huang (2016) argues that civil wars can result in democratic systems 
when they are characterised by substantial forms of  civic mobilisation 
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which post-war powerholders respond to in order to maintain power. In 
reality, few civil wars result in truly democratic systems of  governance. 
However, in some cases, gains can be made in terms of  ensuring more 
public authority accountability towards civilian populations. This was 
the case in Colombia, where social and political action by civilians 
improved the accountability of  government institutions towards civil 
society, which is now more involved in the peace process than ever 
before. Social and political action was also used to ensure the autonomy 
of  civilian affairs in some communities and the greater accountability of  
armed actors in control of  those communities during wartime through 
negotiations (Kaplan 2017).
Much remains to be done to ensure that social and political action 
during the conflict results in more accountable government institutions, 
and the inclusion of  civil society organisations in the peace process 
remains patchy. Some agreements to improve the inclusion of  
marginalised groups are also still being ignored in practice,5 while clarity 
with respect to the rights of  farmers involved in illegal crop production, 
and of  returning displaced populations remains limited.6 It is, therefore, 
important that social and political action in Colombia continues to 
strengthen as society moves firmly into the post-conflict period.
Empowerment
Social and political action during the Colombian conflict has arguably 
contributed towards the empowerment of  traditionally socially excluded 
and economically vulnerable groups such as the Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous populations, rural communities, ex-combatants, and 
displaced women (Moser 2005). For instance, women involved in 
peace-building processes have reported raised self-esteem and reduced 
levels of  fear, which in turn has allowed them to participate more in the 
peace process and to speak out against injustices, conflict, and violence 
(ibid.). Some of  these women have taken up opportunities opened by 
the armed conflict in Colombia to build ‘strategic action and agency’. 
This in turn has meant that women’s collective action has helped shape 
the public agenda relating to the conflict (Domingo, Menocal and 
Hinestroza 2015; Pearce 2007). At the group level, several civil society 
organisations involved in social and political action during the conflict 
to resist armed groups and support peace tended also to strengthen their 
internal cohesion over time and thus increase their capacity to carry out 
their aims (Moser 2005). Even though the conflict closed down some 
spaces for social and political action due to fear and violence, some civil 
interactions continued to operate informally. Over the years, this process 
may lay the foundations for social change (Pearce 2007) through an 
increased ‘sense of  citizenship’ among community members.
The pitfalls of ‘parochial’ politics
Despite some of  the positive changes outlined above, it is important 
not to forget that the emergence of  both guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups in Colombia (as in many other conflict-affected countries) had 
its origin in forms of  social and political action in response to political 
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and economic changes. The FARC effectively emerged from the failure 
of  the political system agreed after the period of  La Violencia between 
the Liberal and the Conservative party to accommodate the demands 
of  left-wing groups grounded on peasant associations and fighting 
for land rights. These peasant self-defence groups formed what was 
called ‘independent republics’ that provided important strongholds 
for the emergence of  the FARC as a coherent guerrilla group fighting 
for the rights of  peasants across Colombia (Kaplan 2017; Sánchez 
and Meertens 2001). The paramilitary groups that grew in strength 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s originated also from local self-defence 
groups that formed to protect the interests of  large landowners against 
the attacks of  the FARC and the ELN (Kaplan 2017; Sánchez and 
Meertens 2001). Given this history, it is important that local, national, 
and international peace efforts mitigate social, political, economic, and 
cultural differences in ways that prevent the emergence of  divides along 
‘parochial’ lines and specific group interests that may end up reigniting 
– rather than ending – the conflict.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder. The author is 
grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments 
and to Elena Wason for excellent research assistance.
1 Patricia Justino, Professorial Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, 
UK.
2 A dynamic version of  this framework would take into consideration 
the fact that civilian responses (displacement, resistance, or 
collaboration) are likely to generate second order reactions by armed 
groups in terms of  further predation/repression or the establishment 
of  order. This could be formally modelled using a dynamic game 
theory model.
3 www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia.
4 Between 1999 and 2009, more than 1,000 trade union members 
were killed in Colombia, largely targeted by paramilitaries and 
right-wing groups (Arjona 2016).
5 See, for instance, www.onic.org.co/comunicados-
internacionales/2324-declaracion-politica-del-encuentro-binacional-
indigena-y-popular-colombia-venezuela.
6  See, for instance, www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-drugs/
at-least-six-die-during-colombia-protest-over-coca-crop-removal-
idUSKBN1CB2I6 and Londoño and Mejía (2016).
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